

# THE FORTNIGHTLY

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## THE FADING OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

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**G**REAT causes have their watchwords, and these watchwords, potent for some glorious intervals to change the minds of men, have a tendency to become less potent and even at last to degenerate into faint and ineffective parrot-calls. Is there such a fading process at work in the case of that particular watchword christened with the name of Collective Security? This term is still used as if it had daemonic force and could straightway chase away the spirits of evil from every prospective battle-field of the world. In the Debate on Defence at the beginning of March in the House of Commons, Mr. Lees Smith moved an amendment declaring "that the safety of this country and the maintenance of peace can only be attained through Collective Security under the League of Nations". The Committee of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers trustfully believes that the demons of Discord and Aggressiveness can be exorcized if only the National Government will combine with the other peaceful nations to carry out the same cloud-compelling policy. Soon the Assembly of the League of Nations will be meeting to decide what it will do with Art. XVI. of the Covenant which is the special custodian of the principle. Are the omens favourable? Can the League of Nations save Collective Security from gradual inanition?

What is the real aim and implication of the term? Surely the paramount aim and end of Collective Security, first, last, and all the time, is to make war absolutely impossible, by making war not worth while, by making, that is, the game of war not worth the candle. And that can only be done, under the conditions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, by ensuring the immediate onslaught of such a preponderant and overwhelming force against the possible aggressor, that he must feel absolutely compelled to stay his hand. Observe, however, the



terms of this postulate. First, the force must be really overwhelming, secondly, the force must be immediate and assured. Under any other conditions war is a possible gamble, and the aggressor may very well decide to chance his arm. Collective Security in this case becomes a principle for organizing League Sanctions against the aggressor before, or it may be after, he actually resorts to aggression. It is because he understands Collective Security in the former sense that the pacifist is off in full cry against this Sanctions article of the Covenant as simply a war-like alternative under League patronage to the war of the private aggressor.

Now the problem which confronts us in this paper relates to the question whether Collective Security, where the term is still used, is being understood in its richest and fullest sense or whether, at the coming meeting of the League of Nations, it will be found that this much-trumpeted principle has become such an attenuated phantom that it induces only the faintest quiver of the nerves in a possible aggressor? What, in point of fact, is the record of the League of Nations on the subject? Has it been gradually making the effective force of Collective Security stronger and stronger? Or, on the other hand, has it been making it weaker and weaker?

In answering this pertinent and searching question it cannot be denied that the League of Nations, in the earlier years of its history, made a bold effort to give a gradually more coherent and effective meaning to the principle of Collective Security. In the First Assembly delegates elaborated the Statute of the Permanent Court of Justice. The Second Assembly altered and approved that Statute and amended it in the direction of strengthening the Covenant. The Third Assembly adopted the famous Resolution XIV. declaring that disarmament depends on the real attainment of mutual assistance. The Fourth Assembly elaborated this thesis into the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The Fifth Assembly was probably the most glorious Assembly of all, because it produced the famous Geneva Protocol amid scenes of enthusiasm which can hardly be credited in these colder days. The Protocol was immediately signed by France, Poland, Portugal, Greece Bulgaria, Albania, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, and the



Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes. Although Mr. Arthur Henderson, the British delegate to the Assembly, made certain reservations in his approval, there seemed no reason to believe that the British Government would ultimately decline to ratify. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had made one of the first suggestions towards its inception, and he always claimed that, during his time of office, the Dominions had never fundamentally objected to it. The Protocol itself, remember, was subject, so far as its actual incorporation into the Covenant was concerned, to the calling and successful termination of a Disarmament Conference. A measure of disarmament, therefore, the acid test of the effectiveness of Collective Security, was nearer then than ever before or since.

In one sense, indeed, the Geneva Protocol had seemed to give a poorer meaning to Collective Security than did its predecessor, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. In the latter the Council of the League of Nations was granted a certain amount of real executive power. Whereas by Article XVI. of the Covenant the League could only recommend action to its constituent members, the Council by Article V. of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was authorized not only to recommend but to decide. This was the great objection made to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Lord Parmoor and the leading ground on which they claimed to supersede it by its successor, the Geneva Protocol. It is perfectly clear that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was never at any period of his work for the League of Nations prepared to elevate the principle of Collective Security into an automatic guarantee of international security. The earliest of his systematic books was that on *Socialism and Society*, wherein he supported strongly the idea, then much ventilated by some leading sociologists, that the State is in the strictest and most real sense an organism or organic unity. Now if the State is an organism, in the same sense that the body is an organism, you have an independent and self-sustaining entity—the State of Treitschke and the Fascists and, in some of his moods, of Hegel. Such a State is an end and aim to itself, it prescribes its own code of morality, and cannot obey the behests of an international authority unless or until it has corroborated and ratified such



behests by making them into decisions of its own particular legislative and executive authority. In other words, Mr. MacDonald never accepted Collective Security in the only sense in which it can really make war impossible by permitting the automatic and immediate release of such a formidable and irresistible show of international authority against the aggressor that the latter would shrink back appalled.

Yet, inferior as it was to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance in its acknowledgment of international authority, it cannot be denied that, as I have indicated, the Geneva Protocol was the culminating achievement of the League in the direction of really effective Collective Security. In the first place, it was much more than even the Treaty of Mutual Assistance a measure for the *prevention* of war rather than for organizing a League war when the aggressor had already invaded the land. In the second place, it stopped up those interstices of the Covenant where war was permitted to penetrate by making arbitration ultimately obligatory on every country with a sense of grievance, and by branding that country as an outcast and an aggressor which declined to take advantage of the arbitration thus prescribed to it. In the third place it stowed away, amid the framework of its provisions, many subsidiary non-aggression treaties which, in certain crucial cases, permitted an automatic release of fairly overpowering force against the aggressor, while making the stipulation that this fairly overpowering force could only be launched at the behest and with the concurrence of the Council of the League of Nations. And, in the fourth place, if, in the last resource, the ultimate ratification of a League decision was left in the hands of the constituent States, these States were presumed, and indeed exhorted "loyally and effectively" to support the League as far as their resources and geographical situation permitted.

Besides, it must always be remembered that such exhortations could never be merely idle or ineffective words when the circumstances under which the Protocol was accepted by the League are fairly remembered. On this halcyon day of the League's history there was an immense show of enthusiasm, and it seemed as if a common mind was at last beginning to animate all the particular individualities of the Assembly. A historian



who chronicles the scene compares the situation to that of the thirteen independent colonies of the American Union in 1788. At first when these colonies met in Convention they seemed suspicious and apart and then, as by a great co-ordinating impulse, they came together and formed the nucleus of the United States of America.

In a recent address on an auspicious occasion, Lord Cecil of Chelwood has claimed that for the first ten years of its history the League of Nations preserved a glorious record and went on, in its successful career, from more to more. The thought, however, is unduly optimistic; for, on a more critical survey of the League's history, the thesis of this article is nearer to the fact, and a deterioration of the League's efficiency becomes increasingly visible after the rejection of the Geneva Protocol. There were many indications it is true, that the old ideas had not been wholly forsaken. There was whatever is good in the Treaty of Locarno, of which more will be written anon. There was that impressive but somewhat ineffective proclamation by more than sixty nations known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact which, as Senator Borah once flattered himself, marshalled the moral opinion of the world against war and which certainly gave the movement initiated by the League of Nations an even more international character.

Then there were comings and goings between Herr Stresemann, Sir Austen Chamberlain and M. Briand in hotel lounges at Geneva which at one time induced the world to believe that we were on the eve of the great things in the campaign for the United States of Europe and a world appeasement. There was lastly the somewhat quixotic struggle of Mr. Arthur Henderson to save the credit of the Disarmament Conference, baffled as its efforts were, from the very outset, by the previous rejection of that safeguard of security, the compelling power of the Geneva Protocol. All these were notable things in their way, and they must be for ever remembered; but none of them served to satisfy what has been declared to be the essential requisite of any genuine measure of Collective Security, because they none of them made the aggressor who desired to violate their provisions essay a task which was hopeless from the beginning, and they none of them offered more than the very



faintest possibility that the world in the future would be immune from the plague of war.

It was Sir Austen Chamberlain, however, who was the first to give sustenance to that process of degeneration in the course of which Collective Security gradually faded away into a more and more hopeless indefiniteness. There were many good points about his Treaty of Locarno, it is true. On the western European front, it made the general outlook for peace fairly satisfactory. If the aggressor were to run amok again, his attack would not be directed from the plateau of Lorraine. But then that was the whole tragedy of the consequent situation. A distinction had been made and was henceforth to be emphasized *ad nauseam* between Europe's Eastern and Western fronts. The Western front was sufficiently becalmed for Britain to give a real effective guarantee of collective effort to warn off the aggressor. The Eastern front, on the contrary, was in a very different and more dangerous position; and lively leader-writers and feuilletonists in practically all the great organs of British public opinion assured their readers that Great Britain had no interest in keeping the peace in a part of Europe so remote, or in warning off Germany from what was superficially assumed to be the undoubtedly German territory of the Polish Corridor. But what if it were in precisely these eastern marches of Europe where the imminent danger lay? What if it were there that the aggressor meant to launch the impetuous force of a sudden attack? Sir Austen's mind, well poised and magisterial in its outlook on many diplomatic questions, was curiously narrow and restricted on an all-important problem like this. In the Correspondence between the British and French Foreign Offices which preceded the Treaty of Locarno, the latter made gallant, but unavailing efforts to widen the scope of the Locarno guarantees in the effort to get overwhelming force certainly provided at the most dangerous point of aggression; but time after time the French formulæ were quite brusquely rejected at Downing Street. In his reasons for advising the Conservative Government to refuse the ratification of the Geneva Protocol, too, Sir Austen showed the same narrow spirit and total misapprehension of the evident needs of the situation. He was blind to the crowning merits of the Protocol,



its closing of the avenues in the Covenant that might lead to war and its marshalling of sufficient forces to deter the aggressor. To him the Protocol was simply a way "to preserve peace by organizing war and, it may be, war on the largest scale", and he evidently never realized that even if his diagnosis were right, the result would signify that peace had been really preserved and that the organization of war had succeeded in preserving peace. Besides, by his unwarrantable period of hesitation whilst he kept the fate of the Protocol suspended in the balance, he succeeded in contaminating all that fine atmosphere of ideas in which the Protocol had commended itself to the Assembly of the League of Nations. The Dominions were encouraged to discover that Europe was too far off to merit on their part any deep concern for its troubles. Poland, the Little Entente, and Eastern Europe generally, became suspicious and alarmed. Any effective measure of disarmament was now rendered practically impossible. No idea of any really effective international authority had, in fact, commended itself to the mind of Sir Austen Chamberlain. Equally with Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, he stood up for particular States as the only ultimate dictators of the situation. They and they alone were the powers who must sanction—and consume all the time they pleased before sanctioning any measures taken against the aggressor.

No wonder, then, that from Locarno onwards none of the many schemes for disarmament ever seemed to promise very much or in point of fact resulted in any markedly tangible easing of the situation. There was ebb and flow, it is true. Sometimes it appeared as if some points had been gained, and then there was a mild spirit of exaltation in the purlieus of the League. But hopes were raised for a while only to be dissipated at the end. The fact was that now Europe was feeling thoroughly insecure. In Great Britain advanced radicals and many League of Nations Unionists believed that the Germany of the Weimar Republic was thoroughly to be trusted, but other States outside Great Britain, who were in closer contact with the actual facts, hardly subscribed to this unduly optimistic opinion. Certainly after Germany withdrew from the League, the possibility of serious trouble from that quarter could never be banished for a long time from the minds of a large number of the



peoples of Europe who formed part of the League Assembly. And in 1933, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald created additional difficulties by making his surprise journey from Geneva to Rome to confer with Mussolini on the subject of a Four Power Pact. The influence of this ill-fated proposal on the general European sense of insecurity can hardly be exaggerated. It set Poland off on a new tack outside the League of Nations and it resulted, after Hitler came into power, in the Polish-German Agreement. Furthermore, it extinguished most of the hopes that had been entertained of Mr. MacDonald when he gave the first impulse to the preparation of the Geneva Protocol, because, in this Four Power Pact, notwithstanding his protestations of loyalty to the League, he seemed to identify himself with a kind of Directorate of the Great Powers to cut and carve the boundaries of Europe according to their own sweet will. Mr. MacDonald himself was vague and contradictory in his exposition of this Pact before the British House of Commons. In fact, if the gradual fading away of Collective Security is to be connected with any particular set of names, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald must take his place with Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare, as marking stages in the disintegration of the only effective working plan which had up till then been propounded for implementing the Collective principle in actual practice.

The whole story of the fading of Collective Security is a tangled one, and it is unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to recapitulate its varied phases. The League itself has practically recognized its own inability to live up to its ideals, and at Geneva, in the month of September, its Committee for the Application of the Principles of the Covenant will present an inconclusive report. But at the same time it must always be remembered that these failures of the League were not due to any inadequacy in the application of Collective Security, if that principle is to be understood in its fullest and richest sense, but merely to the way in which the principles of the Covenant were explained and explained away until finally there was no sufficient power, such as the Geneva Protocol would have mobilized, to bring the aggressor to a timely halt. There is no doubt that Sir John Simon made a very great mistake in not



co-operating more loyally and more whole-heartedly with Mr. Stimson when the Japanese aggression in Manchuria approached its most serious stage. The United States had been difficult all along the line, whenever there was a question of really actively co-operating with the European Powers, and here was an opportunity of common action which should never have been missed. But it *was* unfortunately missed, and the Japanese when invading Manchuria, as afterwards the Italians when invading Abyssinia, were confident that they could gamble pretty safely on the result. There has been far too great a disposition to whittle away Art. XVI. and to explain, as General Smuts at one time used to do, that it was only intended, when this article was first accepted, to put into action its mild economic sanctions and to leave the military sanctions severely alone. It was to dispel this delusive notion that the Geneva Protocol was explicitly drafted, and unless the point is thoroughly grasped, there is small good in attaching practical value to the concept of Collective Security. Certainly, as is the leading thesis of this paper, Collective Security is meant to be an infallible deterrent of war, not a means of more effectively organizing a League war against an aggressor ; but your power, however overwhelming in theory, becomes utterly of no effect in practice if you go on proclaiming on the housetops that you never intend to use it, or if, with Senator Borah and the pacifists, you continue to asseverate that, at the last resort, the mobilized moral opinion of the world will be sufficient to carry you through all your most dangerous difficulties. If the aggressor is determined he will go on, even if he has only half a chance ; but if he knows that in the very first steps of his aggression he will certainly be confronted with forces that are powerful, swift, and overwhelming, he will think twice before he marches straight to destruction.

Unfortunately Collective Security, is being used nowadays as a kind of mystic term which everybody thinks should be powerful to charm, but which nobody takes the trouble exactly and searchingly to examine. The consequence is that men of different opinions use it in different senses, and elections have been fought in which the combatants, who obviously differ about most things, seem to find a comfort in muttering Collective



Security as if it were a kind of magical and efficacious formula which brings safety of its own accord. Some of these are content to keep the League of Nations in a state of suspended animation, laying stress on its usefulness as a kind of maid-of-all-work, who attends to the transplantation of refugees, or types out beneficent statistics under the ægis of its International Labour Office. Collective Security then means the keeping of Art. XVI. of the Covenant inoperative for the time, but hanging always like a sword of Damocles to ward off any possible intruder. Others speak of Collective Security as if it must surely be the reconciling concept of the future. But what exactly is to be understood by the term, or whether other nations could possibly be persuaded to take it in this same understood sense, is never a subject of very close or very exact inquiry. All parties, except a gradually diminishing crowd of pacifists, agree, however, in this—that any measure of disarmament is at the present time quite impossible and that Collective Security has in the long run absolutely failed to deliver the goods.

What then is to be done? And how are we to march forward to a Collective Security which is worth calling by the name? We have seen that the Geneva Protocol marked the furthest boundary-line as yet reached by the League in its struggle for that most efficacious conception of Collective Security which guarantees the possibility of immediately launching an irresistible and overwhelming force to warn off the threatening aggressor. Is it possible then to return to grace by reviving the Geneva Protocol? It is to be feared not. Some 16 nations welcomed the Geneva Protocol, amidst scenes of impressive enthusiasm. Italy did not venture fundamentally to differ, and Germany only unconvincingly put forward plans to limit her own particular liability. But what is the state of affairs in this Europe of the Rome-Berlin axis? The nations seem to be ranging themselves in two camps, in the name of competing ideologies. Countries like Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian States, appear well on the way to a kind of neutral position, where, unless themselves definitely attacked, and as from a vantage-point of safe indifference, they hope to turn their telescopes on the death-grips of their neighbours. Any rally for the renewal of the Geneva Protocol will appeal only to a



certain number of States, with a certain common ideology, and the aggressor, in another group of States, would feel that, if supported by sympathizers, he might quite safely gamble on a resort to war.

Is it not time then that the misleading term "Collective Security" was dropped and its place were taken by the term "International Security", which denotes more particularly what the world is desiring. It might well be that the time for the realization for such an idea would then be postponed to a more distant date in the future. But the substitution of International Security would have at least this very great compensation, first, that then the prevention of war and its organization would be the paramount object of our striving; secondly, that it would make war practically impossible by banning the aggressor as an outcast with practically all the world against him, an *Athanasius contra mundum*; thirdly, that it would quite definitely declare that real security can only be attained by the partial surrender of purely national sovereignties, *i.e.*, by a reaction against the exclusive Nationalism of Fascist or Nazi ideals; fourthly, that it would set us all practically to work for the establishment of some International Federation where the international authority would have at its disposal an international force, *i.e.*, an air force, to overawe the aggressor; and fifthly, that it would keep folded deep in our memories the wholesome truth that anything short of a guarantee, insured by International Security, is simply a way of organizing the next war on a scale more favourable to ourselves, instead of acting as an infallible deterrent to the angry spirit of the aggressor. For war there must be, sooner or later, unless humanity effectually organizes itself to prevent it; and no partial concessions or agreements, or the reiteration of an ineffective parrot-call, will prevent a State from taking action, where it proclaims that it is a law and end to itself and that it recognizes the behest of no more powerful and constraining authority.



## AMERICA AND MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY

BY FRANK DARVALL

**A**MERICANS feel that their country's responsibility in world affairs is less than that of other Great Powers because its geographical security and isolation, and its economic self-sufficiency, are so much greater. Their risk of being involved, their probable losses if Armageddon should break out, being less than those of other States, it seems to them reasonable that a smaller share of responsibility for preventing war, and for defending international law and treaty rights, should fall upon them than upon others. A State like the British Commonwealth with possessions in every continent, a fleet on every ocean, and a vital stake in the trade or investments of almost every country in the world, is thought to have a much greater responsibility in world affairs than the U.S.A. It would lose so much more if international lawlessness were to continue and spread, and gain so much more than the U.S.A. if world peace could be secured, that its responsibilities would seem to most Americans to be much more immediate than theirs.

Americans feel, therefore, little awkwardness in saying in one breath "We are not going to get drawn in next time" and "What is Britain up to in allowing these dictatorships to run amok as they have been doing"? They will cheerfully criticize Britain for appearing to do exactly what they are insisting that their own Government shall do, that is—reduce to a minimum the risk of being involved in war, even if that means allowing not merely principles of international law but even national rights and interests to be constantly infringed by the totalitarian aggressors. The same American will criticize Britain for not coming more openly to the defence of Czechoslovakia who is quick to criticize his own government if it ventures to utter dangerous words like "quarantine". He will regard as either cowardice, or an improper sympathy with Fascism, Britain's



willingness to allow her ships trading with Spain to be bombed, while enthusiastically supporting those provisions of the Neutrality Act which would impose upon the American Government essentially the same policy in similar contingencies.

Americans not merely criticize Britain for not doing what they are most insistent their own Government should not do, they also criticize Britain more severely than other States for policies and acts which are common to many other countries. Just as whenever the date of a war debt instalment falls due the general default of all America's debtors is frequently headlined as "Britain Defaults Again," so whenever all, or almost all, League members fail to live up to their full obligations under the Covenant, it is apt to be Great Britain's failure to do so which receives the greatest amount of American attention. There are two reasons for this, which should take the edge off the natural irritation that British people often feel at what appears to be unfair discrimination against them. First it is a measure of America's interest in, and friendliness for, Great Britain, that Americans should take greater note of British errors of omission or commission than of those of other States. That this country should be watched more closely and more critically than others is the price we have to pay for being regarded by 55% of the American people (as measured in a recent straw vote) as their favourite foreign country (no other State getting more than 10% of the votes cast). Secondly, it is a measure of American admiration for much that is British that our errors should surprise, and therefore anger, the U.S.A. more than those of other States. As one American elevator boy said to the writer, in relation to the War Debt, "We never thought that the French would pay any more than they had to, but we always thought that you British would never let us down."

It is therefore because Great Britain is not taking the lead in standing up to the thrust of the totalitarian States, because so far from checking their advance she is attempting to legalize their past thefts and to make them her friends, that most Americans dislike Mr. Chamberlain's policy, or what they believe that policy to be. So long as Mr. Eden continued to be Foreign Secretary, Americans were inclined to feel that Britain's surrenders to the totalitarian States were due to her physical weakness. They



had been so captivated by his youth and good looks, and by what they felt was his sincere devotion to the Covenant of the League and to the principles of respect for law, and collective resistance to aggression, which underlie it, that they felt that there must be some such explanation as physical weakness, or a desire to play for time, and to await the favourable moment for action, for vacillations and surrenders occurring during his tenure of office. Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax are, however, merely names to the American people (few, even, remembering that the latter is entitled to the respect many of them felt for that liberal Viceroy, Lord Irwin). They have given no such evidences of devotion to the League ideal as Mr. Eden, and are therefore not so apt to be given the benefit of the doubt when unable or unwilling to withstand the Fascist *coups*. It is easy for those many Americans who still think of Britain as the greatest, and most cunning, of imperialist Powers, to induce masses of their fellow-countrymen to think of Britain's present Premier and Foreign Secretary as capitalists who are so frightened of Communism as to sympathize with Fascism—and so single-minded in their devotion to the purely selfish, material interests of British capitalism, as to be indifferent to aggression which does not immediately touch them.

Moreover, the unfortunate coincidence that Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax have occasionally been the dinner or week-end guests of Viscount and Viscountess Astor has inevitably given currency to the idea of a "Cliveden set", selfishly and secretly plotting the defence of British capitalism, even at the price of the surrender of continental democracy to a militant Fascism. For the idea of week-end and country-house diplomacy, of a sinister kind, is sufficiently story-book to capture the popular imagination, and anything associated with the Astor name in any case inevitably and quickly attracts American notice.

That Americans should tend to adopt the worse rather than the better explanation of Mr. Chamberlain's policy is also partly due to the fact that British Opposition personalities take more trouble to cultivate American contacts. They are glad to accept invitations to meet American newspapermen and other visitors, to write for American papers and magazines, to speak from Britain for one of the American radio chains, or to go to the



U.S.A. on a lecture tour. Being out of office, and therefore possessed of more leisure and less responsibility, it is easier for them than for influential supporters of the Government to talk freely to Americans. Having in general more time and less money than prominent supporters of the National Government, they are more apt to be tempted by American invitations of this kind. Moreover, being somewhat depressed by the domestic political situation, with a Conservative administration apparently firmly entrenched in power, members of the Liberal and Labour parties find American company to-day congenial, since the U.S.A. enjoys a liberal administration, and has a nineteenth-century liberal and low-tariff advocate as Secretary of State. They can easily win from Americans the applause which it has been difficult since 1931 for them to win in Great Britain. They are naturally tempted to expand in such a warm atmosphere and to make for American consumption speeches only too similar to those they make from their own party platforms at home.

British Conservatives are too indifferent, normally, to what foreign opinion thinks of their policy. Neither the Government itself, nor its prominent supporters in Parliament, feel it to be important that their point of view should be sympathetically, frankly, and fully explained to the American press and people. Or at least, if they do feel it to be important, they do far less than they could, or than Opposition people do, to make certain that it is so explained.

There has, of course, recently been a change. Lady Astor has arranged two private gatherings at which the Chamberlain point of view was explained to American newspapermen, the latter being attended by the Prime Minister himself. It was unfortunate that the "off the record" nature of these occasions should not have prevented word of them getting into the press, and into Parliament, through the intervention of Mr. Geoffrey Mander, M.P. Mr. Chamberlain, who was clearly very annoyed at Mr. Mander's questioning on the matter, may well feel that this break with tradition has been an unfortunate one. That feeling may be accentuated by Mr. Hore-Belisha's similar experience, after his speech before American correspondents. It is to be hoped that this will not be so, and that British Ministers



will be encouraged to continue the practice of occasional "off the record" talks with American and Dominion newspapermen. For the experience of Mr. Roosevelt, over five years, suggests that the discretion of the American press can be safely trusted, and that the frankest and freest of press conferences, if skilfully handled, can be an immense asset to anyone wishing to have his personality and policy sympathetically understood by the American public.

Mr. Chamberlain has shown himself sensitive to American and Dominion criticisms of his policy in other ways. It is affirmed in some quarters in Canada and the U.S.A. that he went so far as to write a personal letter to a high official of the American Government in order to induce Mr. Roosevelt to issue his surprising, though empty, statement regarding the Anglo-Italian Agreements. While this has been denied, it seems to be accepted that there was definitely some British Government initiative, and that Mr. Roosevelt's statement was far from being a spontaneous American gesture. The story that the writer found current in Washington in May was that there had been a three-fold British pressure, from Lord Halifax direct to Mr. Hull, in the form of a private letter, and from Lord Halifax to Mr. Kennedy, and from Sir Ronald Lindsay to Mr. Hull, in the form of private conversations. The writer was also told in Canada that there had been a similar approach by the British to the Canadian Government, in the hope of inducing Mr. Mackenzie King and his colleagues to, play down, so far as they safely and properly could Canadian criticisms of the Chamberlain line.

Attempts to influence American and Dominion opinion, or to produce, in the hope of affecting British and European opinion apparent evidences of American sympathy, can, however, very easily defeat their own purpose. The U.S.A. is largely convinced that it was British propaganda which dragged it, against its better interests, into the last war. It is on its guard lest the British propaganda machine (most Americans think there is one) should be at the same devilish work again. The only safe way of ensuring a friendly American reception to British policies is first to try to pursue policies which are in line with American preferences and prejudices and secondly, to explain honestly and



frankly what you are doing, and why. Any attempts to extort from America benedictions on British policies which are in fact out of touch with American opinion, still more any attempts to deceive America as to the real inwardness of British policy—and most of all any attempts to commit the U.S.A. in advance to any limitations on its freedom of action—are likely to have a boomerang effect.

American opinion is not so hostile to Mr. Chamberlain, however, that it would be impossible to get American sympathy for what he is trying to do. On the contrary American opinion is so uncertain and fluid, and so anxious to believe well of Britain, since there is no other Great Power of which it can believe well, that defenders of Mr. Chamberlain can easily gain the sympathy of American audiences. The best way to do this is to emphasize Britain's military, naval and air unpreparedness, and to suggest that time is therefore on Britain's side, if only she can fool Germany and Italy into postponing a conflict until her re-armament has gathered momentum. Americans find it difficult to believe that the British Empire, which is so much more vivid and impressive to them than any other State, is in fact too weak to have prevented Italy from conquering Ethiopia in 1935, or from invading Spain in the last two years. It is almost impossible to persuade most Americans that Britain is too weak to have prevented General Franco from bombing British ships this summer, or that either General Franco or Italy would have resorted to war against the British Empire rather than stop bombing British ships in Spanish ports. It is difficult to persuade most non-Catholic Americans that the victory of General Franco would be good for Spain, Britain or the world, and therefore it is hard to convince them that Britain has good reasons for supporting a system of non-intervention which imposes no effective barrier to German and Italian support of the Franco cause. But considerable American sympathy for the Chamberlain line can be secured by the suggestion that the years 1935-38, inclusive, are the dangerous ones for Britain, in which the dictatorships have the margin of military strength, and that it is the course of wisdom not to press the *Führer* and the Duce too hard now, when a year from now we shall have



reached such a pitch of re-armament that the margin of strength will be increasingly with us.

Americans are, of course, open to the suggestion that war is so horrible that, so long as there is the least chance of avoiding a conflict, the peace-loving States should be willing to pay the highest possible price for peace. If Americans can once be convinced, first that the *Führer* and the Duce are appeasable, and that therefore there is a chance of avoiding war, and secondly that Britain is sincere, and will not sacrifice other States, and world interests, merely in order to save her own skin, they will not lack sympathy for a policy of attempted appeasement. The difficulty at present is that they are convinced of neither of these things. They incline to the view of the British Oppositions, to the effect that so long as the *Führer* and the Duce believe that the League States can be divided, and are susceptible to blackmail, they cannot be persuaded to accept reasonable compromises, or to abide by the agreements they sign, and that neither British interests nor peace will in the long run be served by sacrificing China, Abyssinia, Austria, Spain, and possibly even Czechoslovakia on the altar either of time to re-arm or of appeasement of the dictators.

In any case Mr. Chamberlain has this advantage. Many informed and influential Americans, including those in the Administration, feel for one reason or another impelled to give his policy some backing. Some cordially agree with it, and these, it is said, include Under-Secretary of State Summer Welles, and an influential section of State Department officials. Others feel that, under the difficult circumstances of the moment, there is much excuse for it, and that he would be a foolishly bold man who ventured to criticize it too strongly, however many misgivings it might arouse in him. Others again, and this is possibly the largest group of Mr. Chamberlain's American apologists, feel that it is invidious for the U.S.A. to criticize Britain for doing little to check Fascist aggression while North America is doing practically nothing. Many citizens of the U.S.A., especially those in influential positions and with a sense of responsibility, share what seems to be the attitude of official Canada—namely, that so long as *they* desire to retain in all circumstances a free

hand and unfettered choice for themselves they cannot very well throw stones at the British Government. If they were to do so, and if Britain were to change her direction to please them, they would incur at least some moral responsibility for the consequences.

Finally, even those informed Americans who most regret that Britain is not standing up to the aggressors and treaty-breakers with greater consistency and courage, and who would wish the U.S.A. to do its part in stopping the drift of the world towards illegality and violence, often feel unable to oppose British moves. Like Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull they want to check the drift of the U.S.A. towards isolation. They wish to increase among their countrymen some more lively sense of America's responsibility in world affairs. They realize that if Americans are very critical of Great Britain they are apt to be more isolationist than ever themselves. They realize also that, however unsatisfactory a colleague she may be, Great Britain is in present circumstances the only Great Power with which the U.S.A. can collaborate, and that, without collaboration with some other Great Power, there is little that the U.S.A. can do to check the world's drift towards war. In order not to place further obstacles in their own way, these internationalist Americans, from the President and Secretary of State downwards, have therefore to avoid anything which will encourage Americans to criticize Britain, however much they themselves may in fact share the general misgivings at some of the Chamberlain moves.

This explains even the extraordinary patience of Mr. Hull and his supporters in respect of the long-drawn-out negotiations for a British-American Trade Agreement. It must be galling to Mr. Hull, struggling as he is with extreme protectionists and isolationists in his own country, to have had to wait so long for a Trade Agreement with Britain, and to see the British Government, which this spring rushed into an agreement with Fascist Italy, taking over a year before it was possible even to announce that negotiations for a trade agreement with the U.S. "were contemplated". Mr. Hull might have expected that Great Britain, which has always been eager apparently to see the American tariff reduced, and to secure some measure of



American co-operation in world affairs, would have leapt at the opportunity which his initiative had created. He well knew that the practical difficulties were great, since the concessions which American agriculturalists would force him to demand of Britain were bound to be galling to producers in the United Kingdom and the Dominions. He was, therefore, clearly prepared for lengthy negotiations. He might, however, have legitimately been disappointed, first during the winter of 1936-37, when Britain gave no sign of welcome to his initiative, and secondly, in the recent phase, when the British Government has given little sign of being willing to stand up to those interests which are opposing genuine concessions to America as Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull are standing up to similar American interests. He has, however, given no sign of impatience, knowing full well that to do so would greatly strengthen those elements in the U.S.A. which would rather revert to economic and political isolation.

The misdeeds of the *Führer*, the Duce, and the Japanese militarists, create so much ill-will in America that a smoke-screen is constantly being thrown up by them behind which Britain and other democratic states can, in the colloquial phrase, "get away with murder". American ill-will for Britain, arising out of Secretary Stimson's feeling that Sir John Simon let him down in 1932, or out of Britain's failure to continue token payments in 1934 (in spite of Mr. Roosevelt and his Attorney-General's efforts to secure for the makers of token payments practical exemption from the terms of the Johnson Act), or from the failure to apply oil sanctions, and the Hoare-Laval plan, in 1935, is constantly being smothered by the greater volume of ill-will provoked by the acts of the totalitarian States. *The Times* commenting on July 22nd, on the improvement in Anglo-American relationships in recent years, suggested that the two Governments and their diplomatists deserved great credit for this. Such improvement there has been, but it would seem to the writer to be due more to the *Führer* and the Duce than to Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Ronald Lindsay, or Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Kennedy. It is because they like other States less, rather than because they like Britain more, that Americans have come closer to Britain in recent years.

It is this dislike of the totalitarian States which is Mr. Chamberlain's greatest asset in the U.S.A. It certainly leads Americans to wish he would show greater firmness in the face of aggression. But it also leads them to forget relatively quickly the minor grievances which they have against Britain in face of their major grievances against the dictatorships. It drives the American Government, if it wishes to do anything to check the deterioration in world affairs, to give at the very least passive support, and the backing of "parallel action", to the policy of any British Government, even when that Government pursues policies in which it has little confidence.



## ITALY IN POST-WAR EUROPE

BY COUNT SFORZA

IN a recent speech about Anglo-Italian relations Mr. Chamberlain succeeded in doing something that was unprecedented since the advent of Fascism into power ; he made all Italians, be they Fascist or anti-Fascist, agree in a feeling of deep dislike—no matter if for opposite reasons—for the passage where he sketched a vague idea of continuity between liberal Italy and what he called “ new Italy ”.

No, there has never been, from a moral and historical point of view—the only point which matters—such a complete break with the past as in Italy ; certainly not even in Russia, where certain old habits and tendencies can still be detected, in spite of outward appearances.

Theorists use to say that the foreign policy of a nation is dictated by geography. It may be so. But what is certain is that there is nothing in common between the foreign policy of liberal Italy—which Mr. Chamberlain gave the impression of evoking with some nostalgia—and the methods and tendencies of Fascism.

On the whole, the foreign policy of the Italian cabinets, from Cavour to the advent of Fascism, was prudent, far-seeing, and straightforward.

It was prudent—because the Italian statesmen knew that what Italy most needed was peace, in order to make up by hard work on the part of the whole nation, for the time lost in the first half of the nineteenth century ; when wars, conspiracies and political divisions had made it impossible for Italy to achieve the same industrial progress as England and France.

The foreign policy of liberal Italy was far-seeing—because, although Austria was menacing, Germany patronizing and France suspicious, all the Italian leaders, from Depretis and Robilant to Visconti Venosta and Giolitti, realized that time was

working for us ; that Austria-Hungary was bound to disappear some day ; and that, on that day, nothing could prevent the Italian provinces still under the Hapsburg rule reverting to Italy—who would have thus gained the most perfect geographical frontier existing in Europe, the whole chain of the Alps.

And, finally, the foreign policy of liberal Italy was straightforward. When Italy concluded in the first years of this century her famous agreements with Great Britain and France in regard to the Mediterranean she did so with the full and previous cognizance of her two partners of the Triple Alliance. When Austria and Germany started the World War in 1914, the violation of the Triple Alliance treaty was theirs and not Italy's. Art. VII. of the treaty bound Austria-Hungary and Italy, if they wished to alter the *status quo* in the Balkans "by a temporary or permanent occupation" to come to "a previous agreement based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage territorial or other that each of them might obtain over and above the present position." It was Austria who violated the Triple Alliance treaty by failing to come to a "previous agreement" with Italy on a specific point—Austrian invasion in the Balkans—which was the most essential of all the Austro-Italian engagements.

The machiavellian or—to be fair to the Florentine Secretary—the pseudo-machiavellian variations of the Fascist dispensation, on the other hand, have no precedent in the history of Italian foreign policy. When Fascist propagandists boast of the originality of their leader's thought in foreign policy they do not suspect to what an extent they are right. There is one point, however, where it might be possible to assert that some partial affinity exists between the Fascist foreign policy and a short-lived period of previous Italian diplomacy. This single instance is the attitude of Baron Sonnino, Foreign Minister from 1914 to 1919, towards Italy's South Slav neighbours. The painful but rich travail of the nationalities in Austria-Hungary had completely escaped Sonnino when he concluded in April, 1915, his Treaty of London, which determined the conditions of the entry of Italy into the war. For Sonnino never had believed before the War, and never came to believe during the War, that the Austrian Empire might be completely destroyed. In vain



did I warn him from the Macedonian front, where I had been sent after the entrance of Italy into the conflict, that the Great War was tantamount to a second War of the Austrian Succession. Sonnino shut his eyes and clung to his treaty of London, to the letter of the law. The Italian Commander-in-Chief, Cadorna, had declared that it was desirable to have an intimate entente with Serbia; but—the stubborn Sonnino objected—was that not a danger for the clauses of the treaty of London which bestowed a portion of Dalmatia to Italy? It was enough for Sonnino to veto not only any entente but even any establishment of contact. He carried his policy to extremes which might have looked comic, had not their effects been so tragic. May I quote an example? Compelled as he was—after the Salonika expedition had been decided—to send a division to the Macedonian front (a division that constantly fraternized with the Serbians with whom it maintained all the time the most cordial relations) Sonnino always rejected my urgent requests to have the exceptional services recognized that our XXXVth division was rendering to Serbia and to all the Allies. The Division, spread along most difficult front line, had little by little increased her force to 70,000 men; each of the French and British Army Corps were far below this figure. “Let us call our Division what it is, at least an Army Corps—I wrote him. You complain of the Allies but if we are the first to belittle our efforts, can we expect the others to do us justice?” I never succeeded. And so you had a unique phenomenon, unique in a coalition war: that we poured out on the Macedonian front the blood and the strength of more than an Army Corps, but we firmly refused to admit that we had done as much.

Again, I submitted to Sonnino, later on, an idea that Pashich had enthusiastically approved, *i.e.*, that our Austrian war prisoners of Slav race should be sent to the Isonzo front where they were ready to come and fight beside us, forming a Yugoslav Legion under Italian and Serbian flags. This Legion would have shaken the morale of the Croat divisions still loyal to their Kaiser. Sonnino opposed his veto, and the Croat and Slovene prisoners went on with their unprofitable labour in the fields of Southern Italy until the end of the War.

When President Wilson proclaimed his fourteen Points I

felt it my duty to state once more my convictions to Sonnino and wrote him from Corfu :

" . . . And at the Peace Conference they will all know how to pay lip-service to Wilson's Fourteen Points, and, underneath, to think only of their interests ; we alone, bound by a formula too antithetical, will risk being at variance with Wilson and with everybody ; and in a desperate struggle for the Treaty of London, we shall endanger all our interests. European hypocrisy will give itself *face*, as the Chinese say, by denouncing the Italian *sacro egoismo*, which will probably turn out to be the least realistic of all the Allied egoisms."

Sonnino remained blind, as before. During the summer of 1918 I wrote again that the body of the Austrian monarchy was exhibiting signs of mortal affliction and that it was necessary to prepare final war agreements and preventive peace agreements with the nations who would become the Successor States of Austria-Hungary. In vain : Sonnino had imagined a war that would end without the complete destruction of Austria and he never admitted that history had taken the liberty of evolving on lines quite different from those he had laid down.

In spite of Sonnino's policy, the victory came—a victory more complete for Italy than for Great Britain or France, since Italy not only conquered all the Italian territories which had remained under Austria, but doubled her diplomatic and military power as a consequence of the disappearance of the great State which, on her Oriental frontier, had constantly hindered our expansion.

However, if Sonnino's policy had been neither prudent nor far-seeing, it had been straightforward—in his own morose and clumsy way. As he had been during the war, so he remained at the Peace Conference. Unable to conceive of victory if she is not armed, snarling and bristling—he thought in all good faith that Italy would lose the fruit of her sacrifices if she did not settle in Dalmatia. Once in the poisoned atmosphere of the Peace Conference, he became even more isolated ; disdaining, in his honesty, to imitate his foreign colleagues who hid so well their greeds under the cloak of the new Wilsonian words, he missed the unique opportunity for Italy to ally herself with the new forces created by the war ; he remained alone, with his Treaty of London, and scoffed at as a sort of Shylock by Clemenceau and Lloyd George who happened to be infinitely more Shylockian than poor Sonnino ever was.



What more natural, then, that an important section of public opinion in Italy imagined in its anger that victory had been "mutilated" by disloyal Allies? The conquest of Dalmatia, as it had been planned by Sonnino and his Nationalists (from whom the Fascists inherited their vague ideas about foreign policy), was but a sign of weakness: a suspicious barbed-wire fence against our neighbours; whereas my policy, when I succeeded Sonnino, convinced as I was of Italian superiority and sure of our power of penetration, was to throw open the doors of the Balkans and of the Levant to Italian influence. But the Dalmatian towns were full of monuments of all kinds—each of them relics of old Italian glories. What more natural again than that an ill-informed public opinion, unaware of the fact that the immense majority of the Dalmatians were Slavs who wanted to remain Slavs, should bear with difficulty the idea of losing those ancient Venetian possessions? However much opposed I was to a sterile anti-Slav policy that would have deprived us of any international freedom, since it would have made us the heirs of that very hateful Austrian tradition which we had destroyed, I could not help resenting, myself, the facile advice of "breadth of vision" which were administered to us by Allies who would probably have been annexionist even against their true interest, had they been faced with an analogous political and psychological case.

In June, 1920, I became Minister for Foreign Affairs, determined to reach a complete understanding with Yugoslavia—an understanding based on a creative spirit of future collaboration. As soon as Europe had become convinced that the disorders which were then sporadically breaking out in Italy were only a transitory result of post-war neurathenia, and the clever legend of a Bolshevik danger (an abominable calumny maintained until to-day by Fascism for publicity's sake) had vanished from all clear-thinking minds, I summoned the Yugoslav plenipotentiaries to Rapallo to settle at last the Adriatic question. I found the Yugoslav Ministers just as I had found so many valiant Serbians during the war: heroic when faced with an immediate danger, afraid of responsibility when faced with a complex and synthetic political problem. I

shall not recount here the details of the negotiation (\*) but in view of the recent annexation of Austria by the German *Reich* and of the German aims on Bohemia it is not useless that I point out the climax of the discussion: it was reached one dramatic night when I said to the Yugoslav plenipotentiaries:

“ You go on, here, with endless controversies about some Alpine valley or some miserable Adriatic islet. Do you not see that what we must do is to agree completely and cordially between us, because in twenty or thirty years we'll be probably obliged to defend together Trieste and Pola as well as Ljubliana and Zagreb against a new German menace ? ”

They were loyal patriots, they understood and they signed—while I gave them a special engagement of full diplomatic Italian co-operation with them in relation to any possible danger against Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, two years later Fascism came into power. Fascism had only one programme: to remain where a stroke of luck had brought it. Its leader therefore began by taking on in turn every conceivable colour in foreign policy. Did he not begin by proposing to M. Poincaré to go and “ fetch the reparations gold in Berlin ”—a fact which is now completely forgotten in these days of the Berlin-Rome axis and Hitler's triumphal visit to Italy. It was only because of the support of Fascism that Poincaré was able to enter the Ruhr—the biggest mistake of French post-war policy. It was just the same Fascism which, later on, dictated for years a violent campaign of hatred against France. It was Fascism which seriously suggested, in its first year of life, a Continental entente against England and shortly afterwards entered Sir Austen Chamberlain's service to threaten Turkey with invasion, until Mustafa Kemal gave in to the British Foreign Office on the petroleum question, Italy, in this bargain, getting nothing but compliments from Sir Austen to Fascism. It is not for me, here, to recall variations even more radical and recent—with England and with the same Chamberlain family.

No wonder that the same thing happened with Yugoslavia. During the first months of Fascist rule it seemed that my friendly policy would be pursued. It was the time (January, 1924) of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Pashich's visit to Rome.

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(\*) All the more so that I have written about it in my *Bâtisseurs de l'Europe* (Paris, 1931) and, quite recently, in *Pachitch et l'Union des Yougoslaves* (Paris, 1938).



It even happened that in a House as domesticated as the Fascist Parliament a Member dared to exclaim one day: "But it is Sforza's policy that is being continued!"

It did not continue very long. Fascism needed adventures and stage successes. As soon as it hoped to find them at Yugoslavia's expense, the policy of friendship changed at once. A long and sterile war by pin-pricks ensued, which culminated in a series of dark and tragic events. Although the European life of the recent years is mainly a story of deliberately-contrived oblivions, the memory of the hysterical fury of Fascist Italy against "savage Yugoslavia" is not yet quite forgotten—as was proved by the scepticism with which European diplomatic circles received the sudden reversal of the situation that took place in March, 1937, with a solemn new treaty of "friendship and collaboration" signed in Belgrade by the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Stoyadinovic, and the Foreign Minister of the Fascist Government.

Is this treaty a tactical move in order to feel safe in the Adriatic and on the Eastern frontier while preparing some bigger adventure in the Mediterranean? It is useless to try and guess, when one of the two partners has so frequently proved how rapidly he is able to change his tactics. What is certain is that for an Italo-Yugoslav treaty to be lasting and fruitful it is necessary that both sides really believe and loyally want the prosperity and complete independence of all the Successor States of Austria-Hungary to be considered as a supreme interest in Rome as well as in Belgrade.

In Rome an Italian treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia can only mean what it says if the Italian rulers feel in their hearts—as I did—that to ignore the necessity of an independent Czechoslovakia is equivalent to forgetting that six hundred thousand Italians perished in the World War for the integrity of the natural frontier of the Alps and in order to get rid of the old menace constituted by a Germanism inclined to bar the legitimate influence of Italy in Central Europe and in the Balkans.

To make a treaty of "friendship and collaboration" with Yugoslavia and at the same time to rejoice at the destruction of the Little Entente—which is in reality a *fait accompli* in spite

of the mournful Sinaia meeting of May 5 and 6—means only one thing : that the Belgrade treaty was concluded in a spirit which has nothing to do with the programme of moral and economic collaboration between Italy and the free peoples of Central Europe and of the Balkans, as hoped for and foreseen by the prophetic genius of Mazzini and Cavour. (Everybody knows, or should know, that Mazzini's *Lettere Slave* constituted the first and most eloquent defense of Yugoslav nationality in Western Europe ; it is less known that Count Cavour, the most far-seeing statesman of the XIXth century, wrote in 1848 : " It is futile for you Italians to hate the Croats (\*) ; they are like yourselves the victims of a selfish Power that sets its subjects against one another. These Croats must one day become with their brothers, the other Southern Slavs, the best friends and allies of Italy ").

The most cunning discovery of the dictatorships being that a lie becomes a truth when repeated a thousand times, the standardized press of Fascist Italy has ended by persuading many Italians that the Little Entente was an instrument into the hands of France, and hostile to Italian interests. Who remembers to-day that when the Little Entente was created by Benes's fertile mind and with my firm support, the Quai d'Orsay began by looking suspiciously at the new constellation since they found it " too Italian " ?

The fact is that both the victory of Italy and the cause of international freedom could be maintained only through a policy of friendship and collaboration with all the new States that were unwilling to become victims of a new German *Drang nach Osten*. It will appear incredible, some day, that it should have been an Italian Government that has sought for years to disrupt what constituted one of the strongest defences of Italian independence.

Once again it is demonstrated that the interests of the dictatorial *régimes* do not always necessarily coincide with the permanent interests of the nations whom they rule. If the little Austria of the Saint Germain Treaty has disappeared in

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(\*) The Croatian troops were fighting in 1848 for the Austrian Emperor in the plains of Lombardy with a dynastic loyalty which their Kaiser rewarded a few years later with characteristic Hapsburg ingratitude.



1938, creating for Italy a dangerous Nazi menace at the Alps, is it not because Italian Fascism imposed a few years ago on Dollfuss the destruction of all the Austrian social-democratic forces and the creation of a violent minority *régime* based only on the clergy and the feudal class ?

The *Drang nach Osten* of Imperial Germany which was halted in 1918 by the Italians on the Alps and by the British, the French, the Italians and the Serbians in Macedonia was infinitely less menacing than is the new racial Germanism, drunk with the idea of an "ethnic mission." To compromise with this Germanism in order to secure other—problematic—spoils elsewhere, is equivalent to preparing the way to the erection of intolerable hegemonies in Europe, hegemonies from which the Italians would end by suffering quite as much as any other European nation.

It is only too natural that *régimes* of violence are morally unable to conceive of the mission and of the future of Italy in the serene, confident, human way which made immortal the names of the great Italians of the Risorgimento. That is why the dictators try to gain victories and successes of "prestige" through dangerous gambles. But these gambles are not only dangerous ; they are vain. The truth is that what may best guarantee the progress and the independence of Italy is simply a policy of international justice, such as was proclaimed during the Risorgimento and after. Italians who cannot feel the nobility of a policy aiming at a superior international solidarity and at the end of the present European anarchy should, therefore, out of selfishness, pretend to believe in it. If they have an excuse for doing otherwise, it is that even the leaders of certain powerful and free democracies seem sometimes to think and feel not much more highly and generously.

## THE EVIAN CONFERENCE AND AFTER

BY NORMAN BENTWICH

IT was observed by one of the delegates at the Inter-governmental Conference upon Political Refugees, which was held at Evian in July, that the name Evian spelt backwards gave the word "naïve". The meeting of the government representatives, it was inferred, was the reverse of naïve. But in fact the motive for it was simple and direct, just as the call for it was urgent. It was the response of the Christian conscience, primarily in America, to the relapse into medieval persecution. The Conference had been convened, at the instance of President Roosevelt, to consider what could be done to assist emigration of political refugees, particularly those from "Germany including Austria", as the courteous terminology referred to the annexation. It was not designed as a public international conference, like meetings of the Assembly of the League of Nations, at the other end of the Lake of Geneva; but rather as a working committee which was to examine in detail what contributions the States could make, individually and collectively, to the practical solution of a terrible and growing human problem. It had to confront the challenge of a mass of refugees fleeing from destruction and thrust upon States of Europe and America by the ruthless policy of the National Socialist Government towards racial and political minorities. And, as was said at the outset by Mr. Myron Taylor, the American delegate and former President of the United States Steel Trust, who was chosen as the Chairman: the Governments must work primarily and effectively upon a long-range programme of emigration on a comprehensive scale if they were to make a serious contribution.

The results of the week's examination may seem a little flat and unexciting, like the water of Evian; but it was a definite step that the Governments recognized at last the responsibility



to organize the emigration of potential refugees from the source, as well as to help the absorption of those who have managed to find a refuge.

Inevitably, some of the voluntary organizations which have been struggling for years with the problem of refugees, and Jewish communities in different countries, which have to support a burden that becomes constantly more crushing, formed exaggerated hopes of what the Conference might accomplish. Just as, during the Middle Ages and down to the eighteenth century, masses of men, in times of distress, looked expectantly for the coming of a personal Messiah—to-day, in this era of international conferences, masses of men are inclined to build Messianic hopes on international gatherings. Many hoped that the meeting of the representatives of thirty-two States from Europe, America and Australasia would devise a solution for the needs of a stricken population not only in Germany and Austria, but also in Eastern Europe. The Governments would not only provide openings for a much larger number of exiles, but would assist in the financing of their immigration and settlement. Nor were the voluntary organizations and the Jewish communities alone in entertaining great expectations of Evian. The Government of the *Reich* paid great attention to the proceedings; and in anticipation of the gathering put extreme pressure on their non-Aryan minority to secure, legally or illegally, enlarged openings for emigration. With their approval delegations attended from Berlin and Vienna, and urged despairingly the greatest possible liberality by the participating States. They did not address the Conference or any Committee of it; but they spoke with the principal delegates; and nobody could hear their tale without being moved by it. They made it clear that the position of the 'non-Aryans' throughout Greater Germany was being made systematically more intolerable, and that the young generation was now faced with the alternative of slavery, like that of the Children of Israel in Egypt before the Exodus, or forced emigration. The German Government is in fact blackmailing the conscience of humanity.

If the hopes of the oppressed and succouring communities were inevitably exaggerated, the attitude of most of the official spokesmen at Evian was inevitably cautious and restrained. In

a period of world-wide unemployment it is hard for Governments to offer to open their doors liberally to a stream of immigration, even though the immigrants may bring great qualities of energy, industry and intelligence, and in some cases exceptional talents. It is hard to dispose of the fallacy of 'the lump of labour', which makes a people believe that any newcomers into the country will take away part of the employment that is already not enough to go round. In developed and less developed countries alike the fear is that immigration of foreign talent and labour would mean dispossession of the native talent and labour. In the public sittings of the Conference, therefore, the ministers of the States rose one after the other to express their abundant sympathy with the victims and their limited power of helping them. They illustrated a remark of Sydney Smith that Man is a benevolent animal: when A sees B in distress, he is convinced that it is C's duty to come immediately to B's help.

Some positive contributions, indeed, were offered towards the solution; most notably by Mr. Myron Taylor speaking for the United States. He made it clear at the outset that one objective should be to establish a governmental Committee which should concern itself with refugees, wherever governmental intolerance shall have created a refugee problem. In the first place it should focus its attention upon the most pressing problem of the refugees from Germany and Austria. It should be complementary to the League Organization for the assistance of refugees, which, long threatened with liquidation, is likely, on the recommendation of the Council of the League, to be maintained by the next Assembly for a further indefinite period. He noted also that the American Government had consolidated the German and the former Austrian quota of immigrants, so that now a total of over 27,000 persons may enter the United States on the German quota in one year. And he implied that facilities would be given for the filling of the quota, provided there were adequate guarantees that the immigrants would not become a public charge. That would be in itself a very substantial assistance in numbers. Hitherto, since the persecution began, the annual American quota has not been half filled. Finally, he stressed the broad aspects of the forced and chaotic



dumping of unfortunate people, which had more serious, disruptive consequences upon world relations than the dumping of merchandise upon world economy. "The sentiment of international mistrust and suspicion is heightened; and fear, which is an important obstacle to the general appeasement between nations, is accentuated."

The principal delegate of Great Britain, Earl Winterton, also offered a positive and definite contribution towards the aim of the Conference. It was clear that the United Kingdom could not be a country of immigration on any large scale, in view of its crowded population and its chronic problem of unemployment. But the Government was prepared to give facilities to young persons to undertake courses of training or enter industrial enterprises, so as to prepare themselves for productive work with a view to emigration; to explore to what extent they could accelerate the process of assimilation of those elements in the present refugee population who can be fitted into the social and economic life of the country; to find openings for a number of professional persons and others who are fleeing from Germany and Austria; and, lastly, to examine the possibilities of settlement on the land in certain East African territories of the colonial Empire. Admittedly, such settlement could provide only for a limited number of selected families in the early stages, but it might form the nucleus for an ordered inflow. On the broader issue, he pointed out that the task would be immeasurably complicated and rendered insoluble unless the country of origin was prepared to make its contribution, and allow the emigrants whom other countries are asked to accept, to bring out some means of self-support. Germany could not ask the rest of the world to receive her unwanted minority naked, and take for herself all their possessions. Lord Winterton pointed out also that the Conference must be restricted to the immediate problem of emigration from Germany and Austria, which would tax to the full the goodwill of the countries represented. They would only raise false expectations if it were believed in countries neighbouring to Germany and in risk of infection, that a policy of oppression of religious and other minorities could force other countries to open their doors to the victims.

Most of the States represented at the Conference were American. They included nearly all the countries of Central and South America. The delegates of the most important of them, Argentine and Brazil, spoke positively about the wish of their Governments to encourage agricultural settlers; the former quoting the hopeful slogan of his State: "To govern is to populate". The Mexican delegate also stated that his country was willing to receive an ordered immigration. The Colombian called upon the Conference to take a firm stand against the German violation of the principles of international justice. But, generally, delegates refrained from political judgments or indictments.

Four of the British Dominions were officially represented: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Eire; and the Union of South Africa sent an observer. Australia has become a 'blessed word' to the victims of persecution. Her vast spaces, her small populace, and her need of workers for primary and secondary industries seem to offer opportunity for thousands in Germany and Austria who are eager to start a new life. But her Minister of Commerce, who was at Evian, emphasized that the policy of a predominantly British Australia could not be largely modified while British settlers are forthcoming; and that they were not desirous of encouraging any scheme of large-scale foreign migration. The response of Canada was even more restrained. Immigrants could only be admitted individually and by special exception, save for certain classes of agriculturalists; and while the Government would apply its regulations in the most liberal and sympathetic manner which might be possible, it could not hold out any prospects of a change of principle. Eire and New Zealand gave their testimony of good will, but could not put a figure to it.

The final and formal result of the public declarations and the private deliberations at the Conference was a series of resolutions. After reciting the general principles that the fate of those forced to emigrate has become a problem for international action, and that the best available solution requires the collaboration of the country of origin, which will make its contribution by enabling the *émigrés* to take with them their property and to emigrate



in an orderly manner, the resolutions made a series of positive findings :

1. Certain countries overseas have indicated their desire to consider plans for settlement of refugees in their territories when such plans are presented by official and private organizations.

2. The countries bordering on Germany, while unable to make any substantial addition to their present efforts, may help emigration by affording facilities for technical or agricultural training for those to whom temporary asylum is given.

3. Other countries have expressed a willingness to accept selected classes of workers. Some allow immigrants to enter without occupational restriction.

4. The Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement should not assume any obligations for the financing of involuntary emigration.

5. A Permanent Inter-Governmental Committee will be established in London, and will appoint a Director, "a person of authority", who will undertake negotiations with the Governments of countries overseas, "to improve the present conditions of the exodus from Germany and Austria and replace them with a system of orderly emigration. He shall approach the Governments of countries of refuge and settlement with a view to developing opportunities of permanent settlement". That Committee and Office might seem to be merely adding new machinery, but they should mean more than that : a new will and a new approach. The Director is to be an American, so that American credit will be fully engaged ; and America, free from European entanglements, may be able to tackle the *Reich* authorities more effectively than European Powers.

It was suggested that a new governmental organization would overlap the existing international Organization, and that it would be better to establish simply an Advisory Committee to assist the High Commissioner in matters of emigration. But that proposal overlooked the essential facts that : (a) the High Commissioner's Office is concerned only with the refugees after they have left Germany ; (b) the High Commissioner during the last two years has not made any approach to the German Government, and would be prejudiced in making it because of his dependence on the League, and (c) the Council of

the League at its meeting in May, adopted a recommendation that the single Organization of the League, which is to be set up, it is hoped, at the next Assembly, should be concerned primarily with the juridical aspects of the problem. The League has itself imposed a considerable limitation on its efforts for German refugees during the last years, so as, on the one hand, to avoid political entanglements, and on the other hand not to engage any funds of the League or the Governments. Its functions have been mainly consular and advisory, and it has left to the voluntary organizations the practical work of finding homes and settlement. Yet to-day the dimensions of the problem of emigration are beyond the power of the voluntary organizations; and the need of governmental assistance is urgent. It would be blind, too, to disregard the handicap which the League would suffer in this respect, because of the absence from its membership not only of Germany and the United States, but of several important South American countries.

We have to face up to the reality that international co-operation, no less than international security, must be sought, for the time and in part, outside the framework of the League. The High Commissioner, who has secured from a number of European Governments the signing of a convention that defines certain rights for the refugees as regards documents of residence and of travel, and a qualified right to work and to social aid in the countries of refuge, will seek to enlarge the adoption of the Convention, and to extend his juridical ægis to the refugees whether in temporary or permanent lands of asylum. He will be closely linked with the Emigration Office by his presence on the Governmental Committee. The voluntary organizations will have a double support; from the League for their work in securing a measure of human rights in the lands of refuge, and from the inter-governmental Emigration Office in the planning of an ordered emigration overseas.

There was natural disappointment on the part of many of the Jewish bodies whose representatives were gathered at Evian, that Palestine had little part in the discussions at the Conference. She has been the principal country of settlement of the Jews from Germany since 1933, and has received over 40,000 of them. At the moment she can no longer fill that part in the same



measure; and Lord Winterton maintained that the proposal for immigration on the scale of 1934 and 1935 was untenable. Another proposal which is constantly put forward from various sources, including ingenious or disingenuous Nazi writers, for a mass immigration to empty lands, received little encouragement. Madagascar, Western Australia, South-West Africa, it is said, could harbour hosts of refugees. Let us give a land without a people to people without a land. But experience has proved that the greater the space, the greater the cost of settlement, and the fewer the settlers in the first stages. The main remedy must continue to be found by infiltration of emigrants into existing and established communities, whether urban or rural.

One other aspect of the Evian Conference is to be noted in its special relation to the British Commonwealth of Nations. A week before the Conference assembled, the report was published of the Overseas Settlement Board which was appointed in 1936 to advise upon proposals for schemes of migration within the Empire. It establishes two principal points. It is urgent to strengthen the Empire by migration, in view of the insistent call for the development of the sparsely settled regions fit for white settlement. And whereas in the United Kingdom and the Dominions the birth-rate shows a remarkable decrease, it can no longer be assumed as axiomatic that the migration of large numbers from Great Britain to the Dominions is beneficial. The corollary, hesitatingly drawn, is that British migration should be supplemented by a carefully regulated flow of other emigrants of assimilable types.

Since 1931, in fact, there has been an adverse balance of British movement from the Dominions, amounting to over 130,000 persons. That contrasts with the net increase of British migration to the Dominions of 223,000 in the single year before the World War, and of 600,000 in the first seven years following the War. Moreover, unless the decline of the birth-rate is reversed there will be a steady reduction of the population in the younger ages, and, therefore, of the section best fitted for migration from Britain. The policy of a White Australia may still be feasible; but the idea of a British-born Australia is no longer in accord with the essential facts of population. The doctrine of autarchy in regard to the population of the British Commonwealth may

run counter to the best interests of the Empire and to international well-being no less than the doctrine of autarchy of other States in regard to goods.

The Board suggests that the non-British immigrants should come preferably from those countries whose inhabitants have sprung originally from the same stock as ourselves and who share our outlook in many directions. Do they mean by this description Germans and Scandinavians? But if Aryan Germans spring originally from the same stock, they cannot be said, to-day, to share our outlook in many directions; and, as to the Scandinavians, the report observes that their birth-rate has shown a heavy decline since 1923. The countries of Northern Europe are moving, like Great Britain, towards a stationary and then a declining population. On the other hand Germany, by her present policy towards her non-Aryan minority, offers to the British Dominions a section of her citizens who are looking for a home in which they may live free from persecution, who include persons of the highest economic intellectual and moral qualities, and who would be eager to assimilate the British character and adopt, at the earliest moment, British citizenship. They would be British, if not by birth, then by choice. Hitherto the self-governing Dominions have provided a home for only a tiny fraction of the 150,000 Jews and non-Aryans who have left Germany during the last five years. Their immigration policy, it may be suggested, adheres somewhat too closely to the ideas of the Victorian and Edwardian age. The new factors of population and the new circumstances of the British Commonwealth call for a broad reconsideration of that policy.

The Dominions, no less than the United States, have gained greatly in the past by the reception of elements fleeing from persecution. The Evian Conference has given a fresh lead to a movement for the international planning of migration of those elements. If, in response to that lead, the Dominions would adopt a more liberal policy towards the immigration of refugees from Europe, they would make a positive contribution to their own economic well-being, to the strength of the Empire and to the service of humanity.



## THE INTELLIGENT MAN'S GUIDE TO OSCAR WILDE.

BY HUGH KINGSMILL

**B**ERNARD Shaw's attempt to persuade the world that Frank Harris's *Oscar Wilde* is the authoritative work on Wilde, the book by which Wilde's memory must stand or fall, is as strange a story as literary history contains.

Frank Harris was writing his book on Wilde round about 1910, and when I met him in the autumn of 1911 he showed it to me in manuscript. Having been attracted to Harris by his book on Shakespeare, I was rather taken aback that he should have devoted a book to Wilde. The subject seemed to me unworthy of him, and there was a moment during which I wondered if he had written it for money. This fantastic idea was dispelled by his deep and earnest tones as he held the manuscript towards me—"Take it and read it" he boomed, "and let me have your full mind on it. It may help me, and will at least give me a deeper knowledge of you". Opening the manuscript, he pointed to the aphorism which stood at the beginning of the book, and indeed still stands there, having survived the many excisions, modifications and afterthoughts which have ravaged this authoritative work in the course of the last twenty-seven years. "The Crucifixion of the Guilty" he read out "is still more awe-inspiring than the crucifixion of the innocent; what do we men know of innocence"? "Does that say anything to you"? he asked. "It holds the spirit in which I have written, and in which a few, perhaps, will read".

The aphorism did not say anything very intelligible to me, but there was a cavernous majesty about it as intoned by Harris which subdued me to the proper mood for reading the manuscript. The book impressed me deeply. First of all, there was the bold challenge to English hypocrisy in the realistic treatment of sex. The opening chapter, which introduces the reader to Wilde's parents, is entirely filled with the details of a suit brought by a

girl who accused Wilde's father of first drugging and then seducing her. The middle of the book is given up to the two trials of Oscar Wilde, and draws profusely on the law reports of these trials. The close of the book is largely concerned with Wilde's seduction of a youthful conscript in Paris, set off by long talks with Harris, in which Wilde is lyrical about the delights of homosexuality, hints that he is beginning to like his pleasures seasoned with cruelty, and expresses his repugnance to normal sex in a diatribe on the disgust inspired in him by his wife when pregnant.

The structure raised on this foundation seemed to me full of pity and terror—the man of genius crucified by English middle-class hatred and envy; the sinister young aristocrat, Lord Alfred Douglas, hounding and re-hounding his friend to his doom; and, rising above this welter of weakness and wickedness, Greatheart Harris, dazed when Wilde first confesses his guilt, but infinitely generous and compassionate to his fallen friend, and ready to brave all Philistia in his aid, though a little impatient at the, to him, incredible absence of any fighting spirit in the gifted but feeble Oscar.

Frank Harris's treatment of Douglas made publication of the book in the ordinary way impossible, so he decided to bring it out privately. In spite of the aphorism quoted above, he knew a great deal about innocence, and persuaded a friend who had a small bookshop to guarantee the cost of setting the M.S. up in type. Various complications, including a month in Brixton goal, interfered with Harris's plans, and the book did not start its career in England. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, Harris sailed for the States, carrying the sheets of the book with him, and leaving his friend to settle with the printers out of the proceeds on the forced sale of his shop.

In 1916 Harris published *Oscar Wilde* in America, and sent a number of copies to Hesketh Pearson, who in the ardour of youth did not expect to meet with any difficulty in carrying out Harris's request that he would interest the leading English writers in the book. Having sent copies to Arnold Bennett, Joseph Conrad, James Barrie, H. G. Wells, Edmund Gosse and Rudyard Kipling, Pearson awaited their replies, which were either in the first person and bitter, or in the third person and



brief. The only gleam of light in the literary landscape was Bernard Shaw, who wrote Harris a long letter on Wilde for insertion in his next edition, and asked Pearson round for a "chat on Frank".

It was in this letter that Shaw said Wilde's memory must stand or fall by Harris's book, and, accepting Harris's facts, characterized Wilde in his last years as "an unproductive drunkard and swindler". Yet in his talk with Pearson, immediately after this letter, Shaw, referring to some sketches by Harris of himself and other English writers, said: "He is really a frightful liar, writing imaginary conversations in an imaginary character, with odd little bits of actual reminiscence in them". So at the outset of Shaw's connection with Harris's *Wilde*, we are in the presence of the still unsolved problem why Shaw should consider Harris an unimpeachable authority on Wilde, but a frightful liar about everyone else.

In 1918 Harris re-issued his *Wilde* with Shaw's letter, which gave it a large sale in the States, and later in France and Germany. The thought that if only he had taken a different view of Alfred Douglas the book would be having an equally large sale in England preyed increasingly on his mind, and in 1925 he approached Douglas and offered to withdraw all the misstatements about him, and re-issue the book in its purged form with a preface setting forth how he had been deceived by the malicious misrepresentations of Wilde and Robert Ross. Douglas agreed, and Harris wrote a preface in which he said that the whole story showed what an elusive goddess Truth was, since she had succeeded in eluding someone so sincere and scrupulous as himself. After the preface had been written, Harris jibbed over the correction of the misstatements, Douglas refused to lift the ban, and Harris wrote what he called a Final Preface, in which he withdrew his withdrawal, and reinstated Douglas as the villain in the Wilde drama.

Harris died in 1931. Although my belief in him as a great and good man had perished while I was still in the early twenties, my interest in him as an extraordinary character remained, and I wrote a life of him which was published in the spring of 1932. Harris wanted to be everything, a Shakespeare, a Cæsar, a Christ, a millionaire, a great lover, an athlete, an æsthete, an

Adonis, an anarchist, an anchorite and an Old Etonian. The natural result was that he did not succeed at all in most of these parts, or conspicuously in any of them. As he would neither abandon his ambitions, nor admit that he had failed to achieve them, he adjusted what was to what should have been by romancing on a scale which can never have been surpassed, and which Casanova alone, of liars I am acquainted with, has come anywhere near equalling. Beneath the high sentiments adorning his *Oscar Wilde* and his other biographies, there was a savage bitterness which he tried to appease with inventions designed to glorify himself and to belittle everyone who had hurt his vanity, either directly or merely by being superior to him in virtue, intellect or any other form of human excellence.

Hearing from Wilde's oldest friend, Robert Harborough Sherard, a few months after my book appeared, that he had written a detailed exposure of Harris's *Wilde*, I asked to see the manuscript, which was published last year (1937) under the title *Bernard Shaw, Frank Harris and Oscar Wilde*, Shaw appearing in it as the person responsible for guaranteeing Harris's reliability. I suggested to Sherard, when I had finished the manuscript, that I should pass it on to Shaw, who could not fail to be convinced by it of his mistake in recommending Harris's book as the work by which Wilde's memory must stand or fall. Sherard consented, and I called on Shaw. I did not think Shaw would much mind withdrawing his endorsement of Harris's *Wilde*. The time for being generous to Harris was now over, and the time for being just to Wilde had arrived. As a public man Shaw, I recognized, would not seek occasions to withdraw his pronouncements, but in this instance he had simply to point out that since endorsing Harris's *Oscar Wilde*, he had been compelled to revise and in many places rewrite Harris's *Bernard Shaw*.

I made no headway at all with Shaw. He said that Harris's *Wilde* was far more interesting than the real Wilde, and when I replied that the point at issue was not the interest but the authenticity of Harris's *Wilde*, he diverged into memories of Wilde and Wilde's mother, both of whom seem to have filled him with considerable distaste. Reflecting after I left him on all he had said, I realized that he had a deeply-rooted antipathy



to Wilde, and a less deep but lively affection for Harris. Irishmen are seldom susceptible to one another's charm, and there were many reasons, some valid, why Shaw should not care for Wilde. His sentiment for Harris was also understandable. If Wilde was the hare in the race for fame, and Shaw the tortoise, Harris was a bull who had charged on to the course, killing a score of spectators, broken all records for the hundred yards, charged off again, and later been found dead in a ditch. A tortoise would be rather taken by a bull who behaved like that.

Shaw's aversion from Wilde and his affection for Harris did not, however, excuse his refusal to look at Sherard's manuscript. I concluded that he attached as much importance to a reputation for infallibility as the dictators whom he admired, and had not learnt from Dr. Johnson's "Ignorance, Madam, pure ignorance" how tenderly the world feels towards anyone capable of admitting an error.

Sherard, having failed to find a publisher for his manuscript, set up a printing press in his Corsican lair, and presently issued a pamphlet in two parts, the second containing a combined attack on Shaw and Harris. The pamphlet attracted some attention in England; and when, a little later, Mr. Vincent O'Sullivan published a dispassionate unmelodramatic account of Wilde in his last years, the jacket of the book contained a tribute from Bernard Shaw, in which he said that Mr. O'Sullivan's account would prove a valuable corrective to Frank Harris's.

At last the manuscript of the indomitable Sherard appeared in book form, and was accepted everywhere as totally disposing of Harris's *Wilde*. Shaw's praise of Vincent O'Sullivan was the first step towards a full repudiation of Harris's caricature, and a letter to the papers, when Sherard's book came out, would have enabled him to complete the evacuation of a position which had become altogether untenable. But Napoleon would not resign himself to Elba, and Shaw, too, was resolved to have his Waterloo. In the July of this year, 1938, Frank Harris's *Oscar Wilde* was published for the first time in England, with a preface of over forty pages by Shaw. Shaw began by saying that he had done his best to discourage the agitation against his endorsement of Harris's *Wilde* by ignoring it, and then at once

went on to say that Mr. Sherard was too engaging an author to be ignored. It would be wearisome to follow him through his subsequent contradictions. All that clearly emerged from the preface was his determination not to recede from his position that Harris was not merely the best biographer of Wilde, but the custodian of Wilde's fame. More than ever, Shaw said, did he stick to his view that Wilde's memory would have to stand or fall by Harris's book. For the purpose of telling Wilde's story both artistically and sanely, Harris, said Shaw, was "the noblest Roman of them all".

In the present edition, Shaw explained, some of Harris's facts had been "brought up to date", his strictures on Alfred Douglas, due to imperfect sympathy and knowledge, had been omitted, and there were a few other emendations.

Shaw did not disclose who had made the emendations. Some of the emendations are in the first person, and these are presumably the corrections made by Harris in 1925, before his impatience got the better of his desire to placate Douglas. Others are in the style of Shaw, who neither here nor in Harris's *Bernard Shaw* has succeeded in blending his manner with Harris's. Occasionally there is an emendation which begins with Harris and goes on with Shaw : for example,

"Oscar, I believe, died slowly and quietly in the modest hotel where he was treated with extraordinary kindness and forbearance by his landlord Dupoirier and Madame Dupoirier".

The tribute to the Dupoiriers is certainly a graceful borrowing by Shaw from Sherard, who is the chief source of such facts and facts-brought-up-to-date as Harris's lives of Wilde contain ; but the "slowly and quietly" is, I think, Harris's 1925 modification of the "loud explosion" which preluded Wilde's death in the original edition.

The reception accorded to this authoritative hotch-potch has been unanimously hostile. Mr. Desmond MacCarthy suggested that the publishers should withdraw it, Mr. Harold Nicolson said that it ought never to have appeared, and while Shaw was treated with the consideration due to his age and past achievements, the noblest Roman of them all was pelted from all sides with what he would have described, borrowing for once



from himself, as "the mouldy cabbages of pedantry and the rotten eggs of envy".

A greater or a lesser man would have given in at this stage, but Shaw attempted to defend himself in a letter to the *Sunday Times*. After saying that Harris was "a curious and interesting character besides being a very amusing one", Shaw continued "I have done my best to depict him as he really was, and to clear his essentially truthful narrative from the errors which affected the justice due to living persons". This defence did not touch the essential point that Shaw had made no appreciable effort to perform the certainly stupendous task of clearing Harris's narrative from the errors which affected the justice due to Wilde.

The same number of the *Sunday Times* contained a paragraph from which it appeared that Shaw had not even succeeded in clearing the narrative of its errors about Douglas. The publishers, one read, following a consultation with Lord Alfred Douglas, had agreed to issue no further copies of the first edition of Frank Harris's *Oscar Wilde*. A second edition was in preparation, from which seven pages of the first edition would be omitted, these pages containing Harris's account of an incident at Chantilly—the passage to which Lord Alfred took particular exception.

It was from anything but a desire to provoke Douglas that Shaw left these pages in. In his preface he had praised Lord Alfred's beauty, poetic genius and critical insight. Lord Alfred, he said, had written the only understanding book on Shakespeare's Sonnets. and this was due to his being the Mr. W. H. of the Sonnets come back to life. In his book on the Sonnets, Douglas insists again and again that Mr. W. H. was not of noble birth, and it is therefore clear that Shaw had not read Douglas with much attention, or he would not have thrown out the suggestion that Lord Alfred was the plebeian Mr. W. H. redivivus. The truth which emerges throughout from Shaw's action over Harris's *Wilde* and the best excuse that can be made for him, is that he does not read books with much attention. He enjoys rhetoric and is impressed by force, and if there are force and rhetoric in a book, and Harris's *Wilde* is full of both, Shaw is satisfied. The Chantilly episode, which Shaw

presumably thought both sane and artistic and to which Douglas most reasonably took exception, represents Wilde as a kind of knockabout King Lear, reeling between Harris-Kent and Douglas-Regan.

In his letter to the *Sunday Times*, which was in reply to Mr. Desmond MacCarthy's review, Shaw said that Mr. MacCarthy might feel a little for Mrs. Frank Harris, left with no property except Harris's copyrights. It was largely out of sympathy for Mrs. Harris that Shaw submitted to having his life written by Harris ; but there is an obvious difference between helping Mrs. Harris at his own expense and at Wilde's.

It is unlikely that the second (English) edition of Harris's *Wilde* will attract many purchasers. There is not much money in putting Baron Munchausen under a cherry tree with an axe, and calling him George Washington. What Shaw has overlooked are the possibilities of Harris as Harris. The best way in which he can serve the Harris estate is by extracting the most striking episodes in Harris's *Contemporary Portraits* and his autobiography, and publishing them with illustrations by the leading cartoonists of the day, beginning with Max Beerbohm, who knew and appreciated Harris. Among the drawings I should be glad to see in this volume are Harris as a new boy at Eton ; Harris and Skobelev storming Plevna ; Harris consoling Carlyle for his failure to consummate his marriage with Mrs. Carlyle ; Harris refusing money from Cecil Rhodes ; Harris in a solitude of desert and mountain wrestling with an angel ; Froude and Lecky in the porch of Westminster Abbey at the funeral of Robert Browning dissociating themselves from Harris's views on prostitution ; Ruskin failing to make it clear to Harris whether he watched by the bed of the dying Rose La Touche or got into it ; Maupassant succeeding in making it clear to Harris that he stood well with the opposite sex ; Lord Roberts confirming Harris's low estimate of Lord Kitchener ; Harris helping a muzzy Walter Pater into a hansom cab ; Harris walking by the side of a weeping Thomas Huxley ; Harris wishing godspeed to Trotsky in New York ; and Harris telling the exact truth to President Kruger in Pretoria.



## AIR BOMBARDMENT

BY J. M. SPAIGHT, C.B., C.B.E.

THE term "military objective" came into use in the Great War. It was devised, a cynic might say, to give some shade of legality to practices which were indefensible, to throw a cloak of decency over what was really frightfulness. That may be true to some extent, but there was something more to be said for the rule and the practice to which it applied. If armed forces can be attacked from the air, and no one would question their liability to be so attacked, it is only logical to hold that their barracks and the depots in which their arms are stored or the factories in which their arms are made are also subject to attack. In principle the rule of the military objective is sound enough. It is in the practical application of the rule and in the extension of it to questionable objectives that difficulty arises.

However indiscriminate or reckless the bombing may have appeared to the victims in any given instance, the authorities responsible for it are always satisfied—according to their *communiqués*—that it was directed solely at military objectives. The dispatches and official reports of the war years are a record of the conviction of each and every belligerent that his bombers confined their attack to such targets. The Germans on their side bombed "*sonst militärisch wichtige Punkte*". No Italian airmen ever attacked any thing that was not an *obiettivo militare*. And the action of "our" airmen was always in striking contrast to that of "the enemy", who showed no such consideration for innocent life and property. Occasionally, of course, it could not be concealed that regrettable accidents had happened. When a Council School in Poplar was hit and some hundreds of children were killed and wounded, when a crowd waiting to enter a circus was bombed at Karlsruhe with pitiable slaughter, well, it was unfortunate, but such things must happen

sometimes in war. *C'est la guerre, que voulez vous ?* In general, it was true, each country held that its own airmen were humane and considerate, those of the enemy baby-killers of set purpose.

In any case, the term came to stay. So well was the rule established that one finds Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, replying to a question in the House of Commons on June 4, 1919, in regard to the bombing of Afghan towns, in the following terms :—

“I have ascertained from the Viceroy that all possible care is taken to confine operations to troops and *military objectives* and to avoid villages and other unfortified places. *British military practice in this respect is sufficiently known* to make a pronouncement upon the subject unnecessary”.

In the Great War the belligerents, according to their own announcements, regarded as military objectives not only barracks, military depots and munition factories, but railways and railway stations, petrol deposits, electric power stations, gas works, waterworks, foundries, blast furnaces, steel works and other plants producing the raw materials of armaments. In the present operations in Spain and China the term has been interpreted at least as widely. Railway stations and railway lines have been a favourite target. The Kowloon-Canton and Canton-Hankow railways have been described as “the most bombed railways on the face of the earth”. The Wongsha station in Canton, the terminus of the line to Hankow, has been bombed practically out of existence. The Taishatau station, the terminus of the line to Kowloon, has also been very heavily raided.

In Spain, besides railways, harbours and ports have been particular targets for the bombs of the Nationalist aircraft. British and other ships have been sunk or damaged in the course of such attacks. The Nationalists have denied that their airmen deliberately bombed British ships, and no doubt in many of the instances the damage was unintentionally inflicted. As the correspondent of *The Times* at Barcelona said in that journal on June 2, 1938, the streets in some of the Spanish towns run down to the waterfront, and in these circumstances a ship in the harbour may well be hit by a bomb not aimed at her. That there have also been cases of direct attack on ships, however, was stated by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on June 21, 1938. There is no doubt whatever that



deliberate bombing of merchantmen, in harbour or outside, is contrary to the principles of international law, but the subject is too large for adequate treatment here. It would require a separate article.

There is no such inevitability about the damage when the innocent property is far removed from any military objective, and some of the bombing in both Spain and China has undoubtedly been open to challenge on this account. Of the eight raids of March 17-18, 1938, upon Barcelona, those which created the greatest havoc were not aimed at military objectives, said the *Times* correspondent. "They were aimed at a section of the Old City where the poor live huddled like rabbits in their warrens. They were aimed also at the wide boulevards and plazas, where at the hour of 2 p.m. throngs are taking the sun or otherwise enjoying the Spanish noonday hour". The damage done on the night of March 16-17, said Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 18, 1938, appeared from the Press reports to have been "done largely to living quarters and not to military objectives". He spoke of the "horror and disgust" with which the reports were read.

So, in the raid on Canton on the morning of May 30, 1938, more than half of the bombs were reported to have been dropped on crowded residential quarters. That was the third day of reiterated bombing attacks and, taken as a whole, said *The Times* correspondent in that journal on May 31, thirty per cent of the bombs were dropped in districts where there were no conceivable objectives of a military, administrative or industrial kind. The raids of May 31 were also in many instances directed at areas in which "there was no discoverable objective of any kind", according to the same correspondent.

It is evident that in the raids referred to in the two preceding paragraphs the bombing was *general*, not *specific*. Bombing of this kind was condemned in the note which Mr. Grew, the American Ambassador at Tokyo, handed (under his Government's instructions) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1937. The note protested against the then recent bombing of Canton and Nanking and stated that the general bombing of an extensive area in which resides a large

population engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to the principles of law and humanity.

Now, *general bombing* may be of two kinds. It may be bombing of an area in which no military objectives whatever exist, the purpose being the demoralization of the civil population. It may also be the bombing of an area in which there are military objectives but in which such objectives are not specifically aimed at, the whole area being sprayed with bombs on the chance that a military objective may be hit.

It was to general bombing of the *first* of these two kinds that Mr. Chamberlain was referring in the House of Commons on March 21, 1938, when he stated that our Agent at Burgos had been instructed to draw the attention of General Franco's administration to the fact that direct and deliberate attacks on civilian populations are contrary to the principles of international law as based on the practices of civilized nations, to the laws of humanity, and to the dictates of public opinion.

In the *second* kind of general bombing, however, the purpose can hardly be said to be the deliberate bombing of the civil population; it is rather the hope of scoring a lucky hit upon the objective or objectives in the course of a raid which "straddles" the whole region. Now, that kind of bombing is regarded as general or indiscriminate bombing and, therefore, indefensible.

It was, in fact, implicitly condemned by Mr. Chamberlain when, in reply to an earlier question on March 21, 1938, he stated that "bombs fell all over the town (Barcelona) and appeared to have been dropped at random". Admittedly, there were many military objectives in Barcelona—they were enumerated in the Nationalist Government's reply to the British and French protests of March—but the fact that the town contained 200 factories of war material (according to a Burgos statement) in addition to barracks, military headquarters and anti-aircraft batteries—all legitimate objectives for *specific* attack—did not justify the general or "random" bombardment of the city on the off-chance of hitting one or more of them.

A *third* kind of bombardment must also be condemned. It is the bombing which is aimed, indeed, at a military objective, and therefore cannot be classed as general or indiscriminate bombing,



but is aimed so carelessly or recklessly that the conclusion cannot be escaped that the primary object is terrorization and not the destruction of the military objective which is the nominal target.

To condemn such bombing is, it is true, to make the lawfulness of bombing depend upon the results. That is inevitable if the rule of the military objective is to be retained and if it is to be of any real value. There have indeed been some indications of late that Herr Hitler's suggestion of 1936, for the prohibition of the bombing of "open localities" outside the range of the medium artillery of the fighting fronts, may again be considered. It is assumed, however, in this paper that, for the present at least, the line of advance will be the development of the doctrine of the military objective. If that line is followed there seems to be no practical alternative to judging a bombardment by its fruits.

In the House of Commons on June 3rd, 1938, Mr. Chamberlain referring to the raids on Canton of May 28 to 30, said: "The reports indicate that, whatever may have been the objects aimed at, most of the bombs fell on points which cannot be considered as of military importance". He went on to say that our Ambassador at Tokyo had been instructed to protest urgently "against this indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and thickly populated centres". In other words, he looked not to the intention but to the effect of the bombardment.

There is nothing unfair, or, indeed, unusual, in the principle of such *ex post facto* judgment. Bombing is expert's work, and from the expert in matters of ordinary practice one demands a reasonably high standard of both skill and discretion, as shown by the results. In everyday life the expert could not evade responsibility for bungled work on the plea that he had done something fairly close to what he set out to do, though he had not done the thing itself!

Nor should the plea be valid that anti-aircraft fire prevented the bombing airman from descending to a height at which the individual objective could be identified or accurately attacked. In the reply of the Navy Office at Tokyo to the resolution of the Committee of Twenty-three at Geneva in September, 1937, condemning the bombing of Chinese towns, it was stated that

Japanese airmen had suffered losses by anti-aircraft fire while flying low to secure accurate aim. They appear to have avoided low flying in later raids, though one or two instances of dive-bombing were reported. At any rate in the raids on Canton at the end of May and beginning of June, the airmen's marksmanship was bad, said the correspondent of *The Times* at Hong Kong on June 5, 1938, "the intensity of the Chinese gunfire, which was greatly increased since last week, compelling them to fly high".

If anti-aircraft fire forces bombing airmen to fly at a height from which specific objectives cannot be bombed with fair accuracy, it is not unreasonable to expect them to refrain from bombing altogether. Such ground fire is one of the normal factors of the case. It is to be expected in a raid. The bomber who encounters it is not entitled to say: 'The blood be upon your own head'. If he could say that, the rule would become a nullity. He is still under obligation to confine his attack to discernible military objectives.

Absolute precision, on the other hand, cannot be expected. Bombing is often conducted today from altitudes in the neighbourhood of 20,000 feet, and it is inevitable under such conditions that innocent life and property in the vicinity of the target should sometimes suffer. A bombardment by a military or naval force does not become unlawful because *unavoidable* loss or damage is caused by the shells aimed at a legitimate objective, and a reasonable margin of error can be claimed with equal reason in bombardment from the air. It is a vastly different thing, however, to scatter shells or bombs over a wide district in the hope of hitting an objective therein—or, even under the distraction of anti-aircraft fire, to aim at a particular objective so carelessly or recklessly that any military advantage achieved by the raid is paid for at an appalling price in non-combatant life.

In fact, the doctrine of the military objective, like Browning's *enclitic de*, must remain 'dead from the waist down' until it has had a revitalizing injection, the prescription for which is suggested in broad outline above. General bombing should be banned, and also the kind of specific bombing which is such only in name. Before that, it should be made clear what the term "military objective" covers, with as much precision as is



possible. Does it cover power stations and waterworks, for instance? The Japanese bombers destroyed both, in the Saikwan district of Canton, in their raids on June 6, 7 and 8, 1938. Does it cover gasworks? Does it cover administrative offices which have no relation to the fighting services? And what of blast furnaces, coke ovens and the like? The position, in general, of establishments which serve the civil needs of a town predominantly, and military purposes only in a minor degree, should be made clear.

The next thing needful is to agree that not only are military objectives (as so defined) alone subject to bombardment, but that they are so subject only if they can be bombed without altogether disproportionate loss being inflicted upon innocent life and property at the same time. The rule governing bombing of military objectives in urban areas should be developed, in fact, as the rule governing blockade was developed eighty years ago. In the Declaration of Paris the Powers agreed that, to be lawful, a blockade must be *effective*. So the bombing of even military objectives should be lawful only where it is effective—in the sense that its main effect is produced within the perimeter of the target aimed at and not over a wide surrounding area. The result would be to make unlawful at least some of the raids which have been conducted against towns in China and in which, as *The Times* stated in a leading article on September 28, 1937, though Tokyo claimed that military objectives alone were bombed, “the ascertainable damage done to such objectives has been infinitesimal by comparison with the havoc wrought among civilians in thickly populated districts.”

Until the rule of the military objective is completed in some such fashion as that outlined above it is difficult to see what practical purpose can be accomplished by the sending of the Commission of two British observers to Toulouse to await requests to investigate complaints of indiscriminate bombing. The commission will have to report whether there were in fact military objectives in any place that is bombed. If the commission can define what exactly a military objective is, they are much to be envied. In any event, the effect upon world opinion of their report, when rendered, is likely to be weakened by propaganda so long as the rule about military objectives is left in its present

decidedly unfinished state. It could always be alleged, for instance, that there were troops in a town when it was bombed, and troops are a military objective, even though only temporarily in the place.



## THE ERA OF MANAGEMENT

By A. G. H. DENT

THE classical definition sets out that Labour, Capital and Land are the sources of wealth but, as Marshall has stated, there is a fourth agent, "Organization". The importance of recognizing this agent is evident in the modern, flow-production machino-facture and mass distribution system, and if one uses the term "Management" instead of Organization it will be more in line with the trend of thought.

In this technico-economic complex, Management is seen to be the essential partner of Labour and Capital without which these two factors could not produce effectively. Industry's growth in economic power, in size of producing unit, and of marketing range, in plant investment, in complexity of system—all these trends have made the demand for higher standards of efficiency, using this word in its broadest sense. During the period of the growth of these trends there has been a wider and wider spread of capital ownership in the joint-stock company system, increasing absentee ownership without an effective corporate responsibility. In consequence of these movements public feeling, as far as one may interpret it, has strengthened in the belief that industry should exercise its economic power with more attention to its corresponding social responsibility.

Parallel with these changes in conditions and in thought there has grown up the "Management Movement" which is, in its best and most enduring form, the education of men for undertaking positions of responsibility in industry—accompanied by a steady professionalization of the function of management.

"Scientific Management" is a product of the industrial revolution, although there are records of method and practice in manufacture and trade from earliest days which correspond with modern systems. The Babylonian harvest records, for example, shew a stock-control plan, the principle of which is

carried out in modern plants. The grain was stored in jars, each having a coloured seal or reed to mark the production-year of the grain. A separate colour distinguished each year, so that the officer in charge of granary stores maintained a complete check on the various quantities in stock from each year's harvest. He could, presumably, estimate the amount in hand and relate it to the consuming power of the population, and probably the priests who studied the vagaries of the Euphrates would attempt a forecast as to the nature of the forthcoming harvest. More recently, in the seventeenth century, a Yorkshire firm was laying down in close detail specifications for the purchasing of raw materials, and rules for conduct of men in the workshops. So that scientific management is not new in principle, although it is new in the intensity of its application to industrial processes. Even its specialization of tasks and their sub-division into detailed unit operations was anticipated by Charles Babbage, a professor of Mathematics at Cambridge in the 1840's.

However, it is customary to date the beginning of Scientific Management some fifty years ago. The application of scientific methods to production processes is associated with the experiments of F. W. Taylor in the U.S.A. in the Midvale workshops. Taylor studied individual processes of production and tried to find out the "best" way in which a particular job should be done. From his early work in the 1880's and from the work of his followers one may date the beginning of the modern flow-production system with its essential feature of the specialization of task. He realized the need for uniformity, that work should be sub-divided into separate processes which could be examined, re-arranged, and then timed by stop-watch to find out the fair rate that should be set an average worker on each process. In its early stages Scientific Management was identified with time-study, task-setting and piece-rate methods and this term was first used by Louis Brandeis in 1910 to describe the methods of Taylor and his school of thought. It was regarded with some suspicion in England at first. In fact, the late John Lee said: "Englishmen generally think of Scientific Management as a means whereby a clever American decided which was the most convenient shovel for a gang of navvies to use".

The scientific approach has been made to other problems than those of production, leading to an increase of specialization and a development of techniques. Long-period planning, budgeting of all functions of production, marketing and finance, establishment of standards in all fields, costing to close limits, psychological investigation into working conditions—these are modern processes in large-scale operations. These have called for such specialists as the economist, the statistician, the budgeting officer, the personnel officer and the cost accountant.

Considering this last-mentioned technique as an example, it is scarcely twenty years old, for it was in 1918 that a pioneering mind produced a work with the title, "Standard Costs". G. Charter Harrison had studied the methods of F. W. Taylor and H. L. Gantt, reasoning that the principles behind them should apply in the field of accountancy. On the whole professional accountancy disliked this innovation: orthodoxy reacted coldly to the assault on traditional practice. No doubt when Luca Paciolo first produced his double-entry system of keeping accounts for the City of Venice, some seven hundred years ago, the accounting hierarchy of Rome sent him a stiff note and advised the Mayor and Corporation of Venice to transfer him to the Gondola Department! However, in both these instances, unorthodoxy survived opposition.

Four years after the appearance of Charter Harrison's publication, an important work appeared in the U.S.A. dealing with scientific methods of estimating ahead, using a co-ordinated system of planning to unify the operations of finance, production and distribution. This bore the now familiar title "Budgetary Control" and was written by Professor J. O. McKinsey of Chicago University.

About the same time as these changes were taking place, the far-seeing mind of Henri Fayol in France was studying Administration (or General Management) to formulate definite principles for organization and control. Long-period planning of company operations distinguished his methods. He recognized the importance of unity and stability in Management and he attempted to set out principles of organization. From the work of Fayol and Taylor, and their fellow-workers have been built up the current industrial methods of fact-analysis,



establishment of standards, sub-division of operations, allocation of responsibilities, and planning and budgeting of all activities.

An important fact recognized by Fayol was that as an individual's responsibilities and status increase in importance, the technical or specialized ability needed decreases and the administrative ability needed increases. This point was well illustrated by Lt.-Col. O'Meara in a paper he gave before the Institution of Electrical Engineers in 1919, and he shewed diagrammatically the relative proportions of technical and administrative ability needed for different positions in an undertaking. For instance, the ratio is given as 75% technical and 25% administrative for the junior engineer and 75% administrative and 25% technical for the general manager.

One may emphasize here three main points from Fayol's thesis; that administration is a major function possessing logical principles and processes; that, this being so, it must be studied; that its importance increases with responsibility and position.

There have been many changes in ideas during the period between the first Scientific Management Congress ever held—in 1911 in the U.S.A.—and the Seventh International Management Congress which takes place in Washington this month. The Congress has returned to the land of its origin, but one may say that it goes home a bigger and a better man. Many of the undesirable features of early work have been removed and the humanizing contributions of many progressive minds have given to industrial management a new and distinctive status. One has only to examine the programme of papers and discussions set out for the Seventh International Management Congress to realize the extent to which the original Scientific Management movement has widened and deepened. The papers to be submitted by the various countries taking part cover the theme of, "Recent Developments in Management", divided into the groups, Administration, Production, Distribution, Personnel, Agriculture and the Home. These cover the technical sessions. The plenary sessions are devoted to the discussion of "The Social and Economic Aspects of Management".

It is recognized that limitations remain to the scientific method in the conduct and control of enterprises. There is an art of

management to consider. This is a difficult thing to define, for it continues to be a very individual expression of capacity. But if art is defined as "practical skill guided by rules", it can be studied for imitation. The ideal blend of science and art in management will continue to escape us; nevertheless, the professional urge in management brings keen executives closer to this goal. For instance, co-operation is more an art than a science and co-ordination more a science than an art. It demands more than a man in authority issuing instructions; it requires organization structure, defined lines of authority and principles of administration. Industry has much to learn from older institutions in applying organization principles—and it has much to teach them in other fields.

One must distinguish between the over-all process and its functions. The term General Management, as used by Fayol, or the term Administrative Management as used by the Committee of the President of the U.S.A. in their recent report, effectively describes those major activities of organization, co-ordination, command, control, forecasting and planning which govern the specific functions of an enterprise such as manufacturing, marketing, financing, purchasing, research, *etc.*

Training for these functions is becoming professional in character, leading to training in principles of administration and management. On this matter there are—and always will be—two opposite schools of thought, the empiric who believe management ability to be wholly a personal attribute and the educational who, while recognizing the fundamental values of 'personality', believe that it needs reinforcing by study of principles and methods. Both empiricists and educationalists agree on the value of experience, the difference in attitude being that the former think solely in terms of individual experience whereas the latter include the systematic study of the experience of other men, their enterprises and how they have been organized and operated.

What has been done for education in management in Great Britain and what kind of progress has this movement made? Two pioneer bodies stand out in this work: Manchester University with its Department of Business Administration, associated with Dr. J. A. Bowie in its early days, and the

Institution of Industrial Administration, associated with the late Mr. E. K. Elbourne. This Institution, founded in 1920, has evolved standards that have been adopted by educational institutions which specialize in training for management and its syllabus is accepted in technical institutions throughout the country. The I.I.A. has worked to create for the function of Management a professional status, and has established a practical scheme of administrative training, holding examinations and granting Certificates and a Diploma. The Institution's "Fundamentals of Industrial Administration" are taught in sixty technical institutions and colleges in Great Britain and the Empire while both the Institution of Electrical Engineers and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers have adopted these fundamentals in their syllabus.

The movement has spread wide, for both the Board of Education and the London County Council include lectures on Management in their summer schools for engineering teachers. In addition, other universities have followed the lead of Manchester in establishing a Department of Business Administration or similar unit: London, Birmingham, Hull, Dundee and Southampton are included in this group. Apart from the recognized academic sources of training, studies have been initiated within certain large-scale enterprises which have developed their own educational plans for producing trained men to fill the posts of higher responsibility. In addition there is the interesting "Management Research Groups" organization, consisting of separate firms which interchange experience and methods freely and discuss each others problems of management.

These facts from the industrial educational field will show those outside industry the stability of the movement towards the professionalization of Administrative Management—and it is not alone in this over-all process but equally in its functions that this trend is evident. Co-ordinating influences have led to the formation of a group of eight professional bodies in the "Confederation of Management Associations" which has a total membership of close on 8,500 individuals on an authoritative level of executive capacity. The Oxford Conferences of this group—initiated some years ago by Mr. Seebohm Rowntree and since carried forward by the Confederation—are well-known



in industry as educational meetings at which the most significant advances in technique and practice are discussed. The Confederation has established a Professional Standards Committee and its various associations such as the Works Management Association and the Institute of Labour Management are setting up their own professional standards in co-ordinated training and examination schemes.

The primary aim of Education for attaining professional status has been discussed. As this passes from aim to achievement it is evident that its influence on executives is towards the cultivation of a greater sense of the social responsibility of industry. Fortunately, the movement is buoyantly free from political influences of any colour.

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It has been commonly noted that in discussions between Civil Service chiefs and industrialists, the former tend to think in terms of principle, and the latter in terms of customary practice. The Managers are beginning to think about principles which earlier organizations have evolved. These Principles of Administration concern fundamental problems of organization and control, including for example, the use and abuse of authority.

One may illustrate this point by a brief reference to the principles of the Judicial Authority and Compulsory Staff Service.

According to the principle of the Judicial Authority it is inadvisable to have in any large industrial undertaking one individual with supreme powers of judge, jury and law-giver acting as chief executive. The implication of this principle is that the present powers of the Managing Director are often too extensive with regard to personnel. One has to bear in mind that modern, large-scale manufacturing enterprises are new; they lack the stability of the Civil Service Departments in handling personnel problems. It becomes necessary to examine more closely the nature of authority; more and more clearly it is recognized that authority belongs to function or job not to the individual. It is not the Managing Director who is obeyed but his Managing Directorship. It is not his power to give orders, make decisions and dismiss men that matters so much as his supreme function of co-ordination. Actually, many decisions arrive on his desk ready made, as the result of

cumulative processes inside the organization. So one has to think less of the hierarchical order and more of the function.

From this line of thought has developed that idea of a judicial court to carry out the rules of the organization with regard to judging cases concerned with discipline of a critical nature—involving dismissal, grievances, etc. Such an internal judicial court, it is contended, should be independent of the Managing Director who would have no power to override its decisions.

Several hundred years ago the Jesuit Society foresaw some of these troubles. In that organization the General of the Society has a Council chosen by the congregation. He must consider this Council's advice and he cannot appoint them or remove them individually. The virtue of this system is that he will get advice which is free from fear of consequences.

Examining the problems of staff independence further, one finds an interesting principle discussed in the important study of organization made by Mooney & Riley, "Onward Industry". This is the principle of compulsory staff service in the Roman Catholic Church. It runs like this: "The abbot of a Benedictine Monastery must consult the elder monks about him before rendering decisions, even on minor matters . . . This rule in no way abridges the line authority of the abbot in making the final decision. He is simply prohibited from making any decision until the rule is complied with". This seems to be an important rule.

Pursuing these ideas further, modern managers are considering the problems of greater individual security of tenure. They are asking—how far can the idea of freedom of the individual be extended in an enterprise which is a profit making undertaking? Would a greater measure of security of tenure lead to less energetic personnel, comfortable and fat in their security? This is a contentious subject. Further, on what grounds should it be possible to dismiss an employee, whether high executive or office boy? Should not a worker in the "shops" be legally entitled to a certain period of notice? Can wise limits be set by binding into the Constitution of a limited company some principle and rule on this point?

Economic insecurity is one thing; insecurity through arbitrary exercise of authority is another. So one should not

dismiss as mere theorizing the idea of a Constitution that might be incorporated into the structure of the industry as a Code having legal status and sanction. One has seen the rise of the powers of the Trade Union as a necessary form of safeguard for one section of industrial workers. Perhaps industry will see the rise of a similar phenomenon among those who have no such protection and are occupying positions of greater responsibility.

Managers are beginning to look at the responsibilities of those who provide capital for industry. Investment houses and bankers, in deciding whether or not to underwrite a new issue of securities or to make advances for industrial companies, might require, in addition to the usual financial data, some information about personnel policies. If capital is to be risked, the factors of staff policy, team work, security of tenure, training of foremen, working conditions, labour turnover and frequency of disputes are vital to the security of the shareholder's investment.

There are other weaknesses of industry attracting the scrutiny of progressive executives. Mr. Horace Samuels' study, *Shareholders' Money*, shows various interlocking directorates, directors acting as trustees for debenture holders of their own companies and similar conditions which are unsound in principle. He considers remedies for these conditions, and among other suggestions, proposes that directors should be divided into two groups: executive and consultative directors; that it should be illegal for any director to accept his qualification shares from the promoters of a company, and that no director should act as Chairman of the company unless he is an active director, either of the company itself or of some allied or associated concern.

Further, many balance-sheets lack adequate detail and are published at too lengthy intervals. Many executives are asking whether it is not time that half-yearly or quarterly balance sheets and profit and loss statements were published, conforming to a minimum of information determined by experienced chartered accountants. These are the type of problems that modern managers are examining in their feeling that they should be able to combine an economic function with a sense



of social utility. It is evident that the professional attitude is penetrating deeply.

Let us try to summarize this view point broadly. The manager is working towards professional status through education for management. He is faced with big difficulties and problems. These may be divided into two groups, one concerning external forces, the other concerning internal forces of a manufacturing-distributing enterprise. In the first group some form of regulation appears desirable in the direction of capital to prevent waste and uneconomic effort, together with an overhaul of the Companies Act of 1929 which does not adequately protect the investor (and ultimately the worker) in industry.

In the second group are the difficulties created by impersonal conditions in industry. Profits as a motive do not stir the rank and file, but interest and enthusiasm can be created for the quality of a product and for the reputation for service which an organization builds up.

To reach these ends certain changes need to be considered ; a greater measure of security for the managing staff through some specific judicial authority ; the appointment of a personnel officer either reporting to the Board of Directors or acting as a Director ; a full measure of information about company policy, plans, objectives, budgets, results, *etc.*, to all ; free opportunities for discussing troubles and exchange of ideas among the organization, and a systematic plan of education and training of managers.

The fact is technical advances have been great but the advances in dealing with the humanities have lagged behind. As stated recently by Mr. F. W. Leggett, Principal Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Labour : " Those who manage industry are not yet occupying their full place in the regulation of life in this country. We are looking forward in the Ministry of Labour to a time when management in association with the workpeople is going to do all our work ". Looking ahead, one may prophesy that there will be important changes in modern large-scale industry along the foregoing lines. These are practical issues ; the era of capital and labour as the two dominating forces is being replaced by the era of Management, the balance-wheel between these two.

## MIKADO JUSTICE IN THE U.S.A.

BY JAMES HARGAN

HONOURABLE judges, in America at least, formerly had an easy time of it. Classical criminology limited their function to the reading forth of a definite punishment for a particular crime. It was plainly stated on page so and so of a big, black book. Since those good old days America has gone experimental in a big way. Criminology has yielded to the teachings of the positive school. The penalty is now required to fit, not the crime, but the criminal. Although obsolete penal codes are still legally in effect, a judge is supposed to consider every factor in the case as well as the guilt or innocence of the man before him. He seeks to devise methods of treatment for the offender that will have some intelligent relation to his life pattern. Such individualization of justice keeps a conscientious judge awake at night while he wonders how on earth he is going to straighten out John Doe as a clock ponderously strikes ten the next morning.

If Portia were to exchange her Venetian court-room for one in America she would think that the quality of mercy had become very much strained. For instance, there is the clever judge in Illinois who sentenced a man to hike three to five miles every evening. His landlady had charged him with disorderly conduct because he walked and talked in his sleep and kept seventeen other roomers (and herself) awake to hear what he was going to say next. A San Francisco *boulevardier* who tore off a policeman's badge was ordered to tip his hat to every officer he met for the next ninety days. A New York janitor was given the choice of a day in jail or a day sweeping up the street he had littered. A man in the country who stole fourteen cords of wood was ordered to saw twenty-eight more for the complainant. A New Jersey farmer, found guilty of disorderly conduct, had his jail sentence suspended until October 1 so that

he might care for his tomato crop. As he claimed on that date that his tomatoes were not yet all picked, the judge mercifully extended the time but cannily warned him that he must present himself at the jail doors "not later than the first killing frost".

When "Golden Rule" Jones, Mayor of Toledo, Ohio, had a man brought before him for stealing a loaf of bread, he promptly fined the culprit ten dollars. The law made no exceptions, he observed, and must be upheld. He dug the money for the fine, however, out of his own pocket; then he sent the bailiff around, hat in hand, to collect a fine of fifty cents from each spectator in the court room. "It is certainly disorderly conduct," announced Jones as he gave the proceeds to the defendant to take home to his family, "for anyone to live in a town where a man has to steal bread in order to eat!"

Judge Mattingly in Washington does not scrupulously observe the letter of the law. He summarily discharged a man who had been arrested for kissing his wife in a parked car in spite of ordinances to the contrary. "I commend any sentiment", said the judge, "that prompts two persons married for four years to be kissing in private or public". Equally gallant, is Judge Musmanno in Pittsburgh. He has decided that "woman is made of finer and more delicate fabric than man, and thus reacts more sensitively to hardship and distress". To be very exact in the matter, he has ruled that she has two-thirds of the endurance of a man. In his court, therefore, she need expect only twenty days in the workhouse, instead of the masculine thirty.

A Brooklyn man who annoyed his wife was sentenced to travel twelve hundred miles in any direction; every two hundred miles he must send a picture postcard to the magistrate in token of his progress. The champion, however, in dealing with cases where the man admits that he 'just pushed her around a little' is Judge Grady of New Jersey. He knows that the classical procedure with wife-beaters is to fine them a thousand dollars and if they can't pay to jail them for two years. His outlook is more realistic. "Who's going to support this wife and her children?" he demands in such cases. Once he decided it was a good idea to give the offender a taste of his own medicine. Calling the entire family before him he gave the domestic pugilist a right hook to the jaw that knocked him down and followed



it up with a good lecture, as the man sat meekly on the floor. Then the judge invited the family to get in his automobile and he drove them home himself, embellishing the ride with a few words of wisdom, and depositing them on their door-step with an admonition to behave themselves in the future.

In another case Judge Grady learned that the man before him indeed confessed to spanking his wife—but not until she had stepped out with another young man. He advised the husband to “let her alone and why not take a few pokes at the boy friend”? His suggestion was promptly obeyed. When a policeman not cognizant of the situation dragged the pair into court for fighting, Judge Grady sat up in glee. The husband he released promptly; the boy friend he sentenced to six months in jail—suspending sentence as long as he remained away from married women.

The fair sex, however, must not get the idea that America is the land of the free as far as they are concerned and that no matter what their misbehaviour they may trust to the chivalry of a judge to get them by. They might be haled before such a tribunal as that conducted by Judge Graber of Chicago. Merely because a red-headed girl said unladylike things about an officer of the law, he commanded that her mouth should be washed out with soap. Equally rude was a St. Paul judge who ordered a woman to stay in her apartment for thirty days because she had ‘chiselled relief money and spent her afternoons riotously in movies or beauty parlors’.

And let us not forget the Rochester judge who actually exonerated a man who had stabbed his mother-in-law with a pen-knife! “This affair never would have happened”, was his decision, “if this poor man’s mother-in-law had stayed away from where she was not wanted. A man has every right to prevent his mother-in-law or any one else from entering his home”!

Among the interesting forms taken by Yankee judicial experiments is that of the part-time sentence. The motivation of this has sometimes been economic; for instance, when there was standing-room only in a Kansas jail, several old-timers were ordered to take a vacation and come back in a week or two to finish their ‘bits’. Similarly in one Alabama town, chain-gang prisoners were ordered to sleep at home and bring a dinner-

pail when they came to work if they did not want to go hungry.

As a more serious project the week-end sentences of Rochester, N.Y., have aroused favourable comment. Their purpose is to allow the petty offender to keep his job and support his family while serving out his sentence. Likewise in Newton, N.J., a man who pleaded guilty to embezzlement of his parents' old age pension checks was committed to jail for forty week-ends. Norwich, Conn., extends the idea and requires that misdemeanants report at the jail each night as well as at week ends. In Woodbury, N.J., the jail matron recently complained because she thought it was no part of her official duties to make sandwiches for a prisoner to take out to work each day! Allentown, Pa., adroitly reversed the part-time sentence idea—a man was locked in a cell for a hundred and twenty days but was released each night to go home to care for his aged mother. In Denver a federal judge sentenced two partners, who had sent false reports concerning their gold mine to the mint, to six months in jail. In order that the mine should not be shut down and cause unemployment he ruled that the men take turns in serving the sentence.

Mayor Bryan of Lincoln, Neb., showed the holiday spirit when he released prisoners from jail to spend Thanksgiving with the home folks. Governor Bibbs of Alabama inaugurated a custom in 1931, which still continues, of giving Christmas paroles to hundreds of convicts. He thought that this reward for good conduct might be more beneficial in maintaining prison discipline than the previous system of punishing misbehaviour. Good results have indeed been reflected in penal administration, and the released men have kept faith surprisingly well.

"Even among the twelve apostles", concluded the governor, "there was a Judas, and these men are but sinners. The fifteen missing men are only three per cent. of those granted parole, whereas Iscariot was eight per cent. of the apostles"!

One warden in excusing his truants said, "Their home is across the line in Tennessee. I believe they are on the way back—just running late. You know we've been having mighty bad weather, and there's lot's of high water. Then, too, somebody told me that one of the boys was in such a hurry he got to riding the rods on the freight trains. He lost his foot and is in the

hospital. Another one's in jail at Birmingham, but I believe the rest will come hitchhikin' in before long".

Their wits stimulated perhaps by the Prohibition era, American judges have nowhere been more ingenious than in dealing with plain drunks. The legislative committee of Massachusetts has indeed gone so far as to recommend a return for culprits of this ilk of the colonial punishments of stocks, ducking-stool, and whipping-post. The mayor of Woburn modernized their idea by obtaining a circus lion's cage in which he proposed to parade his drunks up and down Main Street. Unfortunately his voters, perhaps foreseeing themselves on display, disapproved his project. In Chicopee, Massachusetts an inebriate is admitted to probation on condition that his wife collect all his wages and give him only cigarette money. A Pennsylvania souse was given sixty days in the 'cooler' or the alternative of a visit to every saloon in town to inform bartenders that they were not to sell him any more drinks. In Florida a Saturday night merry-maker was sentenced to rise in court for thirteen consecutive Mondays to give a summary of the sermon he had heard in church the previous day. In Clifton Forge, Virginia, any man who is found to use relief money for intoxicating purposes must wear a sign on his back like a sandwich man, MY MONEY WENT FOR WHISKEY NOT FOR FOOD.

Motor vehicle offences, being a development of the twentieth century, seem appropriately to call for up-to-date remedies. Nevertheless, if you drive carelessly in Hammond, Indiana, you may think it quite old-fashioned treatment to be offered three ounces of castor oil and half a day in jail. In other cities a modernized 'scarlet letter' in the guise of a tag or brightly coloured sticker calls public attention to offenders. In Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, traffic violators are shamed by having their front tyres painted red and yellow. A man in New Jersey who insulted a traffic cop was invited to write him a letter of apology each day for a week. If a motorist needs a friend, the only place for him to go is Wilkes-Barre, Pa., where a judge suggested the other day that it might be a very good idea to horsewhip jaywalkers!

In handling drivers who have gone so far as to endanger their own lives and the public safety there have been many striking



experiments. A Michigan justice would pillory such chauffeurs in a wrecked car in the public square. In Portland, Maine, they are forced to make a long-hand copy of a magazine article discussing horrible accidents. In Cleveland they spend an hour looking at pictures of gruesome wrecks. In some cities they are taken to hospitals to peep at the dying or to the morgues to stare at the dead. Judge Musmanno of Pittsburgh even led seventy-seven of them into a church and preached a funeral sermon over the body of a victim of a hit-and-run driver.

One may very well pause to inquire what the offenders themselves think of this business of fitting the penalty to the criminal and treating an industrious yegg as if he were a guinea-pig whose primary function is experimental. Johnny Doe is no longer sure how many days or years in jail he is taking a chance upon when he meditates an unlawful entry into a Fish and Chips. Probably he has learned to be scornful of jail, but he is uncertain about the indignities that may be put upon him nowadays when a magistrate has sized him up. No Chicago gangster wants to be seen rolling peanuts down the street with his nose.

In consequence the well-meant efforts of judges frequently meet with opposition and sometimes downright ingratitude. Instead of jailing some men and women who had been found guilty of picketing without union permission (law infractions in America are growing as complicated as the administration of justice) New York's Magistrate Marvin thought it was a very good idea to ask them to go home and write two hundred times over, "the oath of allegiance and a promise to respect all laws and the Constitution of the State and nation and to respect the court". The next morning it was obvious, at least, that they did not respect the court. "They brazenly appeared without their copy books and said that they preferred ten days in jail to being treated like schoolchildren.

A mother in Massachusetts who had been ordered to whip her two sons for stealing, protested, "It is not civilized to whip people. We have no right to do things like that even to a dog!"

In New York, Magistrate Overton, told the widowed mother of a boy who had been found guilty of disorderly conduct on an underground train to "bore holes in a paddle and raise some

welts on him unless you want him to go to jail ". His suggestion did not arouse the applause he expected ; instead he finds that his official conduct is under investigation by the Committee on Criminal Courts, Law, and Procedure of the Bar Association which, although it has no power to reverse his decision or remove him from office, may send a stirring report to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

Then there is the episode by which Paintsville, Kentucky put itself on the map. Three men who had refused to work out their fines were chained to posts on a street corner before a jeering crowd. Although comfortable chairs were found for them and it was promised that they would be taken back to the jail for meals and lodging, they were still unhappy. The judge even said when a cool breeze began to blow at noon that they might stay in their cells after luncheon. Instead of appreciating his good intentions they got a lawyer and sued for \$75,000, the equivalent of \$5,000 an hour apiece for their exposure during which they alleged to have " unlawfully and inhumanly suffered great mental anguish and pain from inclement weather ". As the town marshal swore, they didn't have a chance in the world to collect all that money ; still their protest served to put an abrupt end to judicial experiments in Paintsville. For all any one cares offenders can lie in jail there until they rot. In other parts of America, however, experiments will undoubtedly proceed, sometimes taking grotesque form as in the above examples and sometimes achieving dignity. The public realizes the inadequacy of fines and jail sentences as measures of rehabilitation and approves the substitution of more effective techniques. Few will object if a little drama and sense of colour enlivens the drab administration of justice.

## THE WEST IN THE EAST

BY W. H. CHAMBERLIN

“THE West is fighting a rearguard battle in defence of its Far Eastern interests.” This was the judgment of a British financial expert, who had made a careful survey of Chinese economic conditions, a year before the present undeclared war broke out. To-day it is difficult to prevent this rearguard action from turning into a rout. Indeed the Sino-Japanese conflict, the scope and significance of which become clearer as months of fighting drag on into years, seems to portend the twilight of the former Western economic influence in the Orient, regardless of what the outcome of the struggle may be. The idea that the present war is only a passing convulsion, following which the *status quo* will be restored in due course, is, I suspect, nothing but a piece of very wishful thinking.

For the traditional foreign economic position in China during the last few years has been precariously balanced on the very unstable equilibrium of peace between two growing and hostile forces, Japanese continental expansionism and Chinese nationalism. Now this equilibrium has been violently upset. The present war, which is a struggle of nations as well as of armies, seems destined to decide whether large sections of China will fall under Japanese tutelage or whether Japan's expansion on the Asiatic continent is to suffer a severe check, if not a fatal blow. No other alternative seems possible.

And in this stern clash the more or less innocent bystander, the foreigner, is bound to suffer. The disabilities under which foreign trade, shipping and investment and foreign prestige in general will suffer in the event of Japanese domination of the main channels of access to China are already pretty obvious. These will be discussed in more detail later.

But if Japan were somehow eliminated from the political reckoning as a result of an unsuccessful war with the Soviet



Union or an internal political earthquake the terms on which foreigners have been living and trading in China would be subjected to drastic revision by the Chinese themselves.

The strong nationalist movement which flared up under the leadership of the Kuomintang between 1934 and 1937 aimed at the destruction of all special foreign rights and privileges. It fell short of this goal partly because of the military and naval preparations of the foreign Powers, still more, perhaps, because of dissensions within the ranks of the Chinese nationalists themselves. A split occurred between the Kuomintang and the Communists. This was followed by a civil war which dragged on for a decade and only came to an end on the eve of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. The new nationalist *régime* was also hampered by occasional recrudescence of provincial warlordism (although this was reduced to very small proportions before the beginning of the struggle with Japan) and by factional quarrels among some of its leaders.

However, the main reason why the campaign against alien privilege was not pushed more energetically during the last few years was the increasing pressure and the growing menace from the side of Japan since the occupation of Manchuria in 1931. Throughout Chinese history there has been a consistent tendency to try to compensate for weakness in arms by skill in diplomacy, to set one "foreign barbarian" against another.

During the years 1924—1927 England bore the brunt of Chinese nationalist antipathy. Since 1931 Japan has clearly been the most dangerous enemy. During a visit to Canton which I made shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, a local Kuomintang leader explained as follows the Chinese policy of dealing with one opponent at a time :

"When we speak of being anti-imperialist it does not mean that we are against all foreign Powers. When England was especially opposed to our nationalist aims we directed our propaganda mainly against Great Britain.

To-day Japan is the chief enemy; when we say we are anti-imperialist we mean that we are anti-Japanese".

The outbreak of a war which for China is a life-and-death struggle for national existence has strengthened the tendency in China to pursue a conciliatory policy toward third parties whose sympathy and practical help are desired. The recent granting to missionaries of the right to conduct compulsory

religious instruction in their colleges and schools, which had been abolished during the early years of the nationalist *régime*, is an example of this policy. In many cases it has been to China's interest to reverse the previous trend toward placing educational institutions which had been founded by foreigners under Chinese control. Japanese are much more likely to respect properties which can display the protection of a foreign flag. If, however, China can wear down Japan and force her withdrawal through a prolonged war of endurance and attrition, there should be no illusion as to the future of foreign vested interests and privileges. Extra-territoriality and all other institutions inconsistent with full Chinese sovereignty will be swept away. A China strong enough to repulse Japan would stand on little ceremony with Great Britain, America and France—countries which neither could nor would bring to bear on China such formidable military pressure as Japan has applied.

Chinese victory is, of course, a hypothetical assumption. The situation for the present and for the near future is that Japan has placed under military occupation a large and increasing area of North and Central China, inhabited by over one hundred million people. True, the Japanese control of the countryside is highly imperfect, and guerrilla warfare is rife. But Japanese economic control is maintained through possession of the main towns and routes of communication. All the principal Chinese ports except Canton (Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Amoy) are in Japanese hands. Whatever foreign trade goes on with North and Central China must now pass through channels which are dominated by Japan.

And, despite soothing assurances of Japan's intention to respect foreign rights and interests, sometimes accompanied by intimations that Japan would welcome foreign capital in North China and Manchukuo, the effects of Japanese military domination have not been encouraging for foreign businessmen. Manchukuo, where Japan has been supreme for the last six or seven years, is a forest of monopolies, which largely exclude non-Japanese commercial activity. This has been still further limited because Manchukuo has fallen into line with the Japanese legislation, restricting imports with a view to conserving foreign exchange for war purposes. Imports into

Manchukuo were formerly unrestricted, apart from the payment of duty. Now, however, special permits must be obtained for monthly imports in excess of 1,000 Manchukuo dollars (about 55 pounds sterling), unless, and the exception is significant, the imports are purchased in Japan.

Some Japanese hope and believe that North China will develop along different lines from Manchukuo. The latter country has been a heavy drain on the Japanese budget. Every yen of invested capital has been matched by a yen of military and administrative expenditure. It is natural that there should be some doubt, at least in civilian circles, as to Japan's ability to shoulder a similar burden in North China.

But the trend of events there has not been encouraging to the foreign trader. Wherever the Japanese Army moves in it is quickly followed by a host of bagmen, big and small, from representatives of large Japanese firms to small peddlers of everything from narcotics to piece-goods. Given a *régime* of Japanese military occupation, with a Chinese government that owes its existence entirely to Japanese support, and Japanese trade inevitably and quickly follows the Japanese flag.

Several developments in North China point to the systematic absorption of this region into Japan's economic orbit. Most significant for the future, perhaps, is the formation of a semi-governmental corporation, the North China Development Company. It is capitalized at 350,000,000 yen (about 20,000,000 pounds sterling) and is authorized to issue debentures for five times this amount. Half of the original capital is to be supplied by the Japanese Government, the remainder is to be raised by private subscription.

This company is to take charge of all large new enterprises in such fields as transportation, communications, mining and power generation. The whole type of organization is closely modelled upon that of the South Manchuria Railway, which was the spearhead of Japanese penetration and development of Manchuria. The prospects of foreign firms which may come into competition with such a monopolistic enterprise cannot be considered bright.

A Japanese syndicate has already squeezed foreign buyers out of the Inner Mongolian wool market. The creation of an



oil monopoly has been abandoned or at least deferred in response to American and British protests. But the introduction in North China of a new currency, linked to the yen and not, as yet exchangeable for other foreign currencies, has been a severe blow to foreign interests, whether or not it was designed with this end in view. It confronts the foreign importer with the alternative of accepting payment in inconvertible banknotes or of ceasing to carry on business.

Another straw that shows the direction of the economic wind in North China is the reduction of import tariffs, especially on goods which Japan is best able to supply, such as textiles, rayon and sugar. Small in itself, but suggestive of the trend of the times is a recent news item to the effect that Chinese merchants in Tsingtao, the principal port of Shantung Province, have been under strong pressure to transfer their balances from the British-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and Chartered Bank to the Yokohama Specie Bank. If they fail to do this they are refused necessary import and export permits. A methodical Japanese economic conquest of Tsingtao is apparently under way, with Japanese firms taking over the docks and the local bus service, opening manufacturing plants and competing with the British-American Tobacco Company in the tobacco trade.

In the Shanghai area Japanese military occupation has served in many ways to promote Japan's economic advance. For some months Japanese goods were flooding in free of duty. After the conclusion of a customs agreement between Japan and Great Britain, under which payment of the share of customs revenue which is earmarked for the service of foreign loans was promised, while it was agreed that all customs revenue in the ports under Japanese control would be deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank, this situation has changed. Customs revenue will be one of the main sources of income for the Japanese-sponsored "Renovation Government" which claims authority over the Shanghai-Nanking area. But Japanese goods will reap the main profit from the drastic tariff reductions which the "Renovation Government," following the example of the similar *régime* in North China, has just put into effect.

And there are other ways in which Japanese military

supremacy is hastening the twilight of foreign interests in the Yangtse Valley. Transportation facilities on inland waterways have fallen into the hands of a small number of companies which are financed by the Bank of Japan. This not only keeps an important business in Japanese hands, but makes possible a good deal of discrimination as between Japanese and non-Japanese goods.

Something like outright expropriation of Chinese industrial property is going on. According to a recent report in the *North China Daily News*, Chinese owners of cotton mills in Shanghai have been refused access to their enterprises and have been referred to Japanese cotton mill owners for negotiation if entry is desired. In many cases Chinese are apparently being forced to accept Japanese as dominant partners in their establishments. A large new chemical works near Nanking has been taken over by the powerful Mitsui interests, according to reports in the Japanese press.

Mr. K. Yamanaka, director of a Japanese shipping company which is operating in China waters, recently declared :

"From now on I predict that Japanese shipping will become greater than British or Chinese and will win supremacy in the China coast and Yangtse services. It would be a shame if this were not realized".

Along with this aggressive Japanese economic penetration and exploitation of conquered territory has gone a steady undermining of Western prestige, as an inevitable result of the Japanese military control of the situation. The Chinese see that when a foreigner is arrested and perhaps maltreated by Japanese soldiers or police nothing visibly happens. To the Oriental mind such events as the wounding of the former British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, the sinking of the *Panay*, the firing of the *Ladybird* and the many lesser "incidents", affecting foreign persons and property carry just one implication : that Japan is now master in this part of the world. The intangible element of prestige which has hitherto strengthened so much the Western position in the East has been seriously, if not fatally, injured.

There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the desire which has been expressed by some Japanese industrialists for foreign collaboration in developing Manchukuo and North China.

Businessmen who are capable of taking a long-range view realize that Japan, especially after her resources have been so heavily mortgaged for the prosecution of the war, lacks sufficient surplus capital to open up adequately the natural resources of these vast territories. There is also the feeling that an inflow of foreign capital might have a restraining influence on the Army and arrest the trend in Japan toward a kind of military state socialism.

But, if the Japanese desire for foreign capital is sincere, there is little reason to believe that it is feasible. In these new Japanese acquisitions, even more than in Japan itself, the Army is firmly in the saddle. And the regimented type of economy, concentrated on enlarging national defence, which the typical Japanese General desires has few points of contact with a profit-making system of free enterprise.

During my stay in the Soviet Union I saw the working out of the policy, now abandoned, of granting concessions to foreign firms for the exploitation of natural resources which the Soviet Government was not in a position to develop itself. Not one of these agreements, of which there were at one time about one hundred, functioned smoothly or ended amicably. It was impossible to pour the foreign capitalist wine into Soviet socialist bottles. And it would, I suspect, be almost equally difficult to find a *modus vivendi* between the foreign *entrepreneurs*, interested in profit, and the military leaders, who are determined to exercise close supervision over all economic life in occupied regions.

Moreover, foreign businessmen in Japan itself are suffering from the ever tightening network of regulations affecting foreign trade and transactions in foreign exchange. And nothing frightens away new capital so quickly and effectively as the prospect of minute and vexatious bureaucratic regulation. With existing direct obligations of the Japanese Government selling on British and American markets at prices which offer a yield of ten per cent. or more, it is difficult to see how new loans could be floated.

Apart from the occasional and transient profits of war trade, foreign interests in China have already suffered severely and seem destined to face further losses in the future. While there



has been relatively little physical destruction or damaging of foreign properties these properties, in many cases, are in danger of becoming mere empty shells as a result of prolonged interruption of normal trade, the favour which the dependent Chinese *régimes* inevitably show to the Japanese and the growing chaos in the Chinese currency system.

There would seem to be one contingency, and only one, under which Western trade and investment interests in the Far East will survive the Sino-Japanese conflict relatively unscathed. This would be the end of the undeclared war on some kind of compromise basis, affording some assurance of stability for the future, and permitting a resumption of free and unhampered foreign commercial relations with China.

But the Japanese and Chinese positions are so irreconcilable, each side feels so keenly that anything short of complete victory would be a natural disaster, that the basis of a compromise settlement is not visible. It seems more likely that the struggle will go on until one of the combatants collapses from sheer exhaustion.

And most of the omens point to a twilight zone for the imposing fabric of Western banking, shipping, industrial and real estate interests which is symbolized by the Bund of Shanghai and by the more modest foreign sections of Tientsin, Canton, Hankow and other treaty ports. If one could look forward ten years one would most probably see that, whatever political changes might have taken place, a much larger share of the activities formerly carried on by Western firms would be either in Japanese or in Chinese hands.

## ON THE WAY HOME

BY INEZ HOLDEN

**I**N the street outside a barrel organ began to play. Harriet said, "Well, I must be getting home."

Margaret had cooked the dinner. Now she was tired, perhaps not too sorry her guest was going away.

She said, "Oh, do stay a little while longer."

But Harriet was putting on the dun-coloured coat, the gloves Aunt Emily had given her for her birthday, and the brown scarf her mother handed out to her each morning when she left for the office, 'It doesn't do to have nothing round your throat these cold evenings.'

Harriet, getting ready to leave, said aloud, "Shall I help you wash up?"

She asked from politeness. It did not mean much, but she always asked it, and Margaret answered in the usual way.

"No, don't trouble. Mrs. Folly will do it in the morning."

When she got outside in the street Harriet thought, 'It's funny Margaret doesn't seem more content. I should be happy all right if I lived alone. Fancy being a free agent.' Now at home it was always the same. There was Mother reading books from the library and telling in her flat, confused way the stories of films she had seen, and Father, never listening to what was being said, sat making rugs, holding the coarse canvas on his knees and snip-snipping away all through the evening. He had been taught this work in hospital after he had been wounded in the war, the nurses said, "The rug-making is a splendid thing for the patients, it saves their nerves."

Well, Harriet was on her way home once more, the old uneventful routine. Of course she could have stayed a bit later with Margaret, but the friendship of women began to pall after a time. Some of the girls she knew went out to parties in the evenings. 'It's a wonder they are able to. I get so

tired after the office work.' Going out with young men meant so much brightness and so much dull listening to talk, 'not worth it really.'

It seemed a luxury to be alone now, no need to hurry home. She liked to stroll down the gay street where the dark smiling man, 'not English, I am sure,' played the barrel-organ. She stopped and stared into the shop windows which, lit up at night, 'gave you the chance of seeing the things without reminding you that, after all, in the daytime you could not afford to buy anything.' She thought, 'My word, what a terrible dress! But that one over there is not so bad, not if you took the trimmings off'.

A little further on an antique shop. Harriet liked to look at the rings set out on a tray in the window—always hoping to get something cheap and strange—but her hands were still without any jewellery. She looked at them, they were white and strong. 'I should hate my hands to get old.'

Harriet moved on to the next antique shop. It was some distance away—'follow your fancy'. Far back in the window here she saw two or three Victorian collars of heavy black material with a jewel in the centre. 'Funny to think of being a married woman in those days. Even nowadays it's not all it's made out to be, far from it. But in those days, my God, what a hell! No wonder women wore collars like dogs, but jewelled to show that they belonged to a good class.'

In the distance the barrel-organ, now fainter, seemed to churn out a sadder song. The joy had gone out of walking about alone looking at shop windows. 'Well, after all, who would want to be me? No one in their right senses.' It was better to be in love, to be sad and to get over it than to be like poor Harriet working all day in an office and not loving anyone, but suffering from a deep discontent that was like an ache and had no beauty in it.

Now with slow steps Harriet wandered on. 'Life's not much catch unless you are an artist, a great lover, or a famous actress, and then you live intensely—two hours to everyone else's one—and in the end get burnt up by a splendid flame and die young.' She came to the end of the shops. 'I am tired of Life and wish to die.' So Harriet, not yet twenty years old,



believed at that moment. 'God! how different people's thoughts from the things they say aloud.'

She reached a square. 'This is a part of London I don't know at all,' small houses and no lights showing in the windows, as if the inhabitants had lost all love of light and life under the shadow of these threatening trees. How would it be possible to get home from here? In what direction was the tube station?

A servant girl slunk her catlike way round the railings.

"Could you tell me the way to Notting Hill Station, please?"

The girl stared back with hopeless eyes. She was a stranger here. Now that was an old sentence, almost a music-hall joke, and worse than this, the girl was a foreigner as well.

Harriet walked on a few steps. A man appeared, a listener from the shadows of the square.

"I heard what you said. I am going to Notting Hill Station too".

Harriet looked at him. He was in evening clothes, a white scarf round his neck, and although it was cold, no overcoat. At his heels the dog followed, a small terrier, white like the scarf the man wore.

"If you like, I will show you the way to the station."

Harriet answered, "Thank you!" She looked at him in shyness. "It is very kind of you."

He did not hear this. He stared straight ahead, not aware of her. They started to walk. It was difficult to speak to him without shouting because of his height. But it was not going to be a silent walk. He spoke suddenly, in a feverish, violent voice. Music and life, love and death came into the talk, but not in any ordered sequence. Silence was an enemy to be kept at bay, and the ordinary headings of conversation had been guillotined from his mind.

"What a strange life. You don't realize much of its strangeness till you come to lose it. Then of course it's altogether a different matter. It is a long time since I was afraid, and yet a year ago I feared conventions and other people's prejudices. God, what a pack of damn fool lies!"

He threw back his head with a quick, impatient jerk. "It's not far to the station." This was only polite talk, but into

the words he put a terrific meaning—difficult to read. “You see, I know all the short cuts.” He laughed harsh-sudden. Harriet could not see the joke, but already he was galloping away on a new zigzagging course of conversation.

What was he talking about? What did he mean? He said something which Harriet couldn’t hear, and then, looking back at his heels, “You see, the dog agrees with me.”

There was no longer any doubt that he was mad, but Harriet had not known that it would be like this to be alone with someone mad. She had not known that it was possible, with a second person, to seem still alone, lost and with a will and strength that were no longer of any account.

“Two people against the whole world.” The man looked down at Harriet with a terrifying tender love. She became more afraid, and in her thoughts shrank from him as from the unexpected fondness of a foreigner. “Strangers on their way to the Station,” he said.

Night was descending, making everything around humid with half-hidden fears.

“Once I worked in an office, chattered with others, belonged to a club, and travelled in comfortable trains where the food was ‘not bad,’ and in my mind thought ‘Was I born only for this?’ Well, that did not last.”

The eyes of this man burnt with the fire of madness. Round his neck there was the white scarf, and surely he had the strength of six sane men. He never ceased from talking, and only interrupted himself to say, “You heard what the dog said? He agrees with the doomed man all right.”

From time to time a sentence came out of the talk completed. Harriet believed that he was speaking about love.

“Away from trivial life, if you understand me, and yet more than ever in life. Colours were too strong for my eyes, music too vibrant for my ears, the presence of someone loved too much alive for everyday existence. It was no longer possible to step in time to the slow sad dirge of all well-fed people. As if I had been taken from the grave only to have life breathed into me, I was as swiftly entombed again. Indeed, no one had time to notice the difference.”

The man walked more quickly now. His speech increased its speed as if a gramophone in his brain had been turned on to 'repeat' and now no human hand could switch it off.

"What did you say?" he asked, quick—sharply, and before she had time to answer, said "Could a judge know it? Could a jury understand it?"

Because of his long steps the man got ahead of Harriet, and then slowed up so that for a moment he was walking behind her. 'Was he going to strangle her now? Quite quietly she would die here, in the night. It was a gentle death, she had been told that once, or else she had read it. But the things people say are not true, and the things people write are not true either.'

"People half-live," the man said, "but that's really wrong. Better far to half-die and then be brought back to consciousness at the last moment, and then you know something and can keep it beside you, like a pain-killing drug."

Forms lost their familiar kindness now. The man's scarf was like a long white sheet which he might have used to dress himself up as a ghost. The dog that walked at his heels was tame, but he was not tame himself. He could kill Harriet with the scarf, twist it round her neck, and then slink off like a leopard, his eyes burning. Already there was nothing in her future, nothing in her past, no other life of home and office. Nothing here and nothing there. Everything was gone except fear.

"You see," he said, "I am like a second person who has to answer for the deeds of a stranger."

'Steady! Keep steady, Harriet, and try to walk without stumbling.'

The stranger's voice was tired. He talked now as if from a distance. "Oh well, let the formalities be over quickly."

As if they were coming out of a cave, Harriet saw the lights. They went straight into a wide street. People moved about here and talked to each other in a friendly way without saying anything much. Everyday life. This was Notting Hill, and all the passers-by Harriet's saviours. The past was clear again. A hazy plan for the future came back, soon there would be home with Mother's library books and film stories and Father's rug-making, the fire, familiar conversation and washing-up.



"Oh, it's there," Harriet said. "I see the station now."

"No, it's over there."

"But I can see it written up—'Notting Hill Underground Station.' " She was so safe back in a crowded street.

"The underground station," he repeated. "But I thought you were going to the Police Station—as I am—to give myself up for murder."

## JOHN STUART MILL AND SOCIALISM

BY H. G. ABEL

A DISTINGUISHED writer on Socialist economics who has a world-wide reputation, despairing either of finding intelligent men or of persuading them to adopt his conclusions, wrote a guide to Socialism for intelligent women : in the appendix where he gives a historical survey of the subject he makes the statement that "John Stuart Mill, from being an eminent Ricardian, died an avowed Socialist". When Mr. Shaw's Guide to Socialism appeared in 1928, I pointed out the inaccuracy of the statement in a letter to *The Nation* ; but now that that very interesting and possibly prophetic book has been reprinted in a very cheap edition and is therefore brought before a much bigger public, the truth about Mill's position must be again published, not in order to defend Mill's reputation—as if the avowal of Socialism conveyed any stigma—but because the wider public must necessarily be less critical and informed. For if the influence of a cheap press and of telephoned propaganda must be welcomed by the friends or democratic enlightenment, obviously the importance of accuracy varies directly with the enlargement of the field.

John Stuart Mill, impelled by compassion for the poverty and struggle of the working-classes, turned his attention to political economy and became, for his day, an advanced thinker, leader of the Radical thought of his generation. In his Autobiography, speaking on his circle he actually says: "Our ideal of ultimate improvement would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists". Again: "we regard all existing institutions and social arrangements as being (in a phrase I once heard from Austin) 'merely provisional', and we welcomed with the greatest pleasure and interest all Socialistic experiments by select individuals (such as the Co-operative Societies) which, whether they succeeded or failed, could not but operate as a

most useful education of those who took part in them". But, as Leslie Stephen pointed out, "the Socialism of Mill meant that of Owen, Fourier, St. Simon, and Louis Blanc" (he does not seem to have read Marx or Lassalle, whose writings were published, at least in part, in the decade which ended with his death in 1873). The point need not be laboured: not only had he a mind open to new schemes of political amelioration, but by temperament and education he was ready to examine and anxious to approve systems which promised the emancipation of his fellow-men. A novice he remained all his life and an eager novice, wishing to be persuaded but unable to make his intellect keep pace with his emotions, so that he never took the vows. To say that he 'died an avowed Socialist' therefore is to say the one thing that is incorrect. An eager and brilliant advocate of Socialism may wish that such a man could be numbered among the elect, but his wish must not father the thought that he was.

In 1869, we are informed, 'Mr. Mill formed the design of writing a book on Socialism'. This book was never published. *THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW*, in 1879, however, published the 'first rough drafts thrown down towards the foundation of that work', as Helen Taylor wrote in a short preface when she 'yielded to the urgent wish of the editor (John Morley) to give these chapters to the world'. In the earlier part of that rough draft Mill dealt with the defects in the conditions of society in his day, and the charges brought against the social system. He admitted that the allegations were answerable, though much of the criticism proceeded from errors in political economy. In the later part he criticized rather severely what he considered the inherent defects of the Socialist schemes and, in the light of the Russian revolution, it forms very interesting reading. He considered the effect of a Socialist system first upon the 'managing minds of the association'. He thought that under the Communist system (it is interesting to note that he uses that word) the person most qualified for the management would be likely very often to hang back from undertaking it, for, while he could be in no way better off than any other labourer, his responsibilities would be so much greater that a large proportion of mankind would be likely to prefer the less onerous position.



(Plato foresaw the same difficulty, he observed, in getting his 'philosopher kings'.) 'Communitic management would thus be, in all probability, less favourable than private management to that striking out of new paths and making immediate sacrifices for distant and uncertain advantages which is generally indispensable to great improvements in the economic condition of mankind and even to keeping up the existing state in the face of continual increase of the number of mouths to be fed'. He then considered how the case stood in regard to the ordinary worker, and admitted that, in that respect, matters would be no worse than they were then in regard to the great majority of the producing classes. A change to a state in which every person could be rendered as industrious, skilful, and careful as possible, which would be the case under Communism, would be a change very much for the better. But he qualified this concession by the opinion that improvement in that respect could be obtained at least to a great extent by arrangements compatible with private property and individual competition, and he suggested piecework and industrial partnership as remedies, summing up that part of his argument with the words which are as far from being an avowal of Socialism as anything can be :

"Communism has no advantage which may not be reached under private property, while as respects the managing heads it is at a considerable disadvantage. It has also some disadvantages which seem to be inherent in it through the necessity under which it lies of deciding in a more or less arbitrary manner questions which, in the present system, decide themselves, often badly enough but spontaneously."

He then criticized the system of equal payment (again it is interesting to note the change of policy in the Russian experiment), and wrote words of which we have lived to see the truth :

"plans for the regeneration of society must consider average human beings and the large residuum of persons below the average in the personal and social virtues . . . The institution of Communism provides that there shall be no quarrelling about material interests. But there are other departments from which no institutions can exclude it : there will still be rivalry for reputation and for personal power . . . For these various reasons it is probable that a Communist association would frequently fail to exhibit the attractive picture of mutual love and unity of will and feeling which we are often told by Communists to expect, and would often be torn by discussion and not infrequently broken up by it".

He touched, unfortunately in one paragraph only, upon the vital question of education: "here is a most fruitful source of discord in every association. Individual parents, supposing them to prefer some other mode of educating their children (than that made by the collective body) would have no private means of paying for it and would be limited to what they could do by their own personal teaching and influence". As may be expected from the author of *Liberty*, he wrote strongly on the question of free thought. The whole passage ought to be given:

"The obstacles to human progression are always great but an indispensable condition of their being overcome is that human nature should have freedom to expand spontaneously in various directions, both in thought and practice: that people should both think for themselves and try experiments for themselves and should not resign into the hands of rulers, whether acting in the name of a few or of the majority, the business of thinking for them and of prescribing how they shall act. But in Communist associations private life would be brought in a most unexampled degree within the dominion of public authority and there would be less scope for the development of individual character and individual preferences than has hitherto existed among the full citizens of any state belonging to the progressive branches of the human family. Already in all societies the compression of individuals by the majority is a great and growing evil: it would probably be much greater under Communism".

It is obvious that a great conflict is taking place in his mind between the individualism which is perhaps the instinctive independence of a first-class mind 'voyaging in strange seas of thought, alone', and which is also partly the acquired result of his education, conditioned by his environment, and the desire to test new and hopeful systems of political and social philosophy. With a soul so sincere as his and an intellectual flame so white, there was no cowardly refusal to follow a gleam, no *Video meliora proboque: deteriora sequor*. The only question was whether the things that he saw were better, not for himself, but for humanity. As W. L. Courtney said 'though Mill surveys the promised land, he yet will die on some Ricardian Pisgah.' The even tenour of his liberalism, as I wrote nine years ago, was undoubtedly disturbed both by his interest in all social theories and by his compassion for martyred mankind and by his passion for justice. But his deviations into the particular speculations labelled Socialistic in his day were, as undoubtedly, corrected by his equally great passion for individual liberty and an

equally great compassion for minorities. It may be that his mind was too sceptical, too little adventurous, too unwilling to adopt what was, after all, an intelligent woman's plea 'to do a great right, dare a little wrong', to be truly useful, but mis-statements will not correct his attitude, and we must take him as he was, not as we wish him to have been, or think he might have become. There was another John writing in those days, visionary, prophetic, disastrously petulant, urged by the same passion for justice, possessed by the same analytical power, strangely like Mill in his diagnosis of human frailties, the truth of social equity like a fire within his bones. Both pioneers are almost unheeded in the whirligig of time : political development has adopted, either wholly and on a great scale or in part and tentatively the collectivism which Mill feared to put to the touch and which in so many ways followed the trail which Ruskin blazed ; both were in quest of that Platonic Holy Grail, Justice. But neither was, or could have been, an avowed Socialist : each had too much independence of spirit and of mind to acquiesce in that governmental domination which was considered in those days the menace of such a system.

How could an avowal of Socialism be made by the man who could write as Mill wrote in the *Liberty*, except by a conversion which the whole of the contemporary thinking world would have hailed as miraculous ? No such conversion could have passed without comment : it would have been a political event as famous in its world as Cardinal Newman's in his, and the absence of comment is sufficient proof that there was no such conversion to comment upon. The avowal was never made, and if there was any hardening in one direction or the other, it was a hardening against the Socialist cause and not in favour of it. Mill wrote in 1859 :

"Where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. The constitution of such countries is an organization of the experience and practical ability of the nation for the purpose of governing the rest ; and the more perfect that organization is in itself, the more complete is the bondage of all. . . . The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals comprising it ; and a State which postpones the interests of *their* mental expansion and skill, which dwarfs its men in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished and that the



perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish ”.

Ten years later, in planning the history of Socialism to which reference is made in this article, he tries his utmost to examine the case through the eyes of the Collectivist, but his intellectual sincerity, the *lumen siccum* of his political creed, the heritage of his tradition, will not, with all the goodwill that he forced into his service, permit him to go further than the following paragraph with which this article may be suitably ended.

“ From these various considerations I do not seek to draw any inference against the possibility that Communistic production is capable of being at some future time the form of society best adapted to the wants and circumstances of mankind. *I think that this is, and long will be, an open question*, upon which fresh light will continually be obtained, both by trial of the Communistic principle under favourable circumstances and by the improvements which will be gradually effected in the working of the existing system, that of private ownership. The one certainty is that Communism, to be successful, requires a high standard of both moral and intellectual education in all the members of the community, moral, to qualify them for doing their part honestly and energetically in the labour of life under no inducement but their share in the general interest of the association and their feelings of duty and sympathy towards it; intellectual, to make them capable of estimating distant interests and entering into complex considerations. I reject altogether the notion that it is impossible for education and cultivation such as is implied in these things to be made the inheritance of every person in the nation ; but I am convinced that it is very difficult and that the passage to it from our present condition can only be slow. I admit the plea that, in the points of moral education on which the success of Communism depends, the present state of society is demoralizing and that only a Communist association can effectually train mankind for Communism. It is for Communism, then, to prove by practical experiment the power of giving this training. Experiments alone can show whether there is yet in any portion of the population a sufficiently high level of moral cultivation to make Communism succeed and to give to the next generation among themselves the education necessary to keep up that high level permanently. If *Communist associations* show that they can be durable and prosperous, they will multiply and will probably be adopted by successive portions of the population in the more advanced countries as they become morally fitted for that mode of life. *But to force unprepared populations into Communist societies, even if a political revolution gave the power to make such an attempt, would end in disappointment ”.*

## GERMAN HOUSEKEEPING: *A Study in "Political" Economy*

BY F. U. HAGGNAU

**A**BOUT the economic development of Germany two opinions are current. The one maintains that a country poor in raw materials, over-industrialized and without reserves of gold or foreign exchange is bound to collapse sooner or later. Such a country must, therefore, welcome economic support which would lead it away from political adventures towards international collaboration. The other recognizes achievements and successes of the last five years, but considers national socialist economic policy a transitory phenomenon. Both opinions overlook the fact that in both Germany and Italy new ways of economic thinking have arisen and are still being developed.

A nation's economic life is the expression of a given cultural, political and social situation. The economic development of Germany is determined by five previous movements :—

1. The revolt of country against town, *i.e.*, against its predominance in the political sphere (democracy), in the economic sphere (capitalism) and in the cultural sphere (intellectualism). Characteristic of this was the attempt to foster a specifically rural civilization, the *Landvolkbewegung* (1929-32) which was to comprise—apart from peasantry—agricultural middlemen, teachers and officials.

2. The revolt of the lower middle class *i.e.*, of craftsmen, retail traders and small manufacturers. Its slogan was the protection of "national" production as against "international" mobile capital, big business and modern social policy. From 1918 to 1932 this movement was represented by the *Wirtschaftspartei des Deutschen Mittelstandes* whose policy was determined exclusively by the interest of butchers, bakers, candlestickmakers, etc.

3. The revolt of a certain section of the middle class, composed of people living on pensions, dividends from stocks, university teachers, civil servants, and professional men. The complete revolution in the distribution of property in Germany caused by the inflation had robbed this class of its inherited capital and its savings, so that, reduced to the status of proletariat, it developed its resentment against capitalism into a *Weltanschauung*.

4. The traditional revolt of wage-earners against employers, accentuated since 1918 by the increased political influence of the workmen and the failure of the so-called "economic leaders" (men like Stinnes, Goldschmidt, etc.).

5. The traditional struggle of employers against trade unions, based since 1918 on the fight against taxation policy, collective wage agreements, limitation of working hours—coupled with the absence of any constructive policy on the part of the trade unions.

National Socialism has coordinated these several currents, which overlapped and were in part antagonistic to one another. It has solved the question about the primacy of politics or economics, which from 1919-32 was a favourite subject of discussion in Germany. Moreover, it has developed a new philosophy of economics out of beginnings originating among the rural population and the small capitalist middle class. And it has begun to shape the economic structure in accordance with that philosophy. It is wrong, therefore, to consider German economic policy since 1933 as a casual product of temporary needs. That policy is based on certain specific theories and aims. It is shaped and given its laws by the State. It is an instrument in the service of the unfolding of national totalitarian power.

In National Socialist Germany there are thus no economic laws by which economic development is governed, as the laws of classical economic theory are supposed to govern economics. The laws of the national socialist State govern the economic order. And these laws are in the service of those ideas which dominate the policy of the Third Reich: Power, Honour, Liberty—in the connotation given to those terms by that Reich.

To give economic matters their place in the organism of the totalitarian State demands comprehensive planning. This



has been systematically carried out since 1933, from retail trade to planning for the whole Reich for agriculture, industry, housing. Since, according to National Socialist opinion, Power, Honour and Liberty can only be defended or won by military means the plan is a military one.

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Romanticism and Realism characterize German politics; the same phenomenon is to be seen also in the economic field. In particular in agricultural policy. Romantic traits are the "Myth of the soil" and the "Myth of the tiller". A realistic feature is the idea of agriculture as a source of biological and military strength. Realistic, too, is the tendency to strengthen agriculture in the direction of autarchy, although complete autarchy in food is not attainable within the present German frontiers. Farmers, always hostile to foreign trade, naturally welcome a policy of autarchy which increases prices. But farmers are hostile not only to foreign but to all trade. The Reich's peasants' leader, Herr Darré, has given to this hostility against trade a philosophical basis. As Minister of Agriculture he has largely eliminated retail trade, in stock and corn; it will not be long before agricultural producers' co-operatives will exclusively deal direct with consumers' organizations. Strict regulation of prices has robbed the market, in so far as it still exists, of its principal function, the balance of supply and demand. The name of the compulsory corporate organization for agriculture, the *Reichsnährstand*, implies the reversion from a capitalistic economy, which is bent upon earning profits, to a medieval economy which seeks to satisfy needs. The abandonment of an economic system based on money and the myth of the soil found statutory recognition in the *Erbhof* (farming estates which can neither be sold nor mortgaged): it suggests a phase which England passed through by 1290—A.D.

Realism is shown likewise in industrial policy. The latter has been strongly influenced since 1933 by the problem of raw materials. In view of the shortage of raw materials State support for any particular industry depends exclusively on its military importance. Heavy industry, of course, (coal, iron ores, blast furnaces) is supported as being the basis of armaments.

It should be remembered that National Socialism did not find, but itself created, the problems of procuring foreign currency and raw materials. The gold reserves of Germany amounted to :—

1932	1933	1934 (in Million Reichsmark)
1132.5	684.9	261.1

(The rise of world prices has, of course, to be taken into account).

All other needs have to make room for military exigencies. Policy in regard to manufacturing industry and production of consumers' goods thus depends on whether they are of direct military importance or whether their export makes it possible to purchase raw materials which are important for armaments. The motor-car industry is encouraged for both these reasons. The toy industry works for export and represents "National Culture". Its protection is by way of a gift for the middle class element. The difficulties of industries which have to import raw materials are met by the development of German products and substitute (*Ersatz*) materials. The question whether this pays must never be put. If the change-over to the new production methods or the erection of a new plant exceeds the resources of the private firm in question, the State will provide the means or provide guarantees. The consequences are State control and interference, compulsory amalgamations, restriction of private initiative and responsibility.

The economic policy of the Third Reich towards large-scale industrial enterprise is largely in accordance with the resentment of the middle class. Economic Romanticism endeavours to promote retail trade by destroying consumers' co-operatives and restricting the business of big stores. That the propaganda for retail business and against stores has been effective is demonstrated by the following figures of their respective turnover:

Stores		Retail business	
1931 (year of crisis)	= 100	1928 (year of prosperity)	= 100
1932	= 82.3	1932	= 65.1
1935	= 65.1	1935	= 69.2

Similar attempts have been made to assist skilled handicraft at the expense of the big stores; the result is not clear. By concessions to the romantic notions of the craft guilds (e.g., training of apprentices, craftsmen's register) it is hoped to rehabilitate the guild tradition.

Planning means direction as well as interference by the State. Private enterprise has been preserved in principle and has sometimes been restored, *e.g.*, shipping lines, banks, the Gelsenkirchen mining concern. There have been attempts to define the conception and meaning of private enterprise more clearly by a reversion from late capitalistic forms, the encouragement, for example, of transformation of joint stock companies into partnerships, the prohibition of the publication of newspapers by public companies. But there has been interference with private property, expropriation of newspaper publishers, expropriation of the Simson armament works by the Reich. The Hermann Goering State works are nothing new in principle; its precursors are industrial Reich undertakings from the time of the Great War (Reich Aluminium works). But they are now equipped with the right to expropriate private property.

Typical of national socialist economic policy is, therefore, not the abolition of private property, but the restriction of the owner's power to use and dispose of it. Interference with the management of private undertakings is frequent; as for example the prohibition on the dismissal of workers in case of shortage of work or orders to pay full wages despite short working hours—these are a matter of course. All industries are subject to the supervision of one of the numerous Control Boards, which regulate the distribution of raw materials and thus supervise buying and selling. On smaller units (crafts, retail trade) sale regulations are imposed (*e.g.* for cake making, meat, butter, textiles); shopkeepers are forbidden to tell the buyer whether textiles contain pure wool or substitute materials. All business is subject to price control.

Industry, by order of the State, provides the fund for the stimulation of export by which German dumping is financed. Joint-stock companies may not distribute unlimited profits; they have to pay over any dividend exceeding 6% to a Reich fund. The whole business world is subject to a methodical and precise tax espionage—apart from the comprehensive dues in respect of "voluntary" social contributions. The general clause (*cf.* Law of 1934) that tax legislation is to be interpreted



in accordance with national socialist ideas makes any arbitrariness in matters of taxation possible.

The compulsory organization of industry imposes additional charges on industry by special dues and bureaucratic regulation. A more serious burden is the *Deutsche Arbeitsfront*. Originally it comprised the former trade unions; to-day it comprises workmen, employees, employers in any craft, trade or industry. It is considered to be an expression of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and the victory over the class struggle. This is not the place to describe its activities—from hygienic and æsthetic measures in the works—at the expense of the employers—to personal interference with production, sale, and revenues. In a word, the employers have exchanged the hated trade unions for the State and the powerful *Arbeitsfront*.

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It is clear that planning and interference must extend to money as well as to production.

National Socialism took over the balanced budget which had been put into order by the Bruening Government—though at the beginning of 1933 the finances of the German States (as distinct from the Reich) were weak and those of the municipalities were desperate because of short-term indebtedness.

National Socialism found the currency secure after the attack of 1931 had been overcome. Gold reserves were depleted, but a ruthless deflation policy had blocked the sources of danger, albeit at the price of a shrinkage in production.

In the deflation policy budget and currency had been looked upon as the determining factors. National Socialism did not trouble about either budget or currency theories. It subordinated finance and currency to economic considerations and all three to political strategy. The first problem that it had to face was unemployment. The methods by which this was fought, in particular by credit inflation, are known; criticism of German financial policy is mainly based on the increase in the short-term indebtedness of the Reich. But it should be observed that the increase in short-term indebtedness of the Reich is counterbalanced by a decrease in the short-term indebtedness of the States and municipalities from about 2.7 million Reichmark in 1933 to about 875 million RM in 1936.

The increase in tax yield, *e.g.*, of income tax from 1438 million RM (1932-3) to 3090 million RM (1935-6) is also of importance. Finally, the systematic transformation of floating debt into consolidated debt must also be noted.

This last-mentioned process is of great importance for private credit policy. Since savings banks, insurance companies, public and private banks have to take over Reich loans, private investment is restricted. The supervision of private banks by a Reich Commissioner—who has the right to close banks—ensures the control of the Government over banking business.

Germany has not, legally, abandoned the gold standard, but she has, in practice, if not in theory, created a second, internal currency. The rate of the official German currency is not determined by supply and demand on the international money markets; it is a clearing unit for the German share in international trade. Despite occasional lack of orders and changes in production caused by shortage of raw materials the German economic organism shows no sign of exhaustion. The lack of gold reserves has had little influence upon the currency. Autarchy has been proclaimed as the economic goal; the Government is well aware that the integrity of the currency used by the people is of vital importance; thus, solicitude for the internal currency takes first place. This must be clearly realized—despite the problems resulting from the lack of raw material and foreign currency.

This internal currency can be traced back to the beginnings of currency control in 1931. By the gradual elimination of international money transactions and by credit inflation it has been extended in scope. Psychologically, it was encouraged by the flood of amateurish currency projects which swept over Germany from 1931-33. "Artificially" the State has created credit and, with it, has had new goods produced; new credit has been founded on new goods. It is applied under the impulsion of the State. The State thus creates money, makes the currency independent of gold reserves and uses the credit funds for the production of goods—in its absolute discretion.

National Socialism has proved, like Fascism, that the authority of the State determines the strength of the currency, as soon as it has turned away from the international money

markets, just as the agricultural and the small capitalist element of the population desires it. Suppression of public criticism, confidence in the strength of the Government or compulsion exercised through that strength are psychological factors to which an impoverished people is more accessible than to the idea of a gold reserve. By a strict fixing of wages and prices and by a rigorous taxation policy the circulation of the means of payment is confined within definite channels. Money is an instrument of the State, a technical expedient necessary to increase the production of goods. And it is goods alone which are important for the totalitarian State—even if there be deterioration in quality and a general lowering of the standard of living.

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As regards German foreign trade policy, the aim is the conclusion of bilateral treaties, just as bilateral pacts are a principle of German foreign policy.

International commerce endeavours to buy goods where they are best and cheapest. The totalitarian State wants to buy from and sell to the best customer. Foreign trade is no longer, as a rule, the purchase or sale of goods against transfer of money values, but, increasingly, genuine barter. Moreover, foreign trade is no longer dominated only by economic factors ; it shows quite clearly how economics are in the service of the State and its aims, how, for example, economic ties pave the way for political alignments (Germany—Italy 1935-6, Germany-South East Europe). On the other hand, ideological antagonism has not yet substantially affected the economic relations between Germany and Soviet Russia, which appears to be in the interests of the re-armament policy of both States.

Control of foreign trade is indispensable for the totalitarian régime ; its subordination to policy is part of the re-armament effort. It is therefore a dangerous fallacy to assume that the granting of foreign loans might restore "free economic exchange" in regard to Germany and Italy and might revive world trade. Needless to say, it is not the needs of export industry or the interests of consumers which would decide how foreign loans were to be used. The Government would use them to foster and complete its rearmament. It is a



fundamental error to believe that national socialist economic policy would admit considerations of private interest or profitability. The German Government feels like the commander of a beleaguered fortress. Its policy, accordingly, subordinates the needs of the civilian to those of the military population.

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The liberal State produced liberal economics, the totalitarian State has produced totalitarian economics. Economics is a function of the government like law, science, religion. Social conceptions, social organization and certain aspects of economic organization already create closer ties between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other than between the two former and the capitalistic-democratic States. The "fight against Bolshevism" veils this state of affairs. It does not affect the anti-capitalistic and collectivistic development of German and Italian economic life.

Economic relations between the totalitarian States, moreover, are not based on money relations but on the exchange of goods and the hire of labour organized by the State (30,000 Italian farm labourers go to Germany, German workmen and engineers to Spain). Spanish raw materials for Germany and Italy and the acceptance of German and Italian products would be the price that Spain would have to pay for assistance rendered—after the victory of Franco. Its economic policy would be subordinated to State purposes as in Germany and Italy. The "dynamics" of the totalitarian State demand it.

The "Reich of all Germans" is the goal, for which German economic policy is one instrument, determined by politics. So far national socialist economic policy has been successful. The conquest of Austria has increased stocks of iron ore and timber, if it has made the corn supply problem more difficult. But the German people will starve again if ordered to do so. The song of the Hitler Youth, of the S.A., Labour Service promises the reward :

"Heute gehört uns Deutschland,  
Und morgen die ganze Welt".

## EBB AND FLOW

BY STEPHEN GWYNN

BURKE is said to have written that "the world is governed by go-betweens". Mr. Chamberlain has chosen a go-between *in excelsis*—and fortunate he was to be able to make such a choice. Lord Runciman's parliamentary career was long and distinguished, yet he might well have risen higher; for his quality was of the first rank. Without the dæmonic gifts of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill, he showed in every office that he held a lucid and determined efficiency with admirable temper. In the National Government he might well have come to be where Mr. Chamberlain is now, but for the suspicion which a protectionist majority held of those who had been convinced Free Traders. At all events, there he is now in a position of supreme difficulty and importance, and he is there with a universality of approval which is no ordinary tribute. In a sense, one may say that he is like the personage, indispensable in all Irish fairs, who at the psychological moment seizes a hand each of two bargainers, forces them together and addresses them persuasively: "Come now, you won't break my word. You'll split the differ". That procedure as a rule succeeds, since unquestionably one man wants to buy, and one to sell; it is only a matter of price, and to some extent of prestige. But in the bargainings now on foot at Prague, is there a real desire on both sides to shake hands over a settlement? This much is certain; Lord Runciman's efforts are watched with anxious interest in many regions besides those which lie south-east of the Reich. An able Swiss told me that his peaceful country was uneasy about the contagion that had spread across its border to the young. They were captivated by the spectacle of power. Even in Switzerland among the Germans, there was perceptibly a desire to join up with the phalanx of *Deutschtum*.

I asked if there was not also a contagion of Communism, and he laughed at me. In Europe he saw only the one active danger—the racialist dictatorial State.

In other parts of Europe apprehension is directed primarily to the Southern member of the "Rome-Berlin axis". If the **The Greco-Turkish pact of last April was, as "Nestor"**  
**Salonica pointed out in the August number of this Review,**  
**Pact the immediate result of European events, it has**  
been quickly followed by another pact at Salonica, for which "Nestor" felt unable to hope. The Balkan Entente, linking Turkey, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece, has come to a friendly understanding with Bulgaria. That hardy State is now freed by consent of its neighbours to re-arm and to fortify its frontiers. According to *The Times* of August 2nd, it is understood that she will now obtain access to the Ægean in the form of railway and port facilities in Greek territory. Bulgaria does not join the Entente, since that combination was formed to maintain a frontier delimitation against which Bulgaria protests; but it is clear that this group of States, which, taken together, are formidable, have moved far to avert the permanent danger of an angry Bulgaria in their midst; and that the effect of this appeasement will be to lessen greatly the chances of those attempts by Italy to penetrate this region which "Nestor" foresaw.

Every proof of co-operation for mutual advantage between the lesser States of Central Europe adds to the chances of success for Lord Runciman's peace-seeking mission; and the Salonica pact is more than a good omen. By improved relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland, the most imminent danger of war would be averted. If my Swiss friend's estimate of the danger from Bolshevism as being negligible compared with that of Nazism is shared by the Polish authorities, there should be little to prevent agreement except a long-standing ill-will. Lord Runciman may possibly effect more as a go-between in the relations of Prague to Warsaw than in those of Prague to Berlin.

As to the relations between Prague and Berlin, one thing ought to be made clear by any writer in the British press. Lord Runciman is not representing the British Government. He has been placed by the British Government at the disposal of Europe,



to do the best he can, in the interests of Europe. It seems clear that the interests of Europe preclude any extension of the Reich's territory. To give Herr Hitler one parish or one village more would probably be giving him other Jews to despoil and oppress till they are driven out on the mercy of the rest of Europe, already encumbered with the victims of his 'ideology'—blessed word.

It has been said repeatedly that one ought to avoid a conflict of ideologies. *Que messieurs les assassins commencent.* Herr

**Contempt** Hitler and Signor Mussolini make no scruple about  
**of** asserting their ideologies in Spain, and avowing  
**Civilization** their intention to do the same whenever they see occasion. We may be permitted to have an ideology of civilization and to assert that Herr Hitler's proceedings against the Jews, whose consequences the rest of the European world have in some small measure to alleviate, are a crime against European civilization.

It is perhaps presumptuous for a layman to speak on these questions of persecution when a bishop of the Established Church has called for silence. But the Bishop of Gloucester's rebuke, (dated August 3rd and published in *The Times*) of those who "irritate the authorities in Germany by the constant stream of resolutions that they pass" really extends itself to no less a person than the Pope. I shall be surprised if a good many English Protestants are not saying that they would sooner take their politics from the Vatican than from Gloucester. The Bishop's letter is chiefly concerned with the case of Pastor Niemöller. But although the treatment meted out to that gallant Christian is nauseating, he is not driven out penniless from the land in which he grew up, trusting in the protection of the laws. Europe has not as yet to provide him with a home and a living. But we cannot, and we should not, ignore the injustice which encumbers every avenue of flight, every possible haven of succour with Jewish refugees. The Bishop tells us that he finds everywhere in Germany "very great friendliness" towards England, and thinks it desirable that we should reciprocate this feeling. "The mass of the German people are in no way responsible for what we complain of. They rarely are aware of what is happening; if they know, they often

condemn it strongly". Is it seriously asserted that the mass of the German people are not aware of the measures being taken against the Jews? That, I confess, passes my powers of belief. And if they are not aware, should they not be made aware? Should they not know and feel what civilized humanity thinks on these matters? They are responsible for their own moral enserfment. They are gainers by the plunder of every Jew whose property is confiscated. It may not come to them in the form of wealth, but it comes in some other form which by their vociferous applause they have preferred. Protests have at least this value that they will make a British Government think twice before they permit any extension, whether by force or fraud, of the boundaries within which this iniquity is accepted and approved.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is well also that this public detestation should be known and noted in Italy, for the cult of Germanic models is spreading there.

**Pomp  
and  
Power**

First came the goose-step; but this introduction of the *passo Romano* was quickly followed by tentative essays in Jew-baiting. One sickens to

see an older and higher culture debase itself to the standard of a lower. Last July two Italian training-ships visited Dublin, and occasion was taken to show an official film of Hitler's reception in Italy. We saw, and it is a safe guess that Mussolini wished the world should see, the two leaders side by side. There was the Austrian, awkward and embarrassed, looking like a bank clerk who has been pushed into an assembly of highly placed and decorated persons; pushing his arm in and out with the mechanical actions of a toy doll. Beside him the Italian showed as the born *condottiere*; every movement had swing and amplitude, a supple robustness. One of the two has Germany behind him, with its Prussian excellence; the other has a new Italy—not so proven in the fire. But as between the men, judgment would never hesitate. We saw the new Italy on review, by land, on sea and in the air; certainly impressive; but what sticks in my mind is the sight of Italian regiments parading at the goose-step, doing it with the perfection that a chorus of English girls could not exceed—and then a battalion of marines swinging past with the well-knit easy rhythm of

men marching superbly. That was Rome; the other was Hollywood. Hollywood also were the multitudes assembled for the reception, cheering and waving with unnaturally perfect unison. One saw the difference as the parade of tanks and so forth went by, and people cheered and waved in simple delight at the show.

But if many felt like one Italian, who said at the time to a friend of mine in Italy that Hitler's visit after the Austrian *coup* was "the ultimate degradation of Italy", what concentration of power was needed to stage that reception—and what police precautions!

\* \* \* \* \*

Good news must have come to a great many homes when the latest regulations as to the pay of officers were published.

**The Army** Military service used to be almost a hereditary  
**as** profession in many families; since the War it  
**Education** seems that this has most regrettably ceased to be the case. The causes were economic and I should say closely connected with the appalling increase in cost of education at the so-called public schools. Now, opening is to be deliberately provided for lads educated at the cheap schools which every taxpayer contributes to maintain but which the old officer class thought it unsuitable to utilize. In some respects I think there will be a change in the traditions of the British army, and that there ought to be; but in essentials, God forbid. It was my fortune, as it must have been the fortune of many during the war, to come, pretty far on in life, in close contact with a class of whom I had known little before; and I never in a long existence met men better to be with. My experience of life was totally different from theirs; my outlook on many things was totally different; that only made the more for friendships which I valued beyond most things that life has brought. Of course there were exceptions; I only came across one, and that colonel was very soon and very rightly sent back from France. The rest had the high and rare courtesy to be professionals who were tolerant of amateurs. If it be really true that the State-supported schools cannot give the finishing touches to make a gentleman, the British Army is the best school to complete that work. For part of my life I had to help in getting youths into



the army ; later, as a temporary soldier, I came across some who had been my pupils and were now my instructors ; and either I had underrated the material or else had singular cause to admire what had been made of it.

I say this because I want to criticize ; for it must be criticism to suggest where change might be desirable. One point is about expense. There are regiments which have, and perhaps value, the reputation for being expensive. I am not sure that it is good for the service that there should be regiments conducted on that footing. The efficiency of the Guards is no legend, as we all know ; and possibly a decorative corps might usefully exist ; otherwise I see no reason why one regiment of the line should be less accessible than another to a subaltern with little beside his pay. Commanding officers in the British Army have an influence which is not easily paralleled elsewhere, and they could, if they chose, insist that young officers who have money should not make life difficult for those who have not. This form of considerate conduct—and perhaps there is no better mark of a gentleman than that he should be considerate—is not one in which the English excel. A good many colleges in Oxford and Cambridge used to be split into two by different standards of expense which lessened their social value. But a regiment is too closely tied up to be split in that way ; and I do not think that a man should have to exchange simply because he is less well off than his brother officers.—However, I speak only with knowledge of wartime conditions when these criticisms did not apply.

The other observation has to do with a tradition which forbids or used to forbid “ talking shop ” at mess. One of a very

**The Impor-** clever family spoke to me of this, long before I ever  
**tance of being** thought of soldiering. The result in practice was,  
**Articulate** he said, that there was no technical talk at all  
at any time, and no technical reading, such as every doctor or  
engineer must do daily. Now it is not easy to imagine a  
community of doctors or engineers who would bar professional  
talk at their meals. Men clarify their ideas by discussion in  
almost all walks of life ; but I heard Lord Haldane before the  
Dardanelles Commission complain that one of the difficulties  
in conducting war or in preparing for war was that British

soldiers were so 'inarticulate'. Notoriously, Haig's lack of power to express himself gave only too full proof of what Lord Haldane said before Haig was in supreme command. Perhaps the fact that Sir Henry Wilson could express his ideas gave more prominence to this soldier than was desirable.

Command, I think, ought to be articulate. It is never again going to be so simple to be a soldier or an officer as it was during the periods of stationary trench war. The British army will have a deal of complex and interesting professional subjects to think of. I hope it will be encouraged to talk about them, even at mess.

Still, the sentimental conservatism is very strong. At a regimental dinner, before the Irish regiments were disbanded, everything was, as of old; mess kit, which I had never seen before, the regimental plate and so on. "Isn't it splendid?" I heard one officer of really distinguished service say. "You wouldn't know that there ever had been a war".

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# THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

## THE LAST YEARS OF PEACE

By E. H. CARR

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR, edited by J. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. Vol. X., Part 2 : The Last Years of Peace. H.M. Stationery Office. 20s.

This penultimate volume of the series *British Documents* whose publication began in 1925 virtually brings the great enterprise to a conclusion. The last volume, covering the five weeks which preceded the outbreak of war, appeared long ago as 1926. Nothing now remains to come except an index volume, which will also contain a few supplementary documents brought to light since publication began. The editors permit themselves on this occasion the luxury of a "final foreword," in which they review the scope of the work as a whole, and repeat the pledge that no document of substance has been withheld and no excisions have been made except a few of no essential importance dictated by considerations of "personal, official or national susceptibilities".

The first temptation of the reviewer, going back on the whole series, is to wonder whether the publication of official archives on this scale will ever be repeated. The sixteen years before the War have occupied eleven immense volumes—this latest runs to more than 1,000 pages. The sixteen years after the War would probably require fifty. The universal extension of State control in economics and finance has introduced into international relations a vast complexity of new problems ; the growth of publicity has swelled the output of speeches, declarations and *communiqués*

for window-dressing purposes ; the post-War mania for treaties and pacts of every kind, if it has achieved little else, has produced a bewildering welter of documents and correspondence ; the League of Nations itself has opened up a totally new area of diplomatic activity. In the pre-War volumes the "minutes" of officials occupy a modest share of the space. Since the War, the multiplication of officials within the Foreign Office and, in particular, of shorthand-typists (almost unknown before the War) has been responsible for a growth in minute-writing which may well strike terror into the heart of any researcher of the future. Professors Gooch and Temperley may be heartily congratulated on the completion of an arduous task. But their work has been child's play compared with that which confronts their successors if ever an enterprise of similar dimensions is undertaken again.

The volume before us is not the most important or the most sensational of the series. The diplomatic manoeuvring for position when the main European groupings were still fluid is recorded in previous volumes. The tragic thrill of the weeks before the catastrophe belongs to the last. Here the situation is relatively static. The Powers have all taken up their final stations—even Italy hers on the fence ; and nothing occurs, or seems likely to occur, to move any of them. This volume is devoted almost exclusively to patient, long-drawn negotiations which were doomed to sterility and which, in retrospect, never looked like affecting the essential issue. The most important of them



are the negotiations over the Baghdad Railway, the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 about the Portuguese colonies, the negotiations for an Anglo-German Naval Holiday, and the negotiations for a Mediterranean Pact between Great Britain and Italy. On all these questions, except perhaps the Anglo-German naval discussions, the facts have hitherto not been fully revealed; and this volume, like its predecessors, therefore offers a rich quarry to the student.

Psychologically, the most interesting section is perhaps that dealing with the negotiations regarding the Portuguese colonies; and here it would be difficult to say whether the frank imperialism of the German, or the embarrassed wriggings of the British, Government leave the more uncomfortable impression. In 1898, Great Britain and Germany made a secret treaty delimiting their claims to the existing Portuguese colonies in the "unfortunate" event of the integrity of the Portuguese Empire not being maintained. In the following year, the Portuguese having got wind of what had happened, there was an Anglo-Portuguese Declaration, the so-called "Treaty of Windsor", reaffirming the Treaty of 1661, by which Great Britain had undertaken to defend all Portuguese territories. As Sir Arthur Nicolson points out in a minute, we had acquired Bombay under the treaty of 1661, so that we were bound to honour the guarantee which had been the *quid pro quo*. But a number of nice questions arise here. Would the treaty have been equally valid if it had not been recently reaffirmed? For how many years or centuries can a king's or a minister's signature bind his country? Did the guarantee apply to the Portuguese possessions of 1661, or also to possessions subsequently acquired?

At any rate, it is clear that when at the end of 1911 Germany proposed to revise the secret treaty of 1898 with a view to making it more precise, the British Foreign Office was considerably

embarrassed. But was the embarrassment due to a greater keenness of moral susceptibilities in international affairs or merely to the fact that in 1898 our interests had seemed to lie in close association with Germany, whereas in 1911 we realized that we might need as allies against Germany, those Powers (including France and Portugal) to whom the secret treaty was most distasteful? The second conclusion suggested by these documents; for the embarrassment was felt far more strongly by Sir Eyre Crowe, who was actively working to strengthen the Anglo-French Entente, than by Sir Edward Grey, who still believed in the possibility of a *détente* with Germany and who would still have liked "the division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place as soon as possible". The negotiations eventually broke down on a difference of opinion as to publication of the various arguments. But the whole episode, though barren of results, is a fascinating little study in international ethics.

The student of politics can play up and down this volume the alluring, but deceptive, game of chasing historical parallels. The Italian chapter is particularly well stocked with them. In 1912 one of the inducements for an agreement with Italy was to guarantee against the danger of an attack on Egypt from Italy's newly acquired province in North Africa. In May, 1911, "Italy wants to square the circle without exposing herself to the charge of a breach of faith: she wants to remain in the Triple Alliance, and yet not go to war with France in accordance with its stipulations". Finally, there is Sir Edward Grey's memorandum to the King of December, 1912:—

Your Majesty's Government is not committed in the event of war and the public opinion of this country is, so far as Sir Edward Grey can judge, very averse to war arising out of a quarrel about Serbia. But if Austria attacked Serbia aggressively and Germany attacked Russia if she came to the assistance of Serbia, and France was then involved, it might become necessary for England to fight.

## THE COMPLETE MAN

By DENIS SAURAT

MILTON, edited by E. H. Visiak. *The Nonesuch Press*. 10s. 6d.

THE MILTONIC SETTING, by E. M. W. Tillyard. *Cambridge University Press*. 7s. 6d.

On all major questions Milton was right. Perhaps this statement can be made about Milton alone of all the great thinkers of the past. This in itself should be sufficient to make it necessary that the book market should always be supplied with a cheap, respectable edition of Milton's works, both in poetry and in prose, as far as possible.

E. H. Visiak and the Nonesuch Press have done their work excellently; of course many objections could be brought forward; for instance we could have spared a good many useless passages in the pamphlets here given, and in exchange, the essential parts of the *Treatise of Christian Doctrine* could have been printed, much as Professor Patterson has done in his *The Student's Milton* for America. The next popular edition (but we cannot now expect one for many years, I suppose) will have to do that, as the value of Milton's philosophy is not yet sufficiently realized in England, whereas it is in America.

Part from this major error, a few minor lapses could be pointed out; but on the whole, it is useless to criticize on small things and the work, I repeat, has been done excellently. I wish, however, to protest against the assumption (p. XIII) that Milton's marriage took place in 1642. This ingenious hypothesis has not been proved. 1643 still holds good.

Milton is not only an Englishman, he is European; he is probably the best, the most complete representative of Western civilization; which is the reason why, even to-day, on all major questions Milton was right, and is right, for us. On the questions of God, of the soul, of liberty metaphysical, psychological and political, of woman, of social problems, of political organization, our present Western civilization is vitally bound to the answers that Milton formulated. We cannot repudiate any of his fundamental principles and live. This is not to ascribe to Milton an originality or a genius above the human—not at all; this is to make him, in all such matters, a normal Western man. Shakespeare was obviously a much greater poetical genius; many thinkers have been more logical or better equipped technically. But no one has been a complete man to the extent that Milton is in his work: Shakespeare gives no answer to most of our questions of to-day. Milton does. Nearly all thinkers try to drive us further into a system than we care to go. Milton does not, because he is more a man than a thinker.

It is, of course, regrettable and to our great loss, that Milton should be hard of access. That is his great fault: he requires study and perseverance and at times, in the reader, a capacity to be bored in a good cause. In this he is less human, in our sense, than we should like him to be. But such is the price, and the price is worth paying. Once we are willing to pay it, we get in exchange an infinite wealth of detail,

both in the poetry and in the prose, besides the great return of the highest kind of deliberate poetry and of a high-pitched eloquence which we hold too cheap to-day, since it is also an art.

Dr. Tillyard's book will help the general reader to see where Milton's major importance lies. To my mind, Dr. Tillyard makes out Milton more of an orthodox Englishman than I can feel him to have been; but perhaps that view is more attuned to the minds of English readers generally. Dr. Tillyard's book is always fascinating for a reader who has an interest in ideas or art. One can only wish that it may excite more English writers to enter the lists seriously and debate Milton. Milton is not sufficiently thought about or written about in England: here the Americans give a lesson. Dr. Tillyard is at present the best English scholar on Milton—and, alas, he is practically the only one. Here is a great field, nearly fallow, for the younger generation.

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**THE SECOND TORY PARTY, 1714-1832**  
by Keith Grahame Feiling.  
*Macmillan.* 15s.

Mr. Feiling's earlier *History of the Tory Party* is remembered as an exceptionally fine historical achievement. That volume covered the years from 1640 to 1714, a period of three-quarters of a century of steady and comparatively logical party development. The present volume covers a century and a quarter of intricate and often incomprehensible changes, a period when parties collided and interwove in a bewildering kaleidoscope of personal rivalries and accidents. In attempting to cover such a tract of ground in the space of a single book, Mr. Feiling has been forced to resort to such an extreme measure of condensation that his narrative is always difficult and often almost impossible to follow with attention. There is hardly an unnecessary word in his four

hundred pages: and though this is in many ways a merit, it is none the less true that a certain amount of redundancy and an occasional slackening of speed are essential to achieve that variety of emphasis without which the salient features of a story cannot be given their proper value.

Almost the first task of a historian is to decide before whom he intends to lay the results of his labours, and how much knowledge he is to postulate in his readers. Undoubtedly the easiest class of history both to write and to read is the sort once purveyed by Sir George Otto Trevelyan, whose breezy style and hearty prejudice could breathe life into the most arid materials. Mr. Feiling could have written his book in this manner, as one might say, standing on his head. He has all the necessary brilliance of style and lightness of touch, together with a wholesome dash of party bias. Alternatively, at the opposite extreme there stands Professor Namier, the historian's historian, whose meticulous preoccupation with facts and figures renders his books as forbidding as a Whittaker's Almanack. Mr. Feiling could have succeeded in this medium also. His book is the outcome of extensive researches, and his knowledge is backed by an imposing list of citations; by disdaining a popular audience, he could have claimed immunity from any accusation of dullness.

The middle course which Mr. Feiling has chosen has landed him, heavily and disastrously, between two stools. His work is far too good to be confined to a small and purely academic audience: yet his extreme economy of style, with its substitution of allusion in the place of explanation, must place it beyond the grasp of any but the most knowledgeable. Here is a random example of Mr. Feiling's manner of compression:

"The engine worked, and in July ministers asked leave to bring Pitt, Lee and Egmont into office; with the Princess's knowledge they kept up intermittent negotiations with Pitt all August and September. But their bargaining power got steadily weaker. An



unsuccessful attack on a French fleet in the St. Lawrence made war certain. General Braddock was defeated, and killed, near Fort Duquesne. The King sent home a Hessian treaty, payment for which Legge refused to pass through the Exchequer, and was making another with Russia to guard Hanover. Fox would not defend all this, if he were not given power. Bedford, though against a 'Leicester House opposition', opposed the subsidies. Richard Beckford financed a new Opposition paper, the *Monitor*, with a drastic programme of a supreme navy, a strong militia, and American federation."

that one paragraph there is material for a chapter. As it stands, only an inventive student, armed with notebook and pencil, could be expected to take all in.

The real pity of Mr. Feiling's failure is to tell his story in an assimilable way, that he has such a magnificent story to tell, and is himself so admirably fitted for the task. What a grand biography he could have made, starting with the first two Georges, and the slow recovery of the party from downright Jacobitism to serious opposition; passing on to the period of royal favour under North, converted into one of universal favour under Pitt; and ending with the two decades when a one-party system, so like our own, ruled the country with so little distinction and so much success. By casting his narrative upon a more adequate scale, Feiling would have given himself the opportunity of examining the Tory philosophy, as it survived for instance the prejudices of Dr. Johnson. Only in one chapter, where he describes the impact of the French Revolution, does he come near to doing this. Yet the revival of Toryism as a point of view, the Toryism of *Hudibras*, after the generation of the Stuart cause, is one of the most striking and cheerful subjects of the eighteenth century. For this reason, if for no other, it is to be hoped that Mr. Feiling will retrace his steps, this time less breathlessly, and devote himself to a further and more leisurely survey of the subject.

CHRISTOPHER HOBHOUSE.

PRINCESS LIEVEN, by H. Montgomery Hyde. *G. Harrap.* 12s. 6d.

As Sorel said about Talleyrand, we might well say of Madame de Lieven: "*Pour parler d'elle avec quelque nouveauté, il faut en dire du bien*".

Reaping the benefits of recent scholarship, Dr. Hyde has written a biography which is admirably impartial. He assumes the rôle of recorder, rather than that of critic or champion, and his book gives an excellent workmanlike account of the great ambassadress's life from her orphaned childhood to the glories of her days in London under George IV and her last, lonely years in the Paris of Napoleon III.

Madame de Lieven's tragedy is that her life was perforce built upon sand. Her brilliant position was always threatened by a 'letter of recall', and it may be that her trying restlessness, her irritability were in part due to her sense of the ultimate insecurity of her power.—How much more unsafe she was than a Lady Holland, a Madame du Deffand, free to go on talking for ever in their own drawing-rooms! For Madame de Lieven the caprice of an Emperor, the tantrums of a minister were enough to ruin in one day all she had built up in a life-time of skill, intrepidity, patience.

It has often been wondered how "this tawdry piece of impertinence"—thus the malicious Sneyd—managed to establish herself so securely in English political and social life. Dr. Hyde makes the interesting and valuable suggestion that the Lieven household was so important because, at a time when England was so sharply divided by party strife, government and opposition could meet there on neutral ground. That was in itself a brilliant achievement and to this day it remains an unusual one. Madame de Lieven had the art of handling people; she could please, conciliate, interest, charm. She could also snub cruelly. But Castlereagh did not confide in her merely because she was intimate with Metternich; Canning did not respond to her advances, because she was dangerous and important. The

secret of her influence was her splendid, her passionate interest in people. As Guizot once said : "*Il Vous faut une âme en face de la vôtre*".

It was discerning of Dr. Hyde to let his heroine speak for herself. He gives a vivid and coherent account of political events, though he is guilty of minor inaccuracies and some slipshod sentences which fail to make his meaning clear, but the real value of his book lies less in his interpretation than in his judicious and liberal use of Madame de Lieven's letters and memoirs. It enables us to see events and personalities through her eyes and enjoy the wise and perspicacious comments of a woman who wrote as well as she talked. But the very fullness and variety of her experience makes her a difficult subject, and Dr. Hyde must be congratulated on acquitting himself so skilfully of his task. His book deserves the distinction of being the first biography in English of this re-markable character.

H. DU COUDRAY.

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**ROUMANIAN JOURNEY,** by Sacheverell Sitwell. *Batsford*. 8s. 6d.

Mr. Sitwell knows hardly more about Roumania than when he started : indeed he knows so painfully, yet refreshingly little about the country's politics that every one of the three references which he makes to that subject throughout the book is about as wild a misapprehension as it well could be. He will probably never go back to the country again. He has paid for his holiday with fifty thousand words or so, and that is that.

But, even to someone who often wanders about East of Vienna, and even East of the great Hungarian plain, Mr. Sitwell's book is something of a revelation. He can see beauty even in tawdriness, and the macabre in squalor. He can see a vision of Hell on earth in the dreary Jew colony of Hotin on the Dniester, all tin-can huts and stink and no sanitation. And, even though you may recognize the

tricks of Mr. Sitwell's writing, the repeated allusions, the loading simile and metaphor, you must be fascinated by these his descriptions of Laetzi gypsies at the fair :

"They are known at once, as in Spain, Hungary, or even England, by their stolid insolence which is their characteristic. This tribe are horse copers, and his long whip was held in his hand, while, with the other, he munched a hunk of bread. As he has, it will be seen, an immense belt of leather and brass, almost a Cretan or Minotaur belt, which gives a magnificent, virginal figure to its wearer. This particular Tzigane had, moreover, a wall-eye which much enhanced his air of duplicity, chicanery. . . . If a Tzigane can be induced to stand bare-headed for his portrait, this scriptural appearance is very much enhanced. They are the bearded shepherds or shepherd kings of the Old Testament, and their close similarity to each other, all the men of this tribe are alike through interbreeding, makes them akin to prophets in some school of primitive painting. At the same time, as we have shown, their insolence and chicanery turn their physiognomy into the trick that they are playing upon the public. They are thieves and liars, with the look of ascetics who have fallen from grace."

God forgive us for thinking of figures but cretins and nuisances, striding with blank faces through the underwood of thin arms and distended hands outstretched by their beggar brats!

There are other experiences of Sitwell's which should be mentioned even in a short review. The monks of Petropavlosk, "a monastery where the monks were so old and poor that it was painful to see them," who, among the terrible saintliness had their Abbot's grandson "in whom the pathetic hermit of this extraordinary place resided, and who, they hoped, would return to become a monk after he had done his military service. The bird world of the Danube delta. The Skoptzi, Jewish towns of the North. Etc. etc. once do I think I have caught Sitwell being sentimental, sloping sentimental : was there really so much in that little popular song played by the popular orchestra?

A guide book proper to Roumania



as good as useless. For one thing you cannot get to half the places to which it should guide you. For another, there is so little in the land's monuments or institutions that speaks in an idiom at all familiar to inhabitants of Western Europe. An artistic description of the country such as Mr. Sitwell has written however, has an exceptional value, even though his publisher suggests that his book may rather provide a substitute for a visit to the country than an incentive to go there under present conditions. One is rather apt to overlook or not to find beauty in Roumania (except in its mountains and rivers—for which Mr. Sitwell does not care a rap) because the ugly and the ridiculous are so obvious. Mr. Sitwell finds or makes Roumania a very beautiful place—I think with perfect justice. And that in spite of missing a good deal on account of the shortness of his stay.

There are some very good photographs in the very spirit of the writing.

R.M.

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**THE BRUNELS, FATHER AND SON,**  
by Celia Brunel Noble. *Cobden-Sandersen*. 15s.

**TOP SAWYER,** by Ivor Thomas.  
*Longmans*. 10s. 6d.

The difficulty with engineers is to make them come alive. There is usually plenty of information about their work, and, strange though it may seem, many of them kept detailed diaries. The biographer, however, is faced with the alternative of submerging his subject under a wave of facts, or of refusing to be side-tracked by a mass of achievement while pursuing his main course of attempting to portray the man. Lady Noble, grand-daughter of Isambard Kingdom Brunel and great grand-daughter of Marc Isambard Brunel, accepts the first alternative. She sets out in a comparatively short book the story of her illustrious forbears, describes them, breathes fresh life into them and concentrating on their main achievements suggests that for

the rest of the acts of the Brunels and all that they did we may well look, if we are interested, in some document less human than her own.

Mr. Thomas attempts the other plan. He begins traditionally with the cottage and advances stolidly through a life of David Davies of Llandinam. That life was certainly remarkable and astonishingly successful. David Davies when he had two pennies saved one of them, and it was his proud boast that he had inspired all his workmen to do likewise. One certainly gets the idea, from his speeches, that Davies was a bit of a character, but he did so much as a top-sawyer, railway contractor, founder of the Ocean Coal Company and colliery owner, as builder of the Barry Dock and as a member of Parliament, and Mr. Thomas is so keen to tell us all about it, that our hero gets a little tiresome. It is the Smiles treatment with stories, sentimentally touching, to the advantage of the hero in question.

Marc Isambard Brunel was a Frenchman. He fell in love with an English miss, Sophia Kingdom, and although when the French Revolution came Marc escaped to America and Sophia spent a period in prison, everything came right in the end, Sophia becoming Mrs. Brunel and Marc establishing himself in England. Financially, he was often worried, but his block machinery brought him immense fame, and although he saw the inside of the King's Bench Prison, he died a knight, still holding Sophia's hand, and having built the wondrous and rather useless Thames Tunnel. It is a romantic story of hard work, failure, depression, renewed courage and immense pains with Sophia playing her part as the best of wives in the background. But long before Marc Isambard died, Isambard Kingdom was a wealthy man with immense ideas. In character he was not so lovable as his father and his greatest achievement was his ability to think 'big' and to make others do the same. He died, broken-hearted, at the failure



of his magnificent ship, the "Great Eastern" but the "Great Western" had been a success and his railways included the Great Western, opposed by some on the grounds of its possible ill-effects on the boys at Eton. This book can be thoroughly recommended as likely to interest a wide circle. It is intensely amusing in places and above all else absolutely alive. If one grouse may be permitted, it is that the only references to another great engineer, Thomas Telford, are slighting and unlikely to suggest to the reader that, at that time in our history, walked many great men.

Unlike the Brunels, David Davies never allowed the magnificence of any scheme to carry him away before counting the cost, and although he was usually willing to invest money in his own undertakings, it was rare for him to know financial embarrassment. His first adventure in coal seemed doomed to disappointment. Over £30,000 had been spent without return and he had paid off his men, unable to continue. The men agreed among themselves to work for a further week without pay and in that time they struck coal at Cwmparc, the start of a gigantic success in the Rhondda Valley. David Davies gave liberally to charity and was extremely interested in education and in the fortunes of the Calvinistic Methodists. At the coming of age of his son, Edward, 6,000 people were invited to attend the celebrations. He improved the occasion with a speech, which, given almost in full, is used by Mr. Thomas to give his readers a considerable insight into his subject's character.

JOHN ARMITAGE

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**SIR JOHN VANBRUGH, ARCHITECT AND DRAMATIST**, by Laurence Whistler. *Cobden Sanderson.* 21s.

The XVIIIth century has been called the age of the enlightened despot. It was certainly the age of the enlightened amateur. To-day the world is so

complex that it is as much as a man can do to master one branch of knowledge. For him to make a hobby of another is matter of wonderment for the gossip-writers, who gape on it as on Sir Samuel Hoare's skating or Sir John Simon's golf. The XVIIIth century was, however, an age of innocence that knew not the curse of *expertise*. In the heyday of the Virtuosi it was natural and right that a man of parts should command a dozen branches of human activity and be enthusiastic over as many more again. Vanbrugh was to this extent of the child of his age. The Captain's Marines suddenly appeared as the leading playwright of his time, this rôle as suddenly merging into that of the fashionable architect. In 1699, when the din of battle waged by the Puritan critics of the stage against "the Relapse" and "the Provok'd Wife" still filled the air, Vanbrugh suddenly emerged as a fully-fledged architect of the front rank when he presented his plans for Castle Howard. "Vanbrugh's genius" wrote Swift

*without thought or lecture  
Is hugely turned to architecture.*

It was an astonishing transformation, remarkable even in that versatile age for the legend that Vanbrugh received an early training in architecture on the continent is, as Mr. Whistler rightly points out, unsupported by any reliable evidence. "Hugely" was the *modus juste*, for this soldier-playwright-turned-architect planned on the scale which suited the tastes of the age. Vanbrugh's genius lay in his handling of great masses. He had all the defects of his qualities, however. At Castle Howard, for example, his handling of that tremendous example of movement in stone is marred by his inexpert treatment of the central cupola. Nevertheless, at Castle Howard as at Blenheim, at King's Weston as at Seaton Delaval, he aptly expressed in architecture the spirit of the great Whig Lords who were his patrons. Vanbrugh's palaces were like the owners—magnificent if something lacking in taste, fit monuments to those

products of the Glorious Revolution who had become peers without first learning to be gentlemen. "His taste", to quote the sympathetic comment of Robert Adam, "kept no pace with his genius", though his works "in the hands of the ingenious artist who knows how to polish and refine them" were "rough jewels of inestimable value".

A better comment could scarcely be found on Vanbrugh the architect, and it is on Vanbrugh the architect, rather than on Vanbrugh the playwright, Vanbrugh the leading light of the Kit Cat Club, or even Vanbrugh, extremely amateur Clarenceux Herald or Garter King of Arms, that Mr. Whistler has wisely concentrated.

The book is charmingly written with so much sense and sympathy that it is unkind to cavil. Connoisseurs of quarrels, however, will regret that the famous bicker between the architect of Blenheim and the lady to whom he finally referred in exasperation as "that B.B.B.B. old B. the Dutchess of Marlborough" lacks something in 'kick' in Mr. Whistler's description. There was plenty in the original! Also, one would like to know Mr. Whistler's authority for saying that "Capability" Brown was head gardener at Stowe. Previously it has been supposed that Cobham confined that destructive genius to the kitchen gardens alone.

But these are minor points and Mr. Whistler is to be congratulated on using so charming a monument in printed words to that "sweet-natured gentleman" for whom Seaton Delaval at Grimsthorpe is almost memento enough.

E. D. O'BRIEN

THE GENIUS OF THE GERMAN LYRIC, by A. Closs. *Allen & Unwin*. 18s.

The author of this voluminous work was brought to Bristol University from his Fatherland such an abundance of addition that this book could easily have been made unreadable. However, Mr. Closs does not only discourse to us

most learnedly about a multitude of poets, he presents us with specimens of their art for which we are most grateful, seeing that a good many of these poems are the reverse of hackneyed.

Of course in a book of this kind it is impossible for the author to please everybody. Some of his readers will be astonished that there is no mention of Birnbaum whose "Labyrinth of Love" contains so many fascinating pieces. There will be others who will scarcely agree with him in preferring Mörike, the Swabian poet, to Heine. How many lyrics by Mörike and how many by Heine have become the treasures of mankind? One would wager that when the notorious Streicher, after editing *Der Stürmer*, comes out of his office, full of *joie de vivre*, and beholds the loveliness of a Franconian morning, the song upon his lips will be "Im wunderschönen Monat Mai" and not one of the productions of Mörike. The reputation of Heine, like that of Byron, is far greater among foreigners than among his own compatriots. Of course, Dr. Closs does not belong to that pitiable class of his countrymen who deny that Heine is a German poet, because he happens to have been born a Jew, but one does not understand why he should apparently complain because Heine "continually changes his tone." That many-sidedness is one of the reasons why Heine is so far superior to his disciple, A. E. Housman.

With Teutonic thoroughness Dr. Closs conducts us through the centuries. He does not reach Goethe until 230 pages have been devoted to the Minnesingers and such personages as Gryphius and Hagedorn, regarding whom, with the best will in the world, we cannot ourselves become lyrical. There is an interesting section on Liliencron and Hofmannsthal; Rainer Maria Rilke, evidently one of the author's favourites, is considered at some length; we are invited to compare "Der Panther" with Blake's "Tiger," but that is to judge Rilke by too high a standard. The metre is too pedestrian and we are repelled by the ending of the third line,



which runs: "Ihm ist, als ob er tausend Stäbe gäbe." However, the last line of the poem describing how, when at times a picture of the external world has penetrated through the silence of the limbo, "und hört im Herzen auf zu sein"—this compels our admiration.

And there is a great deal else in these pages that we can whole-heartedly admire, and not the least thrilling are the many pages of the Bibliography. For example, no less than eleven books were consulted on a single poet, Stefan Georg, a portrait of whom might almost serve as a portrait of Gerhart Hauptmann. Amid the wilderness of authorities catalogued in the Bibliography we observe that, in the midst of the great war, a certain Herr Petsch published at Strasbourg of all places a book called "Das deutsche Volksrätsel." One is reminded of their great philosopher who went about his philosophic business at Jena in blissful ignorance that the battle was in progress.

[In his last few pages Dr. Closs discusses briefly on the poets of the present régime in Germany. We are not told whether "Deutschland muss leben, und wenn wir sterben müssen" is compulsorily chanted in the concentration camps before the inmates "attempt to escape," and are shot in the act. Let us turn to "Manche Nacht," a lovely song by Dehmel, which we are given in its entirety. "Schon versuchte in Stern zu funkeln." displays, as Dr. Closs remarks, a peculiar exactness of observation—"now a star attempts to glitter." And Liliencron's "Die Musik kommt," in the *genre* of Heine's famous Grenadiers, is most enjoyable:

"Zwei Leutnants, rosenrot und  
braun,  
Dir Fahne schützen sie als Zaun.  
Die Fahne kommt, den Hut nimm  
ab;  
Der bleiben treu wir bis ans Grab.  
Und dann die Grenadiere."

HENRY BAERLEIN.

MARRIAGE PAST AND PRESENT  
by Margaret Cole. Dent. 7s. 6d.

THE POLITE MARRIAGE: Eighteen  
Century Essays. by J. M. S. Tompkins.  
Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.

Marriage makes strange bedfellows and so does the accident of book-titling inadequately descriptive of the matter they label. Mrs. Cole's volume exactly what its banner proclaims. Miss Tompkins's, on the other hand, named after no more than the first of its six essays on eighteenth-century literary oddities, and even that one only indirectly concerned with matrimony. But just as it is, in the words of a university tutor quoted by Mrs. Cole, "a poor subject which will not get into a lecture on Roman history," so is it a poor book—a *The Polite Marriage* is far from that which will not cast some light upon broadly human an interest and institution as that with which Mrs. Cole is concerned.

The crucial point about marriage is that it involves such a peculiar personal relationship that more than any other social undertaking it demands a perpetual correspondence between its spirit and its form—a fact one takes to be so obvious that only very rigid formalists will dissent from Mrs. Cole's contention that "our ideas of marriage, families, divorce, sex-relations, etc., need to be correlated with our knowledge and views about the history and present state of our own society," and even with a broader anthropological background. Join that to her further view that "in all ages both the theory and practice of marriage have been conditioned by the position held by women in every stage of society" (a statement which can equally well be stood on its head), and both the material and the intention of her book will be evident. First a study of marriage generally, then of specifically Christian and monogamous marriage, a couple of chapters on the position of women in history (especially these last twenty-five years), an outline of the existing legal position to-day, and then four concluding



chapters—but almost half the whole—on the main purposes of marriage to-day: procreation, a career for women, sexual satisfaction, and companionship.

On all these topics Mrs. Cole writes with more general knowledge and good sense than remarkable originality, but always freshly and coolly as well as frankly. Her broad standpoint is that of the rational liberalist who would have both marriage and divorce equally free and unfettered, subject only to the barest, and most purely social, considerations. Her plain speaking will give offence only to prudes and to religious doctrinaires.

So far as any such generalisation can be true, the eighteenth century was above all others that in which form took precedence over spirit, and it is wholly characteristic that (to judge by its literature) the favourite sport of the period should have been seduction—the male attempt to achieve the sexual fact of marriage without the name, which alone was considered binding. Only two of Miss Tompkins's half-dozen essays, the title-piece and "The Scotch Parents," bear directly on this topic; in the first case the woman won (marriage), in the second the man (mistress). Both are studies of sexual and emotional relations at their most artificial and, to my mind, least likeable, though certainly not, for that reason, least interesting. The other essays deal with Dr. Downman, author of the didactic poem *Infancy*, and a kind of lesser (very much lesser) Erasmus Darwin in his flat-footed treatment of that doubtfully inspiring theme; with Ann Yearsley, the Bristol milkwoman-poet, and her wars with Hannah More; with the Peacockian historical fantasist James White; and with Mary Hays, "philosophess" disciple of Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft. Miss Tompkins is, it will be clear, content to dabble in the backwaters of literature, but she writes so neatly and with such smooth wit that she makes her readers equally content to sit with her and dabble too.

GEOFFREY WEST.

**JAPAN'S GAMBLE IN CHINA**, by Freda Utlej. Secker & Warburg. 6s.

Miss Utlej is well known as a devastating critic of Japan's social and economic weakness. Now she shows how the internal strains and stresses of the Japanese system were a major cause impelling the military to invade China. Since Manchuria had proved anything but an Eldorado, they were driven to make a further plunge in order to offer the deluded people some return for their gargantuan extravagance on armaments. It is not to be forgotten that, for some months before the war, the Army, out of favour ever since the shocking mutiny at Tokyo in February, 1936, had been in a violent quarrel with the Diet over its demands for money and its evident determination to reduce the Diet to a mere rubber-stamp assembly.

Miss Utlej emphasizes, however, that the last people likely to benefit by a conquest of China would be the toiling masses of Japan, since the big Japanese syndicates, which control all industry and finance, would no more allow the more cheaply produced commodities of China to lower prices in Japan than they have done in respect of Manchurian products.

But it remains to be seen whether any Japanese will benefit by the gamble. The new unity and national spirit of the Chinese have put an end to the old Japanese game of egging on one warlord against another, thus keeping China divided and weak; while the brutal savagery of Japan's soldiers wherever they have penetrated has ruined her chances of pacifying and establishing herself even in North China. This view, by the way, is endorsed by all who have seen the war at close quarters. The docile Chinese peasant, usually too much engrossed in the hard job of making a living to care who rules him, has been roused to a deadly hatred of the invaders which finds expression in an increasingly venomous guerrilla warfare.

Miss Utley's sympathies lead her into some serious misstatements. It is the very reverse of what actually happened to say, as she does, that early in 1937 Great Britain let Japan understand that we were willing to give her a free hand in North China if she guaranteed not to interfere with us on the Yangtze. Nor can one accept her evident conviction that all Japanese are equally tarred with the brush of the military and Black Dragon fanatics. What is apparent, even to the oldest and most faithful friends of Japan, is that her government, society and economic life have fallen in recent years into very bad hands and that the national outlook is for the time being distorted by the wildest, most pernicious teachings. Looking to the future Miss Utley believes that Japan's gamble in China will eventually put an end to the "prosperity-through-conquest myth," and then "the Japanese people will at long last be able to win its liberty and change its form of government."

O. M. GREEN.

**THE IMPREGNABLE WOMEN**, by Eric Linklater. *Jonathan Cape*. 7s. 6d.

**THE JOYFUL DELANEYS**, by Sir Hugh Walpole. *Macmillan*. 8s. 6d.

**PRINCES IN THE LAND**, by Joanna Cannan. *Gollancz*. 7s. 6d.

**AND TOMORROW'S DOOMSDAY**, by Edith Roberts. *Harrap*. 7s. 6d.

The much-heralded war arrived and, when its course threatened to become interminable, Lady Lysistrata Scrymgeour organized a Love Strike. Britain's women in every grade of society and of temperament left their men and enlisted under her. Some few, too strong in ardours or too weak in imagination, deserted or were black-legs from the start, but, when the strike spread to the rest of Europe and soldiers, sailors, workers and administrators in all the belligerent countries found themselves deprived of those solaces that war so particularly demands the cause triumphed. Mars lost and Lady Lysistrata won.

Mr. Eric Linklater has enriched his theme in *The Impregnable Women* with all his customary fertility. So terrific was the carnage of the original bombardments that the aeroplanes, the men who flew them and the men who made them became detestable things. A drone in the sky was synonymous with dread and death. Everywhere, and by the hands of their own people, aviators were butchered, their machines destroyed, their hangars burnt. Oilfields, too, were sabotaged and the petrol engine practically vanished from the air and became a rarity upon land or sea.

The effect on the individual and on the mass of the sudden cessation of every kind of traffic between the sexes is more interesting than the somewhat over-elaborate account of the men's efforts to oust the women from Edinburgh Castle.

Just for a change, Sir Hugh Walpole sets his scene in that part of London which lies adjacent to either pavement of the westerly end of Piccadilly. He also takes us into a good many houses and introduces us to a regiment of people, most of whom have door-bees that we should like to ring again.

The fear that the bell of his own ancestral home in Charles Street may one day be rung, not by a friend but by the advance guard of a demolishing gang, causes the head of *The Joyful Delaneys* to keep his beloved roof over his head by letting off the upper apartments. In one of these tragedies occurs, from others force of circumstance, causes the tenants to depart, but just when nothing seems more certain than that Delaney will have to sell—he may be sure he will not allow his huckstering brother to have a nose in the deal—the good fairy arrives and all is for the best.

Altogether a delightful book in which the episodic manner is happily used. There is good character, good philosophy, good dialogue and good "London". A dark thread of macabre lies amid the otherwise gay skein. In the establishment where the loathly Mr. Brockton—what a character for Charles Laughton



—rents rooms to elderly bachelors there are whisperings of the combined horrors of *A Man with Red Hair* and *The Old Ladies*. But these cannot be tolerated for ever in a neighbourhood where Meg Delaney lives, and she herself sees to it that they are not.

One of the many merits of Joanna Cannan's *Princes in the Land* is that, though she has not given herself an abundance of room, she is never overcrowded. A less capable writer would have taken half as long again to tell what happened to Patricia Crispin from the time she feels the childish misery of train sickness till—with her second son doing very nicely out of the Oxford Group—she buys herself a horse and goes hunting again.

Wifehood and motherhood are admirably shown as no mere routine of common round, but as things to be faced with courage and character. Inheriting these qualities from his mother, August, the elder son, drees the weird which a misalliance imposes upon him, but how little her children understand her is ruthlessly shown at the end of a most readable book.

Edith Roberts' second novel *And Tomorrow's Doomsday* ends as its title suggests. A young Serb, sent to America that he may there receive the education to make him a real leader, and not merely a waster of energies, returns to Yugoslavia and is killed in a demonstration against Fascism, about which there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the writer's opinions. To put the narrative in the mouth of a young American student is an experiment which has not totally succeeded.

KENNETH RANKIN

OFF IN A BOAT, by Neil Gunn.  
Faber and Faber. 10s. 6d.

Mr. Neil Gunn had spent over twenty years of his life working as a Civil servant. The adventure of which this book is the record caused him to resign his post and thereby abandon all claims to the pension towards which he had already contributed so many

years of labour. Whether the game has proved worth the candle only Mr. Gunn can decide. But from the book we may conclude that it has. Not merely because Mr. Gunn says so, but because the volume bears all the marks of being written by a man who, at last, has found himself.

Neil Gunn bought a twenty-seven-foot motor cruiser with an antique engine—why he did not go to the trouble of buying a boat better fitted for the job in hand he does not explain—and with his wife as crew and little or no knowledge of navigation, set off for a cruise of the West Coast and Western Isles of Scotland. Just another escapist, the reader may say; one more man who finds civilization too much for him and runs away from it. To which Mr. Gunn answers, 'Have we grown afraid to escape, become dominated by the idea of a social duty that must keep our noses to the human grindstone, the grindstone than an ever-increasing mass hysteria keeps whirling with an ever-increasing madness of momentum? Work, records of unemployment, misery, conflicting politics, wars, and the lowering nightmare of a universal war, until sensitive beings can hardly listen in to the wireless news, so grisly its tales of disasters and mass human destruction. Are we in social honour bound to increase this ghastly momentum by adding the thrust of our own forebodings and fears? or has a time come when it may be the better part of courage to withdraw sufficiently far from it to observe with some sense of proportion what exactly is taking place?' Withdrawing to a distance in order to examine in perspective has its advantages, but in the modern world the atmosphere through which we must gaze is itself so foggy that before we have withdrawn a mile or so the very object of our gaze is liable to become lost in the mist. Whether Mr. Gunn really knows much more about the antics of the world of man since he made his big decision, gave up his pension and bought his boat, is doubtful. That he knows much



more about himself (and incidentally about small boats and coastal navigation) is certain. Equally certain is it that he has written a book which, from the selfish reader's point of view, makes the whole thing worth while.

*Off in a Boat* would be a good book on any one of a number of scores. It is good as a study of the development of Mr. Gunn's "office" outlook under this new and strong stimulus of sea and coast. It is good as a narrative of the misfortunes and triumphs of a man who sets out, late in life, to unravel the mysteries of little ships with only his wife and a sense of humour to help him. And it is good—perhaps best of all—as a study of the crofters and fishermen of the Western Coast and of the small isles which go variously, the book tells us, by the titles of Egga, Ego, Ardegga, Egea, Eiggie, or Eigg, and Hii, Hy, I, Ia, Io, Y, Ii, or Iona. Mr. Gunn has a style which can add romance even to a Ford V8, and throughout his voyage he has been assiduous in the collecting and recording of local legends. From stories of the early Church down to the tale of the Skye fishermen who came back from the mainland for the first time in a motor-boat, and could think of only one way of stopping the strange new creature when they reached their home bay—they circled round all through the night until at last the petrol ran out and they were able to row to land.

GORDON WINTER

#### MISCELLANEA

#### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1918-1937.

Vols. I. and III. Edited by Arthur Berriedale Keith. *Oxford University Press*. 2s.

Of this latest contribution to the World's Classics it need only be said that the source-material brought together here is indispensable to any student of public affairs to-day. It ranges from The Fourteen Points to the various instruments necessitated by the policy of Non-Intervention in Spain

and includes excerpts from important speeches in the British Parliament as well as the deliberations of the League Assembly. The Editor's introduction is suitably incisive.

**WAR AND DEMOCRACY.** Edited by E. F. M. Durbin & George Catlin. *Kegan Paul*. 10s. 6d.

The name 'Social-Democracy' suggests period furniture totally unsuitable for the severely practical bomb-proof home of the middle twentieth century. That this judgment does not apply to the younger generation of our democratic socialists is the comforting conclusion to be drawn from this second symposium completing *New Trends in Socialism*. Clearest and best is the exposition of R. H. Crossman of what in fact is feasible for any British Government in a world where the conditions for 'collective security' simply do not obtain. "Fascism", as he well says, is in one of its most important aspects "the organized opposition to international organization", but in the face of such a menace a Labour Government would have to be no less opportunist than, the "National" dispensation, only "it should seize every opportunity to strengthen democracy in Europe, while they seek desperately to make gentlemen's agreements with our enemies at the cost of our friends". The historical backcloth is supplied by Ivor Thomas, D. P. T. Jay, 'Nationalism and Capitalism', and Robert D. Fraser on Pacifism as refreshingly sane in their appreciation of the pre-eminent importance of an ordered society over questions of justice and the first essay on 'Personal Aggressiveness and War', by E. F. Durbin and John Bowlby, together with a mass of irrelevant psychological pabulum, includes the sage observation that "while there is no unbreakable link between peace and justice, there is such a connection between peace and force". In conclusion, George Catlin who is whipper-in, indulges in some happy intellectual hunting.

**PUPPETS THROUGH AMERICA**, by  
Walter Wilkinson. *Geoffrey Bles.*  
7s. 6d.

Mr. Wilkinson's peep-show was kept waiting on the threshold of yet another volume of adventure by the American Customs, who found some difficulty in making up their official minds about a collection of puppets. Once, however, the puppets had agreed to be listed as "one stout middle-aged blonde," or "one pale minister with upturned eyes" it was plain sailing and the peep-show, appreciated by professional and amateur alike, began its triumphant progress. Mr. Wilkinson enjoyed America. He found it different, but he found it friendly; he found also, in New York, that, "anything over the fortieth floor would be too much above the battle, but at about the thirty-first you are in the centre of things, and the great City opens before you". He is at pains to point out that it is not the America of the cinema but "the America of the ordinary citizen, busy with his own life in his own home and town, the America that we wish all Englishmen could know and a wholesome, intelligent, cultivated, warm-hearted people, who exist in thousands and thousands to the gangster's one". As in all his books, Mr. Wilkinson approaches old scenes with a fresh and fragrant mind.

**MYSELF WHEN YOUNG**; By Famous  
Women of To-day. Edited by the  
Countess of Oxford and Asquith.  
*Muller.* 12s. 6d.

Including Lady Oxford herself, whose contribution is one of the best in the book, fifteen famous women write the story of their youth in *Myself When Young*. It is Miss Amy Johnson who gives us a clue to the conception of the book, admirable in quantity and quality, when she tells us that "by the standards of the publishers" she is still 'young,' for "there is no age limit to youth", although "thirty-five can be taken generally as the starting-off ground to middle-age". Childhood plays its part in most people's memories

but from childhood we are here allowed to follow early ambitions, to early, or the prospect of early, fruition. It is invidious to discriminate in this garden of early womanhood. The closing years of the last century and the early ones of the present were stirring times for intelligent women of courage. The whole professional world was tempting them with the prospects of a career and there was little difference between the impulse behind Elizabeth Sloan (Chesser, M.D.) and Miss Caroline Haslett, first secretary of the Women's Engineering Society. But much good work needed to be done elsewhere and in their various fields Miss Sylvia Pankhurst, Dr. A. Maude Royden, and Miss Picton-Tubervill had splendid contributions to make. Two contributions which well illustrate the good, but opposite poles of upbringing, are by the Marchioness of Londonderry and Miss Ellen Wilkinson. Symposia have very definite limitations, as a rule, to amuse or instruct, but this book is a thorough success.

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**TWENTY ONE-ACT PLAYS**, selected by John Hampden. *Everyman's Library*. 2s.

Readers of one-act plays and especially those readers who are also amateur actors will rejoice that *Everyman's Library* has found it possible to ask Mr. John Hampden to select twenty of the best plays under one cover to be retailed to the public at just over one penny per play. There are some old favourites, indeed nearly all the plays are well known, but they are none the worse for that and one can imagine many amateur dramatic societies ordering their copies a dozen at a time. Twenty plays and twenty authors! Lady Gregory is represented with "The Rising of the Moon," Mr. J. M. Synge with "Riders to the Sea." There is Mr. Charles Lee's charming "Mr. Sampson," Mr. Harold Chapin's "It's the Poor that 'elps the Poor" and Mr. Stanley Houghton's, "The Dear Departed." Others to have a play chosen include Harold Brighouse, Lord Dunsany, St. John Ervine, Gordon Bottomley, Laurence Housman, James Bridie and Noël Coward in a very fine collection.

**MY LIFE**, by Jean Batten. *Harrap*. 8s. 6d.

Many books about flying disappoint as they prove little more than plain tales from the air. Great flights are spectacular in performance and achievement rather than eventful in circumstance. Miss Batten proves that there are only excitements when something goes wrong and a successful flight is even more boring than a successful railway journey. Yet this is not to say that Miss Batten's book is dull or uninteresting. It could hardly be that with her magnificent record of so many solo flights; yet a book of this kind would be more attractive if the background was painted in with more attention to domestic detail. A heroine is three times as fascinating when she lives for the reader as a woman as well as for her achievements.

**LOOKING BEHIND THE CENSORSHIPS**, by Eugene J. Young. *Love Dickson*. 10s. 6d.

As Cable Editor of *The New York Times* since 1931, after nearly thirty years' newspaper service, the author of this fantasia claims to be able to furnish the truth behind the news. The book covers particularly the events of the past eight years, but contains rollicking chapter about Italy from 1923 onwards, which seeks to suggest that Victor Emmanuel is still the kingpin of that structure, and not merely timid numismatist! There is also remarkable chapter purporting to give the 'low-down' on the political aspect of King Edward's Abdication—which suggests that the author is a rather gullible person. Actually, while he is a dab hand at collating facts, and he has considerable knowledge, his ingenious conclusions are often wide of the mark. Indeed, for a verbal distillation of the imaginings and prejudices of the average American citizen in regard to Europe commend me to Mr. Eugene J. Young!

**AIR RAID**, by John Langdon-Davies. *Routledge*. 2s. 6d.

"There may never be a raid on London, but if there is, March 1938, Barcelona saw the dress-rehearsal. That is the justification for Mr. Langdon-Davies' air raid warning which is based on a far-reaching objective study of those Italo-German manœuvres, whose results, the author claims, "amount to a technical revolution"—and "made most A.R.F. literature obsolete." Under three headings—The Technique of Silent Approach, High Explosive and Panic—those grim days, March 16th, 17th and 18th, are examined in detail, with the aid of thirty-two superb—and telling—photographs and a useful map of the city. And this little volume of 144 pages must be accounted one of the most significant books of the year.



## OUR CONTRIBUTORS

*For the benefit of our many overseas readers we provide here each month a brief sketch by way of introduction of our contributors to THE FORTNIGHTLY public.*

If we are to believe the newspapers, an atmosphere of high tension prevails in all quarters which are concerned with affairs of State. The war-clouds are there—only just beyond the horizon. Holiday-makers, however, in England and in France, at any rate, “dinna wash themselves”, and THE FORTNIGHTLY, as usual, is concerned with wider and deeper issues than, say, the prospects of Lord Runciman’s mission or the tergiversations of General Franco.

Nevertheless, the Spanish war, and the behaviour of the British Government in the face of the new horrors it has brought forth, is still the centre-piece of the international situation. It has seemed desirable to examine the scope and significance, for instance, of the term ‘military objective’ used so frequently by way of defence of recent air bombardments in Spain and in China. This study of one aspect of the new aerial terror is undertaken for THE FORTNIGHTLY by J. M. Spaight, B., C.B.E., an authority on air law and strategy. After a distinguished career at Trinity College, Dublin, James Spaight entered the British Civil Service and rose to a high position in the Air Ministry, from which he retired last year. His many publications include *Aircraft in War* (1914); *Aircraft in Peace and the Law* (1919), *Pseudo-Security* (1928) and *Air Power and the Cities* (1930).

Frank Darvall, who supplies a pendant to the article by Pertinax in our July number, is particularly well qualified to assess the judgment of the various groups that make up United States opinion. He has made a number of visits to the States for lecturing engagements, and his work as Director

of Research of *The English-Speaking Union* brings him into constant touch with Americans of all sorts and conditions.

Mr. Chamberlain’s policy, the theme of Frank Darvall’s article (as of so many contributions to THE FORTNIGHTLY in recent months) seems to have become more or less sterilized—by the *impasse* in Spain and the continued manœuvrings of Signor Mussolini. That the Anglo-Italian Pact is dead seems the only possible conclusion. How ill-starred, from the point of view of Italy herself, have been Il Duce’s efforts in the sphere of foreign policy emerges clearly from the sketch of Italy’s position in post-war Europe, for which we are indebted to Count Sforza.

Count Sforza is possibly the most distinguished and best-known of Italians of eminence who have been unable to bow the knee to Fascism. His early diplomatic career took him to China, and even to-day there are few men of his rank with such wide experience and understanding of the Far East. During the War and in the immediate post-War period, Count Sforza saw clearly that Italy’s future in Europe depended upon close and friendly co-operation with the new States emerging from the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. As Minister of Foreign Affairs he was the prime mover in the first treaties with Yugoslavia which stabilized that part of a riven Europe. As Ambassador in Paris he seemed destined to secure that honourable position in the counsels of the Great Powers for which the growing importance of Italy filled her. But his hopes were dashed by the intransigence of the Fascist dictator, and since 1924 Count Sforza has lived



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quietly in Brussels, giving himself up to lecturing and writing.

The prospect of the forthcoming Assembly of the League of Nations is not exactly exhilarating. We give first place this month, however, to a probing article on the political effort of the League—which can only be regarded as a salutary douche for those who still prate of collective security. The author, **J. H. Harley** is a veteran contributor to *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, on a wide range of subjects. A former President of the National Union of Journalists, he has a long and notable record of journalistic service and was the first Press Representative of the Labour Party in the Press Gallery of the House of Commons. His books include a study of *The New Social Democracy* (1911) and *Poland, Past and Present* (1915). We are entirely in agreement with his suggestion that the term 'collective security' be allowed to fade away and be replaced by the more exact and 'necessary' term—international security.

**Norman Bentwich** is another old contributor. He will be known to many of our readers as a barrister and writer who was formerly Attorney-General to the Government of Palestine. International law and the humanitarian activities of the League are his special field of interest—he was Director of the High Commission for Refugees from Germany from 1933 to 1935, so is well qualified to estimate the value of the new initiative at Evian to try and help the "involuntary emigrants". He holds the post of Professor of International Relations at Jerusalem University.

So much for Europe. The other focus of trouble is illuminated by **W. H. Chamberlin**—representative of the *Christian Science Monitor* in Tokyo to which capital he went a few years ago after doing yeoman service in Russia. His books on the Soviet régime are ranked high among the literature which that curious political and economic experiment has produced.

The lighter side of American justice as recounted by **James Hargan**, affords relief to the dismal political picture.

**Hugh Kingsmill**, biographer of Frank Harris—a former editor of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*—contributes a useful *mise au point* of Oscar Wilde, by way of corrective to the Preface contributed to the new edition of Harris' book on Wilde by the ineffable G.B.S. The latter is taken to account also by **H. G. Abel**, until recently headmaster of St. Olave's School, Southwark, who throws interesting light on J. S. Mill, a figure closely associated with this review in its Radical-rationalist days.

Finally, we seize the occasion of the Seventh International Scientific Management Congress in Washington to survey this new—and to most Englishmen fearsome—sphere of interest. **A. G. H. Dent** has been associated with the 'Management Movement' in industry for many years. A Member of the British Management Council, he was Chairman of the British Committee for the Fifth International Scientific Management Congress, Amsterdam, 1932, is the author of a work "Management Planning and Control", and has contributed various papers to societies on management problems from a wide experience in industry.

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## THE FORTNIGHTLY BAZAAR

The 1938 report of the Year's Work at Charing Cross Hospital contains the answer given to a Yorkshireman, who asked why he should give to the Charing Cross Hospital when there was his own local hospital to support. The answer contained a list of Yorkshire people who, when they had been injured or taken ill in London, had been treated within the wards. The response to this telling evidence was a proper one, a very generous cheque. Charing Cross Hospital belongs to the whole United Kingdom. All roads lead to London eventually and there must be few who visit London who do not pass and re-pass along the streets around Charing Cross. 3,343 major operations were performed during 1937, not counting minor operations in the Casualty and Outpatients Departments; 4,941 inpatients were received, 114,321 outpatients attended the Hospital for examination and treatment; 53,193 accident cases were treated, and lastly 410 babies were born in the Hospital. All this work was accomplished at a cost of £73,861, a clear proof of economic management and sufficient indication that every penny received is wisely spent.

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The Charing Cross Hospital still needs £7,000 to pay for the re-equipment of the X-ray Department, although as a rule the Hospital seldom embarks on any scheme before they can see their way to finance it. But the Hospital will make the best possible use of every pound anyone can spare; they need every pound that their great work may go forward. It is suggested, and it is a pleasant and splendid idea, that on birthdays and on other family red-letter days everyone should celebrate by giving. It costs only fifty pounds for a cot to be named for a year, or a hundred pounds will name a bed for the same period. Five hundred pounds will endow a cot in perpetuity and a thousand pounds will endow a bed.

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The World Conference for Action on the Bombardment of Open Towns and the Restoration of Peace, organized by the International Peace Campaign was very well attended, the delegates numbering 1,000 in all, from 34 countries. The diversity of opinion and creed of those present makes even more remarkable the unanimous determination of the delegates to ensure that the Conference produced concrete and realistic plans of assistance in every sphere to the victims of aggression—thus on the one hand, a campaign for governmental action, in particular to prevent the bombardment of open towns, and on the other, the systematisation and development of food and medical aid, etc. There is no doubt that the final decisions of the Conference can serve as a real basis for the intense world-wide effort which the situation demands. There will be initiated a campaign for the supply of anti-aircraft weapons to the victim countries, the granting of loans for their purchase, and the use of the democratic fleets to protect shipping carrying food to Spain. Eye-witness delegations will be sent to civilian areas threatened with bombardment. A Peace Hospital will be founded in China, and a World Commission established to co-ordinate the supplies of food and medical aid. In every country new and striking methods are being evolved to draw wider sections into activity and to increase the supply of material aid. The campaign in this country will be launched, during September, at a series of Regional Conferences, at the moment being organized by the British National Committee of the I.P.C.



The St. Peter's Kitchens, mentioned before in these pages, are in desperate straits. For three and a half years, since St. Peter's Kitchens were founded by the Countess of Oxford and Asquith, many hundreds of men and women have been given a free meal every night. No questions are asked and no one is refused, while as many as thirty bed tickets are distributed to those most in need of a good night's sleep. In addition a doctor and two nurses are in attendance every evening to help those in distress, but an even greater work is performed by the employment officer who endeavours to find work for between twenty and forty unemployed persons every week. This is a tremendous task for many of the men and women placed have no references. That the Kitchen has been able to keep going so long is due most of all to the efforts of Mrs. Scott-Dorrien, and she appeals to everyone to send her something, however little, to keep the Kitchens open. Cheques should be sent to Mrs. Scott Dorrien, 3, St. George's Street, Hanover Square, W.1. Please help!

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There are occasions when any man may be excused for thinking that the remarkable evidence of the growth and development of Social Service activities in town and country, is the only contribution that the present age has made to civilization. Founded in 1919 for the purpose of co-ordinating and strengthening voluntary social effort, the National Council is playing an increasingly important part in directing such efforts into channels, most beneficial to the community. The report of the National Council, entitled *Partnership in Social Effort* is now on sale, price one shilling, and as it is not only a record of some fine achievements but also a serious and expert commentary on many of the social problems which affect this country, it deserves a wide sale. The report is published from the Council's offices at 26, Bedford Square, W.C.1.

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The social needs of unemployed people and their dependants continue to occupy a large amount of the National Council's time, and in this sphere of their activities close contact is maintained with the Ministry of Labour. In the first three months of 1938, 22,000 classes for men and women club members were held in craftwork, drama, music, physical training, cookery, dressmaking and formal educational subjects and over 355,000 attendances were recorded. A survey of the movement has revealed that the number of employed members of the clubs is steadily rising. In some districts they are as many as one-third and the average for all clubs in the country is 25 per cent. Nearly one half of the unemployed members of the clubs are now men of 45 and over, but of the employed members nearly two-thirds are under 35. The appeal of the clubs is primarily social; and the great majority of their members are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, whose standard of income, even when employed, is not, for the most part, high enough to allow them to be members of most of the available social institutions on terms of equality.

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Splendid progress has been made in the movement for the provision of Community centres on new housing estates, and thereby the tackling of a social problem created during the past ten years by the rapid rehousing of large masses of the population on estates on the outskirts of the older cities. Nine years of experiment and study have led the National Council to the conclusion that a solution of the social problems of new estates lies in the Community Centre and Community Association.